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This thesis deals with issues regarding income inequality between ethnic groups in 
Malaysia. Strains between the Malay, the Chinese and the Indian ethnic groups (plus 
a number of minority groups) have been the most important topic in Malaysian politics 
for several decades. Quite often the debates were a consequence of distributional 
concerns rather than religious problems, for example. The thesis analyzes the drivers 
of changes in income inequality between 1970 and 2000, the consequences of a 
number of growth-promoting policies on income inequality, and the extent to which 
soaring world prices for oil will affect inequality across ethnic groups. Before so doing, 
however, we first present a concise history of the inequality issues in Malaysia.    
 
1.1 Ethnic Plurality and Economic Duality in Malaysia 
 
The pluralistic character of the Malaysian society was inherited from the British 
during their occupation of Malaya from 1786 to 1957. The borders of the current 
country Malaysia are not identical to those of the country that became independent in 
1957. Upon independence, it contained Malaya (the peninsula now called “West 
Malaysia”). In 1963, Malaya merged with Sabah and Sarawak (two states on the 
Northern shore of the island Borneo) and Singapore to form the Federation of 
Malaysia. In 1965, Singapore continued as an independent nation. From then on, 
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Malaysia has had the borders shown in Figure 1.1, which also depicts the eleven 
states in West Malaysia and the two states in East Malaysia.    
 
While there had already been some Chinese and Indians in Malaya before the 
British occupation, the mass migration of the Chinese and Indians took place during 
the British occupation. Starting in the second half of the nineteenth century and up to 
the 1930s, the British had encouraged large scale migration of Chinese and Indians to 
Malaya, to meet their manpower needs in tin mining and on the rubber plantations. 
The Chinese immigrants were allocated mainly to the tin mines and the Indian 
immigrants generally worked on the rubber plantations. Based on the earliest 
available information (for West Malaysia only), the Malays constituted 54% of the total 
population in 1921, 29% was Chinese and 15% was Indians (see Fernandez, et al., 
1975). 
 
Figure 1.1 Map of Malaysia 
 
 
Malaysia is still a pluralistic country, with Malays, Chinese and Indians as the 
major ethnic groups. The total population of the country as estimated in 2000 stood at 
West Malaysia  
(Peninsular Malaysia) East Malaysia  
(Sabah and Sarawak) 
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23.3 million.1 About 80% of this population was located in West Malaysia. In this part 
of the country, the Malays accounted for 53% of the population, the Chinese for 26% 
and the Indians for 8%. A group of ethnic minorities constituted the remaining 13% of 
the population. The ethnic composition in East Malaysia—the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak—was much more heterogeneous. In Sabah, a diverse group of ethnic 
minorities (of which the Kadazan and the Bajau are the most numerous) had a 
population share of 72%, whereas the shares of Malays and Chinese only amounted to 
15% and 13%, respectively. In Sarawak, the Malays and Chinese made up half of the 
population (27% was Chinese, 23% was Malays). The Ibans (an ethnic minority at the 
national level) accounted for about 30% of the population and was the single largest 
ethnic group in the state of Sarawak. 
 
Malaya was characterized by a dual economic system. During a significant 
period of British occupation, two coexisting modes of production can be distinguished. 
The first mode was found—in particular—in tin mining and on rubber plantations. It 
relates to activities that were executed at a large scale and used modern technologies. 
These economic activities were concentrated in the western part of Malaya where most 
of the tin deposits and suitable land for rubber cultivation were found. The products 
were exported to the international market via the main ports of Singapore and Penang. 
The profits obtained from these activities were relatively high when compared to other 
economic activities. The second mode of production was peasant agriculture (mainly 
paddy farming, coconut farming, coffee farming, and inshore fishing) based on 
traditional methods. Products from these activities were locally consumed and were 
not intended for sale in the international market. These activities very much reflect the 
way of life in what is called “the Malay belt”, the northern and eastern part of Malaya. 
 
While the commercial and industrial sectors with modern modes of production 
expanded and increasingly clustered in the urban areas, the traditional sectors faced 
stagnation or they even deteriorated. Due to population growth, the pressure on land 
worsened the situation over time in traditional agricultural sectors. In contrast, 
                                         
1 Population censuses are conducted every ten years by the Department of Statistics of Malaysia. When 





increasingly sophisticated technologies were introduced in the modern sectors. Thus, 
differences in productivity, income and ultimately wealth of those engaged in the two 
sectors increased. Since the employment structure was largely determined by 
ethnicity, the current concerns about inequality between ethnic groups dates back to 
periods long before Malaysian independence. Under the British colonial labor policy of 
‘divide and rule’, the Chinese and Indians were segregated from each other and from 
the Malays by economic activity and geographical location.2 Over generations, the 
Chinese and Indians who had migrated to Malaysia to work in the tin mines and on 
the rubber plantations owned by the British, had been allowed to gradually venture 
into modern commercial and industrial activities (which were essentially located in 
urban areas), whereas the Malays were mainly engaged in traditional activities such as 
peasant agriculture and fishing (mainly in rural areas). The Malays were only allowed 
by the British to be involved in modern economic activities as civil servant, i.e. in the 
police and the military forces (for more information see Faaland et al., 2003). Upon 
independence in 1957, 73% of the Malay labor force was active in agriculture and 
fishing, compared to only 40% of the Chinese and 56% of the Indians (see Economic 
Planning Unit, various years).  
 
1.2 Income Inequality and Ethnic Riots in Malaysia 
 
After the independence in 1957, the new government mainly continued the market-
oriented economic policies of the colonial British. This resulted in relatively rapid 
economic growth. In real terms, the average annual GDP growth rate was 4.1% in the 
period 1956-1960, 5.0% in the period 1961-1965 and 5.4% in the period 1966-1970 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 1994). Although the economic expansion in the post-
independence period (1957-1970) was respectable, it failed to make substantial 
contributions towards solving the issue of economic imbalances between the ethnic 
Malays, Chinese and Indians.  
 
 There are two characteristics of the post-independence economy that 
contributed to the fact that inequality between ethnic groups was not diminishing. 
                                         
2 The ethnic differences were not limited to the employment patterns, but cut across almost all spheres of 
life, including educational systems, languages, cultural activities, and adherences to religions. 
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First, little has been done to redistribute wealth towards the poor. As a consequence of 
this, poverty rates improved only marginally between 1957 and 1970 and the income 
gaps between the ethnic groups widened further. This is illustrated by Figure 1.2. In 
1970, about half of the population was living under the poverty line and urban 
incomes were about twice as high as those in rural areas. The poverty rates were 
notably high among the Malays compared to the Chinese and Indians. In 1970, 66% of 
the Malays were poor, compared to only 28% and 40% for the Chinese and Indians, 
respectively. In the same year, the per capita incomes of the Chinese and Indians were 
129% and 76% higher than those of the Malays. 
 
 Second, economic power was not reflected in political power. Political decision-
making was dominated by the Malays, while the economic activities were run mostly 
by the non-Malays, as discussed above. From the perspective of the Malay community, 
the continuation of the colonial laissez-faire had only ensured increased well-being for 
the Chinese, but it had not achieved much improvement in the plight of the Malays. 
Hence, a more aggressive government intervention was called for, to enhance upward 
mobility of the Malays in education and the labor market. The Chinese and Indians, 
however, felt that the government was doing too much for the Malays. This led to the 
question whether their interests were sufficiently safeguarded in Malaysia. The 
disenchantment that had been growing among all segments of the population 
ultimately erupted in the bloody ethnic riots on May 13, 1969. As a result, economic 
policies moved away from a narrow focus on growth towards a broader set of 
objectives, in which both growth and a more equal income distribution featured 
prominently. This policy shift was formalized in the New Economic Policies (NEP) for 





Figure 1.2 Poverty rates and per capita income gaps, 1957-2005 
  
Source: Economic Planning Unit (various years). 
Notes: Figures in 1957 and 1970 refer to West Malaysia only, since data for East Malaysia are not 
available. The income gap is calculated by expressing per capita income of non-Malays over Malays. In 
1970, for example, the average income of an Indian was 1.70 times the average income of a Malay. 
 
 The NEP was succeeded by the National Development Policy (NDP), for the 
period 1991-2000. The approach towards income distribution as adopted by the 
government in the NEP was changed, especially the policies related to the Malays. The 
support now came in the form of assistance to the Malays in their competition with 
other ethnic groups, without making them rely too much on the government (see 
Economic Planning Unit, various years). A more or less similar approach has been 
pursued in the more recent National Vision Policy (2001-2010). 
 
The economic reforms have improved incomes for all ethnic groups. The 
remarkable reduction in absolute poverty in Malaysia between 1970 and 2005, 
however, was not accompanied by a significant reduction in income inequality. In 
2005, the percentages of poor people had come down for all ethnic groups, to 8.3%, 
0.6% and 2.9% for the Malays, Chinese and Indians, respectively (see Figure 1.2). The 
per capita income of the urban households was still 111% higher than for the rural 




















1957 1970 1976 1980 1985 1990 2000 2005 
Chinese/Malays Indians/Malays Urban/Rural
Poverty rates (%): 
Overall = 51.2 
Rural = 59.6 
Urban = 29.7 
Malays = 70.5 
Chinese = 27.4 
Indians = 35.7 
Poverty rates (%): 
Overall = 49.3 
Rural = 58.7 
Urban = 21.3 
Malays = 65.9 
Chinese = 27.5 
Indians = 40.2 
Poverty rates (%): 
Overall = 5.7 
Rural = 11.9 
Urban = 2.5 
Malays = 8.3 
Chinese = 0.6 
Indians = 2.9 
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Chinese and Indians were 64% and 27% higher than for the Malays. These gaps are 
lower than in the 1970s, but the gaps did not narrow much further after the mid-
1980s. These statistics indicate that economic growth alleviated poverty for almost the 
entire Malaysian population. At the same time, they also indicate that effective 
redistribution interventions are needed to translate economic growth into lower 
income inequality across ethnic groups.  
 
The low responsiveness of income inequality across ethnic groups to economic 
growth suggests that more research is needed in order to develop a clear 
understanding of the causes and consequences of income inequality. The 
consequences of economic growth on income inequality across ethnic groups in 
Malaysia are complicated and contingent. The available analytical frameworks do not 
allow for a careful assessment of the inequality consequences that various growth 
policies have on different ethnic groups.   
 
1.3 Research on the Links between Economic Growth and (Ethnic) 
Inequality 
 
Cross-country comparisons find that economic disparity correlates with ethnic 
diversity (see Darity Jr. and Nembhard, 2000). For that reason, there has been 
increasing interest in studying the economic consequences of ethnic heterogeneity in 
recent years. The growing body of economic literature finds that a  degree of ethnic 
heterogeneity induces social conflicts and violence, which in turn, affects economic 
growth (see for example, Mauro, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol, 2005). In contrast, ethnically more homogenous populations tend to 
have more equal income distributions (see Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Fum and 
Hodler, 2010). Given the negative consequences of ethnic diversity, adequate policies 
are required to ensure that the benefits of economic growth are equally shared among 
all ethnic groups. 
 
Poverty and income inequality are the two related socio-economic indicators 
that are frequently analyzed when economic growth occurs. Focusing on the specific 
impact of growth and income inequality on poverty, several studies have shown that 
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the income distribution indeed matters for poverty reduction (see for example, 
Ravallion, 1997; Adams, 2004; Son, 2007; Iniguez-Montiel, 2014). The extent to which 
economic growth reduces poverty depends on how income is distributed—the more 
equal the income distribution is, the more poverty is alleviated. For this reason, the 
relationship between economic growth and income inequality is also a key concern in 
discussions of development policy and is emphasized in this dissertation.  
 
How is income inequality affected by growth? Thoughts about this relationship 
have been influenced heavily by the Kuznets hypothesis. This hypothesis implies that 
an inverted U-shape is found if income inequality (on the vertical axis) is plotted 
against income per capita (on the horizontal axis). In the early stages of economic 
development (when incomes are low), income inequality tends to increase with growth. 
This is because economic advances are concentrated in urban sectors where average 
incomes are already higher than in rural sectors. In response to further increases in 
urban incomes, migration into urban areas will take place. The country thus becomes 
more urbanized with continued development, which at higher income levels leads to a 
decline in income inequality (since relatively few poor people will remain in the rural 
areas characterized by low wages).3 Empirical evidence indicates that the effects of 
growth on income inequality still remain unclear for developing countries. Examples 
are: Bruno et al. (1998) who find that 32 out of 42 the countries in their study do not 
reveal any systematic relationship between growth and inequality; de Janvry and 
Sadoulet (2000) and Walker (2007) who do not observe a relationship between the 
growth rate and the degree of income inequality; or Adams (2004) who finds that 
income distribution does not change much as development progresses. Differences in 
methodologies, in coverage of concepts, in definitions, and in datasets are factors that 
influence the outcomes.  
 
Most empirical studies investigating the relationship between economic growth 
and income inequality rely on cross-country data, time-series data or panel data and 
focus on aggregated inequality measures. Such aggregate measures obviously hide 
many details of inequality, for example differences across various ethnic groups. 
                                         




Attempts at analyzing income inequality across ethnic groups in developing countries 
include Shari (2000) for Malaysia, van de Walle and Gunewardena (2001) for Vietnam, 
Agostini et al. (2010) for Chile, and Bailey et al. (2013) for Brazil. The empirical 
evidence suggests that income inequality across ethnic groups is highly affected by: 
differences in incomes paid to various factors of production (capital and several types 
of labor); differences in demographic factors (e.g. educational levels and age 
structures); and differences in the presence of ethnic groups in geographical locations 
(such as rural and urban areas). A drawback of many of the studies for developing 
countries is that the standard method for analyzing inequality is based on data 
derived from representative household surveys only. The relationship between growth 
and income inequality, however, involves many aspects of the economy that are linked 
to each other, such as domestic production structures, international trade, allocation 
of factors of production, tax structures, and institutional structures. Analyses based 
on household surveys only cannot capture these aspects and their links and are 
therefore unable to take into account how different ethnic groups are interconnected 
and interact with the rest of the economic system (see Round, 2003; Pieters, 2010). In 
response to the economic expansion, for example, incomes of ethnic groups are likely 
to be affected differently, as a consequence of different labor market participation of 
ethnic groups and differential growth rates of the production sectors in which people 
are employed, and reinforced (or dampened) by interdependencies among these 
sectors.  
 
The studies in this thesis apply an economy-wide approach that links 
production sectors, factors of production, domestic institutions and external sectors to 
each other in a single consistent framework, the social accounting matrix (SAM). The 
main purposes of this thesis are to quantify the sources of inequality in Malaysia and 
to estimate and predict the consequences of past and current growth policies on 
income inequality among ethnic groups in this country. More specific questions that 
will be addressed are the following. How much of the inequality across ethnic groups 
is contributed by the functional distribution of income over the various factors of 
production? To what extent did the economic transformation and structural changes 
between 1970 and 2000 lead to income growth for all ethnic groups, and did it 
translate into a reduction in inequality? Given the current economic structure, is there 
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a conflict between promoting a pro-poor sectoral policy and promoting a pro-growth 
sectoral policy, taking full account of the (e.g. input-output) linkages between sectors? 
Does the current policy of deregulation of the domestic petroleum price induce 
distributional shifts between ethnic groups, and—if so—do these reduce inequality? 
Answers to these questions are based on a new SAM and are relevant for the policy 
debate on how to address income differences across ethnic groups in Malaysia.  
 
It should be emphasized that the problems sketched above surface in many 
developing countries with a heterogeneous population. Malaysia has been chosen as a 
focal point of discussion for two main reasons. First, Malaysia’s income distribution is 
very different from that of other developing economies, such as Vietnam (see van de 
Walle and Gunewardena, 2001) and Chile (see Agostini, et al., 2010). In these 
countries, minority groups earn substantially lower incomes, while in Malaysia the 
largest ethnic group earns low incomes. Second, an analysis that encompasses many 
mechanisms relevant to study the links between growth and income inequality 
requires a detailed dataset. Malaysia has a rich dataset with household-based surveys 
that include information on ethnic groups across geographical locations. These 
surveys were essential in constructing the Social Accounting Matrix on which the 




This thesis consists of five chapters aimed at answering the research questions 
formulated above. SAMs play an essential role in every chapter. Chapter 2 describes 
the construction of a new SAM for Malaysia in 2000 and derives some key figures 
regarding inequality across ethnic groups in rural and urban Malaysia. Chapter 3 
quantifies the sources of income growth and inequality changes over a period of 30 
years, by comparing the 2000 SAM with a 1970 SAM constructed by Pyatt and Round 
(1984). Chapters 4 and 5 use the 2000 SAM for analyzing the impacts of specific 
industrial and energy policies. In what follows, the chapters are briefly discussed. 
 
 Chapter 2 quantifies to what extent the distribution of incomes paid to different 
types of factors of production is responsible for ethnic inequality. In this chapter, the 
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general structure of the SAM in 2000 and the disaggregation of accounts (in particular 
for factors of production and household groups) are explained in detail, along with the 
estimation procedures. The standard monetary SAM has also been extended by linking 
it with non-monetary satellite accounts, which contain information for population size 
and employment data (such as working hours) in a consistent way. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the sources of income growth and inequality between 1970 
and 2000. The analyses in this chapter quantify the extent to which the economic 
transformation and structural change between 1970 and 2000 has reduced income 
inequality. For this purpose, a  structural decomposition analysis (SDA) framework is 
developed and applied to the SAMs of 1970 (derived from Pyatt and Round, 1984, and 
expressed in prices of 2000) and 2000. This technique is able to identify the 
underlying exogenous causes of the growth of incomes and thus income inequality. 
Examples of such exogenous causes are changes in input-output coefficients and 
export growth. 
 
 Chapter 4 provides the first application of the 2000 SAM for the assessment of 
growth policies. The empirical analysis addresses two related issues. First, it analyzes 
the link between sectoral growth and poverty reduction, quantifying the extent to 
which increasing output of a sector (as a consequence of pro-growth policies) reduces 
poverty rates (pro-poor outcomes).  The second part of this chapter analyzes 
opportunities to reduce poverty in one sector by targeting growth in another sector (or 
other sectors), as a consequence of intersectoral linkages. For this purpose, an 
extended SAM multiplier decomposition analysis is developed. 
 
 Chapter 5 uses the 2000 SAM for energy policy assessment. The recent 
petroleum price hikes have compelled developing countries (including Malaysia) to 
increase domestic petroleum prices—through an elimination of some energy 
subsidies—to fight budget deficits. The aim of this chapter is to examine what effects 
such deregulations of domestic petroleum prices have had for the income distribution 
over ethnic groups in Malaysia. This income distribution might be sensitive to such 
changes since households do not have identical consumption bundles. An extended 
SAM model is introduced, which not only incorporates substitution possibilities among 
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production inputs and consumption goods, but also allows for the exogenous 
determination of the price of an intermediate input. The model is calibrated using data 
from the 2000 SAM, after which simulation analyses are conducted.  
 
 The final chapter summarizes the main findings of this study and provides 
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Construction of a New Social Accounting Matrix and 






A social accounting matrix (SAM) is a framework that is widely used for the analysis of 
income distribution in a socio-economic system. It is related to the National Accounts, 
but typically incorporates whatever degree of detail is required for special interests. 
The principal goal in constructing a SAM is to integrate elements of the income 
distribution into a single coherent accounting framework. In the past, several SAMs 
have been constructed for developing countries, aiming at a quantitative approach to 
combating poverty and reducing income inequality. See for example Pyatt and Roe 
(1977) for Sri Lanka, and Pyatt and Round (1984) for Malaysia, while recent work 
includes Tarp et al. (2003) for Vietnam and Yusuf (2006) for Indonesia. The SAM for 
Malaysia, which is constructed in the present study, is designed to serve as a 
comprehensive data framework for the quantitative analysis of the income distribution 
across ethnic groups, both in the rural and in the urban areas2.  
                                          
1 A shorter version of this chapter is published in Asian Economic Journal, volume 28, page 259-278, 
2014 (joint with Erik Dietzenbacher and Bart Los). 
2 The major ethnic groups are: the Malay (indigenous, 61% of the population in 2005), the Chinese (26%), 
the Indian (8%) and a group of other ethnic minorities (5%). 
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The issue of (in)equality in income distribution has been subject of discussion 
in Malaysia in the past four decades. The ethnic riots in May 1969 highlighted the 
dangers that are inherent in a multi-racial society when ethnic prejudices are 
exacerbated by economic disparities. In fact, it has been recognized that income 
inequality is the crucial factor leading to social conflicts and political instability (see 
Nagel, 1974, Muller, 1988a;b, Thorbecke and Charumilind, 2002). Consequently, the 
economic development policies in Malaysia have been shaped by the government since 
1970. The commitment of the government is to ensure that benefits of economic 
growth and development are equally shared among all Malaysians.  
 
The growth and structural transformation of the Malaysian economy in the 
period 1970-1990 narrowed the gap in the per capita income between the three major 
ethnic groups. Setting the income of the Malays at 100, the (index for the) income of 
the Chinese decreased from 229 to 174, and of the Indians from 177 to 129 (Economic 
Planning Unit, various years). This trend of reducing the inequality in income 
distribution has come to a halt, despite the fact that the country enjoyed a higher 
economic growth than in the decades before.3 For instance, in 2002, the per capita 
income of the Chinese was indexed at 180 and that of the Indians at 128 (setting the 
per capita income of the Malays at 100 again). This suggests that the recent growth 
and development has not automatically led to further improvements in terms of 
income distribution. In the literature, it has long been recognized that promoting high 
growth rates and rapid industrialization in developing economies, may shift the 
income distribution in favor of the high-income group, while it is detrimental for the 
low-income group (see Adelman, 1975). 
 
Under the current Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010), the government continues 
to pursue a development policy that aims at more economic growth combined with a 
more equal distribution of income across ethnic groups. In order to achieve this goal, 
distributional policies need to be carefully designed and monitored. This requires a 
comprehensive data system that integrates the production structure and the social 
accounts. A social accounting matrix (SAM) is such a framework and the present 
                                          
3 The economy grew annually with an average rate of 6.7% in the period 1970-1990 and with 7.0% in the 
period 1991-2002 (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2004). 
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study constructs a SAM for Malaysia with special focus on the generation and 
distribution of income across ethnic groups, both in rural and in urban areas.  
  
The Malaysian SAM is constructed by applying a top-down approach, which 
seems appropriate in the current situation where data coverage is incomplete due to 
limited resources. Our starting point is an aggregate SAM which is compiled from 
aggregate national statistics. Next, the figures in this aggregate SAM are taken as 
given (or known exactly). Consequently, the estimates for the disaggregated accounts 
of each sector must be in line with the aggregate SAM in order to arrive at a consistent 
SAM. Data from multi-purpose surveys such as a household income survey and a 
household expenditure survey are used for the construction (and estimation) of the 
disaggregated SAM accounts. We will use the SAM to analyze the distribution of 
income across ethnic groups. Linking the data on income to data (from other sources) 
on population and employment, for example, allows us to search for the causes of the 
unequal income distribution. 
 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 provides a general outline of 
our SAM for Malaysia in 2000, gives the definition of the household groups in the 
household accounts, and explains the other accounts in some detail. Section 2.3 
describes the top-down approach that we have used and discusses the reasons for 
choosing the top-down approach instead of the bottom-up approach. The basic data 
requirements and the major constraints in the process of assembling the accounts are 
discussed in Section 2.4. The analysis of the distribution of income across ethnic 
groups derived from the SAM is presented in Section 2.5. Given the availability of a 
SAM for Malaysia in 1970, we discuss the overall changes in the income distribution 
between 1970 and 2000 in Section 2.6. Finally, concluding remarks and some 





2.2 Structure of the SAM for Malaysia, 2000 
 
The first SAM for Malaysia was developed for 1970 in a collaboration of the Malaysian 
government with the World Bank (see Pyatt and Round, 1984). A distinction was made 
between Peninsular Malaysia in the west and the states of Sabah and Sarawak in the 
east (see Chander et al., 1980, and Pyatt and Round, 1984, for a more detailed 
description). In terms of the design and construction methodology, the present SAM 
shows a certain similarity to the 1970 SAM. However, there are also several distinctive 
features. First, instead of distinguishing between West and East Malaysia, the present 
study distinguishes between urban and rural areas. Although most urban areas are in 
West Malaysia, while East Malaysia is essentially rural, there are ample rural areas in 
West Malaysia.4 Second, the classifications used in the production, the household and 
the factors of production accounts are at a much more disaggregated level. Third, in 
comparison to the 1970 SAM, we have been able to use underlying data that are better 
in terms of quantity and quality. For example, the 2000 SAM distinguishes three levels 
of education, introduces the group of non-citizens, and includes 92 (instead of 59) 
production sectors. 
 
2.2.1 General structure 
 
A schematic representation of the accounting structure in the 2000 Malaysian SAM is 
given in Table 2.1. Following the conventional approach, receipts are recorded in row i 
for actor i (e.g. a group of rural households, one of the production activities, or owners 
of capital). The actor’s outlays are given as expenditures in column j. Corresponding 
row and column totals of the matrix must be equal to each other, consistent with the 
bookkeeping idea that the sum of receipts (incomes) equals the sum of outlays 
(expenditures) for each account. In the present SAM, nine groups of accounts are 
distinguished, the first three of which are further disaggregated into 92, 27 and 9 sub-
accounts, respectively.  
 
The first account is for the production activities and their income stems from 
the sales of commodities which are domestically produced. As shown in the first row of 
                                          
4 For the 1970 SAM, disaggregation into rural and urban areas was only possible for West Malaysia. 
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Table 2.1, they include intermediate demand from other production activities in cell 
(1,1), consumption by households (1,3) and government (1,5), investments (1,6), and 
exports (1,7). The expenditures comprise payments for domestically produced 
intermediate inputs (1,1), value added (2,1) and imported inputs (7,1). The indirect 
taxes on the expenditures for inputs (no matter whether domestically produced or 
imported) are shown separately in cell (9,1).  
 
The second account is for the factors of production, which comprises various 
types of labor and capital. The factors receive income from domestic production 
activities as well as from abroad. The transactions are recorded in cells (2,1) and (2,7) 
of Table 2.1. The expenditures of the factors comprise three elements. First, labor pays 
the compensation of employees to the households.5 Second, capital pays the operating 
surplus partly to the households and partly to the companies.6 Third, part of the 
factor incomes are paid abroad. The corresponding transactions are recorded in cells 
(3,2), (4,2) and (7,2).  
 
Conventional practice is to split the accounts for institutions into three 
categories: households, companies and the government. The primary income for 
households and companies are the factor incomes. Factor incomes received by 
households include the compensation of employees and unincorporated business 
profits (3,2), while companies receive corporate business profits (4,2). In addition, 
households receive the following secondary incomes: distributed profits from 
companies (3,4); current transfers from the government in the form of pensions and 
periodical payments (3,5); and social benefits from abroad (3,7). Similarly, secondary 
                                          
5 Compensation of employees includes remuneration (in cash or in kind) payable by the production 
activities to employees in return for work done during the accounting period. The components of 
compensation of employees comprise wages and salaries, allowances and other payments received in 
kind. 
6 The operating surplus measures the surplus accruing from production before taking account of any 
interest, rent or similar charges payable on financial or non-produced tangible assets borrowed or rented 
or owned by an enterprise (i.e. a company) or an unincorporated enterprise (i.e. a household). In our 
study, households receive part of the operating surplus in the form of unincorporated business profits 




incomes that companies receive are: transfer payments from the government, i.e. 
current transfers in (4,5); and from abroad, i.e. non-factor incomes from abroad in 
(4,7). The government income (revenue) is mainly derived from tax revenues. Direct 
taxes are: income taxes paid by households (5,3); and corporate taxes paid by 
companies (5,4). The indirect tax receipts in (5,9) are included as a government receipt 
from the separate indirect tax account. The government also receives current transfers 
from abroad (5,7) in the form of non-factor incomes.   
 
The next account is a consolidation of the capital accounts. It shows that 
capital in the economy is built up of savings by the three major domestic institutions: 
household savings (6,3); corporate savings for the companies (6,4); and government 
savings (6,5). Separate current and capital accounts are distinguished for the rest of 
the world (RoW). The expenditures of RoW, such as the payments for the exports of 
Malaysian goods and services, are listed in column 7 with the current account for 
RoW. The income received by RoW comprises (Malaysian) payments for imports of 
goods and services as inputs into the production process (7,1), or as final goods for 
consumption by households (7,3) or by the government (7,5), or as capital goods for 
investments (7,6). In addition there are the factor (7,2) and the non-factor incomes 
paid abroad (7,4). The Malaysian balance of payment of the current account is shown 
as a payment of the capital account of the RoW to the current account of the RoW 
(7,8). Note that if Malaysian “exports” are larger than its “imports” the balance of 
payments will show a surplus. This implies that its counterbalance, i.e. Malaysian net 
investments abroad in (8,6), is positive. The last account in the Malaysian SAM 
includes the indirect taxes. These are commodity taxes (9,1), sales taxes (9,3), taxes on 
imported capital goods (9,6), and a levy on exports (9,7). The total receipt of indirect 
taxes is part of the government’s income (5,9). 
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Table 2.1 Schematic SAM for Malaysia, 2000 
     Expenditures  
     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
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Notes: *Non-factor incomes paid abroad by the government are included in the consumption of imported commodities. [ ] Indicates the number of 
sub-accounts for the corresponding account. 
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2.2.2 Disaggregation for Income Distribution Analysis 
 
SAMs provide a flexible framework which allows users to choose an appropriate setup 
and level of detail of the accounts, depending on the topic of interest and the specific 
questions that are to be answered. For our purpose of studying income distribution, it 
seems crucial to have a detailed disaggregation of the household sector. Changes in 
production transmit to different households (via factor markets and distribution and 
redistribution channels) in a different way. In this study, nine categories of households 
are distinguished based on the citizenship status, ethnicity and geographical location. 
 
The first distinction of households is made between citizens and non-citizens. It 
is important to distinguish between these two categories because, recently, the 
number of foreign workers has significantly influenced the composition of the domestic 
labor force. The registered growth of foreign workers in the period 2001-2005 was 
18.8%, whereas the growth of local workers was only 1.5% (Economic Planning Unit, 
2006). Most of the foreign workers in Malaysia are from Indonesia, Bangladesh and 
the Philippines, and are employed in plantations and farms, and various 
manufacturing sectors.  
 
The households with a Malaysian citizenship are further disaggregated 
according to socio-economic characteristics rather than income levels (which is the 
common distinction). Pyatt and Thorbecke (1976) already suggested strongly to base 
household classifications on location, sociological considerations and wealth. In a 
pluralistic country like Malaysia, it is considered important to distinguish between the 
four major ethnic groups. These are Malays, Chinese, Indians and Other (comprising 
dozens of ethnic minority groups which are mostly located in East Malaysia, such as 
groups of Iban, Kadazan, Bajau, Murut, Suluk). This disaggregation is important, in 
particular from a policy perspective, because the recent development strategy of the 
government includes specific concerns for the standard of living among these socio-
economic groups. Each of the four ethnic groups is further disaggregated according to 
geographical location, distinguishing between rural and urban areas. The geographical 
criterion is useful because the distinction between urban and rural citizens captures 
many aspects of duality. For example, households with otherwise similar 
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characteristics are quite likely to be paid different wages and generally exhibit a 
different socio-economic behavior (such as a different pattern of consumption 
expenditures). All in all, this leads to (2×4 + 1 =) nine different household groups. 
 
In the accounts for the factors of production, a distinction is made between 
labor and capital. The criteria for classifying labor and households are inevitably inter-
related given the fact that characteristics of individuals are the essential ingredients 
common to both sets of accounts. Therefore, the classification of labor types in the 
Malaysian SAM study is similar to the household classification (i.e. citizenship status, 
ethnicity and geographical location). In addition, the eight citizen groups are 
subdivided according to education level, i.e. low, medium, and high.7 This distinction 
between education levels, which proxies skills, is relevant in explaining income 
differences (see e.g. Pieters, 2010). All in all, this leads to (2×4×3 + 1 =) 25 different 
labor types. The factor capital is split into two categories: unincorporated business 
profits (which go to households) and corporate business profits (which go to the 
companies). 
 
  For the production account (and its splitting up) of our SAM framework, we 
have used the 2000 input-output table (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2005), 
which classifies the production activities into 92 sectors. The remaining six accounts 
in the SAM are all in an aggregate form. Therefore, taking together, the total amount of 
accounts in the SAM is 134 (= 27 + 92 + 9 + 6). 
 
  
                                          
7 Education levels are based on certificates obtained from school, college or university. Those who do not 
have any formal education or a primary school certificate are in the low education category, those with 
secondary school certificates (e.g. L.C.E., M.C.E. or H.S.C.) are in the medium education category, while 
those with at least a diploma or degree are in the high education category.  
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2.3 The Top-Down Approach  
 
Essentially, two approaches have been applied by practitioners to build a SAM, i.e. the 
top-down and the bottom-up approach. The top-down approach starts by building a 
highly aggregated SAM, based on available information from the national statistics. 
Then, the data in the aggregate SAM are used as control values when estimating the 
details of the separate SAM accounts. In contrast, the bottom-up approach estimates 
the separate SAM accounts at a disaggregated level and obtains the aggregate level of 
an account by simple consolidation (i.e. summing up). Because ‘control values’ are 
absent in the bottom-up approach, substantial discrepancies may arise between the 
aggregate level (obtained after consolidation) and the official national statistics. In 
building their SAMs, Pyatt and Round (1984), Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992), and 
Roland-Holst and Sancho (1992) adopted the top-down approach, whereas Keuning 
and de Ruijter (1988) and Jabara et al. (1992) favored the bottom-up approach.  
 
In our study, we have used the top-down approach for three reasons. First, the 
choice of technique for constructing a SAM, obviously depends on the availability of 
data. Of course, if abundant information from survey data (e.g. for households, other 
institutions, industries and companies) is available, the bottom-up approach is 
preferred over the top-down approach. Unfortunately, lack of data is a common 
constraint in most developing countries. Second, the top-down approach is cost-
effective due to the fact that it only requires a relatively short period to construct a 
balanced SAM. This applies, even if we take into account that usually more time is 
required than anticipated because the raw data provided by authorities are typically 
not readily available in the formats that are needed. Third, the top-down approach 
yields a SAM that is (in its aggregated form) perfectly in line with the official statistics. 
 
The starting point for applying the top-down approach is given by the 9×9 
matrix in Table 2.2 which depicts the aggregate SAM. It was used as the baseline to 
estimate several individual accounts in more detail. This table provides a summary of 
the Malaysian economy in 2000 and is compiled on the basis of information that is 
publicly available. Table 2.2 distinguishes four quadrants. The north-west quadrant 
contains numbers, each of which is the aggregate (or consolidation) of a matrix Mij. In 
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the same fashion, the north-east quadrant contains the aggregates of the column 
vectors Cij and the south-west quadrant contains the aggregates of the row vectors Rij. 
In the next step of the top-down approach, each of these aggregates was disaggregated 
into matrices and vectors. The south-east quadrant contains scalars Sij that remained 
scalars, requiring no further disaggregation. 
 
In estimating the elements of the matrices Mij and the vectors Cij and Rij, the 
numbers in Table 2.2 were considered as fixed control values for their aggregates. For 
example, the estimates in the matrix M11 were obtained from the Malaysian input-
output table and the aggregated intermediate deliveries are equal to the control value 
of 293.34 billion MR (Malaysian Ringgit), which also stems from the input-output 
table. In some cases, however, the estimates in the disaggregated accounts had to be 
adjusted so as to match the corresponding control value in order to yield a consistent 
SAM. That is, the aggregated value of the estimates had to be made equal to the 
control value. This applied, in particular, when handling the accounts for the factors 
of production and the households. The reason is that the estimates of the 
disaggregated accounts were obtained from multi-purpose surveys—such as the 
household income survey (HIS, see Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2001a) and the 
household expenditure survey (HES, see Department of Statistics Malaysia, 
2000a;b)—which are not consistent with the control value. Clearly, this is a common 
problem when two or more different sources of data are combined in a single 




Table 2.2 Aggregate SAM (control values) for Malaysia, 2000 (MR billion) 
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  









      Households Companies Government Current Capital 
1 Production activities 293.34 [M11]1  116.58 [M13]1  34.86 [C15]1 52.66 [C16]1 399.38 [C17]1   896.82 










 Households  141.40 [M32]1  10.89 [C34]2 3.70 [C35]4  0.03 [C37]5   156.02 
4 Companies  153.93 [R42]1   1.94 [S45]6  2.66 [S47]5   158.53 
5 Government   9.05 [R53]2 20.00 [S54]2   0.49 [S57]5  21.16 [S59]1 50.70 





 Current 271.45 [R71]1 36.80 [R72]3 18.09 [R73]5 10.39 [S74]5 0.93 [S75]5 41.69 [S76]1  32.81 [S78]6  412.16 
8 Capital      32.81 [S86]6    32.81 
9 Indirect taxes 8.41 [R91]1  9.89 [R93]1   1.77 [S96]1 1.09 [S97]1   21.16 
 Total 896.82 332.14 156.02  158.53  50.70  128.94  412.16  32.81  21.16  2,189.28 
Notes: superscripts indicate the data sources: (1) Department of Statistics Malaysia (2005); (2) Department of Statistics Malaysia (2004); (3) 






 As an example, consider the estimation of the value added payments from the 
production activities (M21). The factor labor receives income in the form of 
compensation of employees while capital receives the operating surplus. On the one 
hand, the total compensation of employees (and also the operating surplus) was 
obtained directly from the input-output table, for each of the 92 production activities 
(i.e. industries, or sectors). These were taken as control values. On the other hand, the 
compensation of employees could be disaggregated into 25 categories of workers 
(according to the citizenship status, geographical location, ethnicity and education 
level) for each of the 92 sectors on the basis of the HIS. Because the compensation of 
employees from the HIS is inconsistent with the totals from the input-output table 
(which were taken as control values), the estimates based on the HIS were adjusted.  
 
2.4 Data Requirements and Problems  
 
2.4.1 Data requirements 
 
There is no optimal sequence for proceeding in the construction of a SAM. A good 
starting point, however, is to begin with the production accounts because a SAM is an 
extension of the input-output table. Not only does the input-output table provide all 
data for the production account, it also contains most of the other basic data 
requirements. For instance, it reports the aggregate sectoral values added and the 
household consumption of commodities, which yield the column sums of matrix M21 
and the row sums of M13 in Table 2.2, respectively. In the present study, we have 
constructed the Malaysian SAM for 2000, because this is the year for which the most 
recent input-output table—the major source of data—is available. The input-output 
table contains 92 industries and was compiled by using a new industrial 
classification, the Malaysia Standard Industrial Classification (MSIC, see Department 
of Statistics Malaysia, 2000c). The MSIC follows the latest International Standard 
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC).  
 
 Taking the input-output table as the basis for the construction of the SAM, the 
main tasks that remain are the disaggregation of primary income by factor types and 
by household groups. For these purposes, the HIS and the HES are the essential data 
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sets. The HIS and HES are multi-purpose household surveys that are conducted to 
gather detailed information on income and expenditures of households, taking 
demographic characteristics across socio-economic groups into account. The HIS 
contains labor force characteristics of household members and was mainly used for 
disaggregating the sectoral factor incomes from production activities (M21) and for the 
distribution of factor incomes over households (M32). It was also used to estimate the 
transfer payments to households from the companies (C34), the government (C35), and 
the rest of the world (C37). A third part where the HIS was employed was the 
estimation of the details of certain expenditure categories of the households, such as 
direct taxes (R53), savings (R63), consumption of imported goods (R73) and indirect taxes 
(R93). The consumption of domestically produced commodities by household groups 
(i.e. M13) was estimated from the private consumption data in the HES. 
 
 A practical issue that arises during the compilation of the household account, is 
that an appropriate statistical unit needs to be chosen for classifying households 
according to their socio-economic status. The household head and the main earner are 
the statistical units that are usually applied (e.g. Lewis and Thorbecke, 1992, or Llop 
and Manresa, 2004, have used the household head, while Chander et al., 1980, or 
Keuning and de Ruijter, 1990, have opted for the main earner). In both cases, the 
incomes of all household members are attributed to a single person. In terms of 
incomes, it thus makes little difference whether households are classified by 
household head or by main earner. For other socio-economic characteristics, however, 
it may make a difference. In particular in employment statistics, the selected 
statistical unit should—ideally— represent a large proportion of employment. For 
instance, Chander et al. (1980) prefer to use the main earner because the proportion 
with an “active employment” status is much larger than for the household head. Also 
in the present study, we will classify households on the basis of the main earner. 
 
The south-east quadrant of the SAM only includes data at an aggregate level as 
represented by the scalars Sij. They are with respect to external transactions, savings 
and inter-institutional transfers, and information was obtained from various sources. 
For instance, a complete balance of payment account is necessary to provide 
information on the income flows and transfers between the domestic economy and the 
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rest of the world, comprising both the current and the capital account. Data for 
domestic savings and investments were obtained directly from the national account 
statistics (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2004; 2006). Other data sources were 
the Ministry of Finance (various years) and the International Monetary Fund (2004), 
both of which also provided unpublished material to estimate some of the SAM 
accounts. For instance, unpublished Ministry of Finance data were used for the 
government transfers. 
 
2.4.2 Problems related to data 
 
The major problems that arise during the compilation process are due to issues of 
classification, to inconsistent data and to lacking data. Most of these problems are 
encountered when assembling the factor, the household and the government 
accounts. The ultimate cause is that the data that are used to construct the SAM 
come from different sources. At least two kinds of errors cause differences across 
sources. First, if data are based on surveys with a coverage of less than 100% of all 
relevant entities (companies, households, etc.), sampling errors are unavoidable. 
Second, even data from full surveys (like censuses) will never be free from 
measurement error. The estimates of many SAM cells rely on a hybrid combination of 
different information sources and thus contain sampling as well as non-sampling 
errors (Thorbecke, 2003).  
 
Classification problems were encountered when dealing with the factor and the 
household accounts. In order to be in line with the United Nations system of 
classifying economic activities (1993), the Department of Statistics Malaysia adapted 
its framework for collecting and compiling industrial activities. Starting in 2000, it 
adopted the MSIC instead of the Malaysia Industrial Classification (MIC) in order to 
stay close to the latest ISIC. As a consequence, however, classifications had to be 
made consistent implying that data from surveys that used the MIC had to be 
reclassified into the MSIC. This applied, for example, to the sectoral compensation of 
employees because the 2000 input-output table used the MSIC, whereas the HIS used 
the MIC. Similarly, the consumption of commodities from the HES is also in the MIC 
classification, whereas private consumption in the input-output table used the MSIC. 
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For these reclassification purposes, Department of Statistics Malaysia (2004) provided 
a concordance to reclassify MIC sectors into MSIC sectors.   
  
The HIS provides abundant information for disaggregating household income as 
well as some expenditure components. However, the aggregate values given in the HIS 
are generally not consistent with aggregate values from other sources. For instance, 
the sectoral compensations of employees from the HIS do not match those from the 
input-output table. This inconsistency is mainly due to differences in the underlying 
sampling methods. While the HIS uses household-based sampling, input-output 
tables use establishment-based sampling procedures. We have “solved” this 
inconsistency problem by using scaling factors (Pyatt and Round, 1984). That is, using 
the HIS, we calculated—for each sector—the share in the total sectoral compensation, 
for each of the 25 distinguished groups of employees. Next, for each sector, these 
shares were multiplied by the total sectoral compensation from the input-output table 
(which was thus taken as the control value). 
 
Inconsistencies may also occur within an individual account. Due to the 
principles of double-entry bookkeeping, every receipt must match an expenditure. 
Therefore aggregate income must be equal to aggregate expenditures. This also holds 
for separate matrices. Consider, for example, the consumption of commodities in M13. 
The input-output table reports the row sums, whereas the HIS gives columns (and 
thus column sums). However, the sum of the row sums is not equal to the sum of the 
column sums. In our study, we have taken the row sums from the input-output table 
as control values. In principle, we could have taken the distribution within each row 
as fixed (reflecting fixed sales patterns for each production sector) and multiply the 
shares with the given row sums. A consequence would have been that the 
expenditures of the household categories (i.e. the column sums of M13) would have 
changed drastically. Alternatively, we could have used the shares within columns, 
because they reflect the consumption pattern of each household group. In that case, 
however, the row sums would not have matched the control values. Instead, we have 
used the classic RAS method for balancing a matrix, given that the row and the 
column sums are known. In our case, we have taken the row sums from the input-
output table and adapted the column sums from the HIS (so as to make sure that the 
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sum of row sums equals the sum of column sums). The RAS technique has also been 
applied for balancing other matrices Mij in the SAM.  
 
Finally, lacking data are a common problem in the compilation process, 
especially when dealing with the government account. A consequence is that some of 
the data in our SAM were obtained as residual estimates. That is, we have used the 
equality between the row sum (incomes) of any given account and the column sum 
(expenditures) of that account. In that case, one piece of information in the 
corresponding row (or the corresponding column) can be calculated as a residual. For 
instance, flows of public transfers to companies (i.e. S45 in our SAM) have been 
estimated by taking the difference between government revenues and expenditures.  
 
2.5 Results and Discussion   
 
For reasons of exposition, Appendix 2.1 reports only an aggregated 47×47 version of 
the SAM for Malaysia, instead of the full 134×134 matrix. Because we would like to 
focus on issues related to income distribution, we have chosen not to aggregate the 
factors of production and the households. We have aggregated the production 
activities from 92 to 10 industries and consolidated the remaining six accounts (for 
companies, government, capital, the rest of the world and indirect taxes) into a single 
composite account. The SAM can be sub-divided into the following sub-groups of 
major accounts: production activities (accounts 1-10); factors of production (accounts 
11-37); households (accounts 38-46); and the sum of all other accounts (account 47). 
The flows are expressed in units of millions of MR.  
 
An important feature of the SAM is that the distribution of the compensation of 
employees to the different types of households has a diagonal structure as shown by 
rows 38-46 and columns 11-35. This is a common way to deal with this account and 
reflects the homogeneity assumption (see e.g. Pyatt and Round, 1984). Accordingly, 
the compensation of the three types (i.e. low, medium, and high level of education) of 
rural Malay employees, for example, is entirely destined for rural Malay households. 
Implicitly, this means that urban (rural) households are assumed to supply only 
urban (rural) labor, and that all members of a particular household are assumed to be 
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of the same race. In the next sub-sections, we will point out some important features 
of the SAM in relation to income distribution. 
 
2.5.1 Distribution of household income 
 
In this section, we focus on the distribution of the household income across ethnic 
groups. In the SAM in Appendix 2.1, we find that the total household incomes are 
given in column 48 and rows 38-46. For example, the major earners are the Malays 
(25.4 billion MR for rural and 40.5 billion MR for urban households) and the Chinese 
(10.2 billion MR for rural and 47.4 billion MR for urban households). Next, we will link 
the incomes to the population shares, which will confirm that the distribution of 
income is far from equal, as mentioned in the introduction. 
 
Table 2.3 summarizes the outcomes for the distribution of income across ethnic 
groups. Panel A gives in each row the distribution (over household groups) of a 
particular source of income. For example, the total compensation of employees 
amounts to 91,311 million MR of which 16.62% are for rural Malay households. The 
column on the right indicates that employee compensation equals 58.52% of the sum 
of all household incomes (156,040 million MR). 
 
The table clearly shows the importance of factor incomes in generating 
household incomes. With an average of 91%, it is the major source of income for 
households. Splitting the factors, we find that the compensation of employees 
accounts for 59% of incomes received by households and that the unincorporated 
business profits (basically due to self-employed activities) accounts for 32% of total 
household income. A remarkable finding is that the contributions of the components 
of household incomes are very similar across ethnic groups and location. The shares 
for the rows compensation of employees, unincorporated business profits and total—in 
rows 1, 2, and 7, respectively—exhibit only little differences. This also holds for the 
distributed profits in row 4 (which account for 7% of total household income on 
average), but to a lesser extent. For example, the contribution of distributed profits is 
above average for “other” households (both rural and urban) and below average for 
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urban Indian households.8  Large differences are found for the pensions and the social 
benefits from abroad in rows 5 and 6. For example, 65% of all pensions and periodical 
payments are received by Malay households and 42% of all social benefits from abroad 
are received by Indian households. Because, together, these two types of income 
account for only 2% of total household incomes, the differences have little effect on the 
overall distribution of total household income across household groups. So, our first 
main finding is that the distribution of household income across groups is very similar 
for the separate forms of income. 
 
Panel B gives the distribution of the population and of labor (for employees and 
for non-employees) across household groups. For example, rural Malay households 
account for 35.37% of the entire population and provide 26.80% of all the employees. 
The rows 13-15 show the income ratios. Note that the ratios in Panels B-D are 
normalized such that the (weighted) average ratio for all nine population groups equals 
one. For example, in row 13 we see that the per capita income in rural Malay 
households is 46% of the average per capita income in Malaysia. The results in row 13 
show that there is a large difference between rural and urban households. Urban 
households all have above average per capita incomes, while rural households 
essentially (i.e. except for the small group of others) have below average per capita 
incomes. The ratios between urban and rural incomes range from 1.43 for Indians, via 
1.62 for Chinese, to 2.24 for Malay households. The observation that the income per 
capita for all ethnic groups is smaller for rural areas than for urban areas, is a 
common characteristic of a developing country. Typically, most of the industrial and 
service sectors (which are the most productive) are centered in urban areas. 
 
Large differences also exist between the major ethnic groups, the per capita 
income for the Chinese being the largest and that for the Malays the smallest. For the 
rural households, we find that the per capita income of Indians and Chinese 
households equal 171 and 200 (setting per capita income of rural Malay households 
equal to 100). For urban households, the differences are smaller: 110 and 145 for 
                                          
8 The group of “other” households comprises a dozen ethnic minorities that largely dominate the 
population in East Malaysia. The distributed profits, turn out to be distributed particularly unequal: no 




Indians resp. Chinese households. These figures are in line with the aggregate 
inequality indicators published by the Economic Planning Unit and mentioned in the 
Introduction. Note that the income ratios for the groups with other ethnicities (and—to 
a lesser extent—the group with non-citizens) are exceptionally large, the reasons for 
which will be discussed later. The major finding here is that the rural Malay 
households are the largest group and they have the lowest per capita income. 
 
Looking at the ratios between the values in rows 8-10 provides information on 
the degree of labor participation. For example, observe that the urban Malay 
households make up for 23% of the population, but provide 21% of the employees and 
only 15% of non-employees (i.e. essentially self-employed). This indicates that a 
relatively large (i.e. above average) share of urban Malay households does not 
participate in labor activities. This might be caused by, for example, relatively many 
children, retirees, and/or unemployed. In order to quantify this observation, we have 
divided the population share by the labor share (including both employees and non-
employees). Row 12 lists these ratios and note that the average number of persons per 
laborer in Malaysia (which is 2.45) has been set to unity. The differences are 
considerable and indicate, for example, that the average urban Chinese laborer feeds 
2.2 persons, whereas it is 3.0 for the average urban Malay laborer. The ratios show 
that Malay and Indian households (both rural and urban) have a labor participation 
that is below average, while the opposite holds for the Chinese households. The Other 
and the group of non-citizens take an extreme position in this respect. 
 
Another element in explaining the large income differences is the payment per 
employee or per non-employee. The income per employee in row 14 shows only small 
differences across urban ethnic groups. For rural households it appears that the 
“wage rate” for the Malays is substantially smaller than that of the Indians and 
Chinese households. The incomes per non-employee (i.e. essentially self-employed) 
show very large differences. Taking 100 for the Malays again, we find 206 and 563 for 
the Chinese and Indians self-employed in rural areas, and 98 and 171 in urban areas. 
It turns out that the Indian self-employed receive much more income per person than 
the other two groups. 
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Table 2.3 Distribution of household income, population and labor (%), 2000 
 















 Compensation of employees (1) 16.62 6.59 2.31 2.71 26.48 30.65 6.56 2.36 5.73 91,311 58.52 
Unincorporated business profits (2) 15.15 6.82 2.78 3.17 23.11 31.69 7.16 2.64 7.48 50,092 32.10 








Distributed profits (4) 16.16 6.15 2.71 3.84 29.35 27.18 4.74 3.46 6.41 10,899 6.98 
Pensions and periodical payments (5) 23.26 1.45 2.61 2.09 42.03 14.45 8.58 1.10 4.43 3,702 2.37 
Social benefits from abroad (6) 27.88 3.05 26.02 1.65 10.99 0.81 16.40 3.90 9.30 36 0.02 
Total (7) 16.28 6.51 2.50 2.92 25.96 30.35 6.67 2.49 6.31 156,040 100 
B. Population and per-capita income             
Population (8) 35.37  7.49  2.89  2.16  23.28  20.33  5.37  0.93  2.18    
Employee-labor (9) 26.80 7.56 2.89 5.93 20.90 23.26 5.45 2.59 4.62   
Non-employee-labor (10) 46.83 10.40 1.54 1.41 14.81 20.69 2.68 0.10 1.54   
Total labor (11) 32.03  8.30  2.54  4.75  19.31  22.59  4.73  1.94  3.82    
Population per laborer [ratio (8)/(11)] (12) 1.10  0.90  1.14  0.45  1.21  0.90  1.14  0.48  0.57    
Per-capita income [ratio (7)/(8)] (13) 0.46  0.87  0.87  1.35  1.11  1.49  1.24  2.67  2.90    
Per-capita employee income [ratio (1)/(9)] (14) 0.62 0.87 0.80 0.46 1.27 1.32 1.20 0.91 1.24   
Per-capita non-employees income [ratio (2)/(10)] (15) 0.32 0.66 1.80 2.25 1.56 1.53 2.67 25.65 4.85   
C. Average number of hours worked per week per person        
Employee-labor (16) 0.93  1.02  1.03  0.96  0.99  1.03  1.04  1.04  1.18    
Non-employee-labor (17) 0.85  1.08  1.12  0.88  1.05  1.13  1.22  1.08  1.08    
D. Index of remuneration per hours worked per person           
Employee-labor [ratio (14)/(16)] (18) 0.67  0.86  0.77  0.48  1.28  1.28  1.15  0.87  1.05    
Non-employee-labor [ratio (15)/(17)] (19) 0.38  0.61  1.60  2.55  1.49  1.35  2.18  23.69  4.51    
Notes: all figures in rows (1)-(11) are in percentages (unless indicated otherwise) and their sum over the nine ethnic groups equals 100. All figures 
in rows (12)-(19) are given as ratios to the grand average (taken over all Malaysian households). 
 36 
 
It should be stressed that the labor data underlying Table 2.3’s Panel B are in 
numbers of persons. It may thus happen that differences across ethnic groups in the 
remuneration rates are due to a different involvement in part-time and overtime work. 
For example, if rural Malays would work much more part-time (or less overtime) than 
rural Chinese and if the hourly wage rate would be the same, then the remuneration 
per employee would be lower for the rural Malays than for the rural Chinese. 
 
Data on working hours were provided by Department of Statistics Malaysia and 
were obtained from their labour force survey (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 
2001b). Panel C lists the normalized scores again. The average Malaysian employee 
works 47.3 hours per week and for the average non-employee this is 46.8 hours per 
week. We see that for the tree major ethnic groups, the Indians work the largest 
number of hours, the Malays the smallest, and the Chinese take the intermediate 
position. This result is observed in all four cases, i.e. for employees and for non-
employees, in rural and in urban areas. Whereas the differences are small for urban 
employees (Indians working 5% more hours than Malays), they are quite substantial 
for rural non-employees (32% difference).  
 
Dividing the indexes for the income per (non-)employee in rows 14 and 15 by 
the indexes for the working hours per week in rows 16 and 17, provides the indexes 
for the income per hours worked for employees in row 18 and for non-employees in 
row 19. Again, the average Malaysian income per hour is set at one. The results 
provide a more detailed view on the remuneration rates per (non-)employee. For 
example, the rural Malays income per (non-)employee is extremely low. This is caused 
by a very low income per hour and by the fact that they work the least number of 
hours per week. In the same fashion, an urban Indian non-employee earns 2.67 times 
the amount that an average Malaysian non-employee earns. Partly this is caused 
because (s)he is working the most hours, which implies that the income per hour 
worked is “only” 2.18 times the Malaysian average. 
 
Jointly, these three elements (income per hour, working hours per week, and 
participation of household members) explain the differences in per capita income for 
the Malays, Chinese, and Indians. First, for rural households we find that the Malays 
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receive the lowest remuneration rates per hour, have the lowest number of working 
hours per week and an above average number persons per laborer. The Chinese are 
doing much better in this respect, they have substantially higher payments per hour, 
work more hours per week and their share of economically inactive members is 
relatively low so that the earned income is shared by a relatively smaller number of 
people. This explains why the per capita income of rural Chinese households is much 
larger that that of the Malays. The rural Indian non-employees earn by far the most 
per hour and they work the most hours (of all rural non-employees). The positive effect 
of the very high income per non-employee is largely offset because the share of Indian 
self-employed is relatively small and because the participation rate is low (and thus 
relatively many household members per laborer). This results in a per capita income of 
rural Indians that is the same as that of rural Chinese. 
 
For urban households, the story is similar. The remuneration rates per hour for 
Malays are slightly better than for Chinese. However, the combination of the Chinese 
working more hours per week than the Malays and having a population per laborer 
ratio that is 25% smaller, causes that the per capita income of the Chinese is 35% 
larger than that of the Malays. The situation for Indian households is comparable to 
the Malays, except that their non-employees have very high remuneration rates per 
hour and work the most hours. Again, this is to a large extent offset by the fact that 
there are relatively few Indian self-employed people.9 
 
2.5.2 Inequality in the labor market    
 
Approximately 60% of total income consists of compensation of employees. Given its 
importance we will focus in this section on the income per employee (or wage rate) and 
employment shares. We have already observed that the wage rate differences between 
urban ethnic groups are relatively small, whereas the wage rates for rural Malay 
households are substantially smaller than those of the Indian and Chinese rural 
                                          
9 The extremely high per capita income for the “Other” group appears to be mainly due to an implausibly 
high participation rate. We feel that not too much importance should be attributed to this result, which is 
most probably a consequence of measurement error for a small group of households. It does not affect our 
quantification of income inequality between the three major ethnic groups in Malaysia. 
 38 
 
households. Table 2.4 breaks the wage rate differences up into skill categories. It 
should be stressed that no information on skill types is available for the non-citizens, 
who account for 4.62% of all employees. Therefore, they are not included in Table 2.4. 
For example, 12.57% of all citizen employees belong to rural low-skilled Malay 
households and they earn 3.74% of the total income earned by employees (excl. non-
citizens). Taking the ratio yields that low-skilled rural Malay employees earn a wage 
rate that is 30% of the average wage rate for a citizen employee.  
 
Of all the citizen employees, 45% are in the rural areas and 55% in the urban 
areas. Observe that the Malays and the Other have more rural than urban employees, 
while the opposite holds for the Indians and, in particular, the Chinese. In the urban 
areas, there are even more Chinese than Malay employees. In general, low-skilled 
employment is typical for rural areas and high-skilled employment for urban areas. It 
follows from Table 2.4 that the share of low-skilled employees (within each of the eight 
ethnic groups) is larger in rural areas than in urban areas. For example, for the rural 
Malay employees we find that 44.7% is low-skilled and this share is 19.4% for the 
urban Malay employees.10 For high-skilled employees it is exactly the other way round, 
their share (within each group) being smaller in rural areas than in urban areas.11  
 
The next observation from Table 2.4 is that the wage rate per employee is lower 
for rural than for urban employees, although the gap declines if skills increase.12 
Together with the observation that low-skilled labor is dominant in rural areas, this 
explains the large gap in the overall wage rate—in row 14 of Table 2.3—between rural 
and urban employees. 
 
 
                                          
10 The corresponding shares for the other groups are: 57.5% and 38.0% for rural resp. urban Chinese; 
54.4% and 32.7% for rural resp. urban Indians; and 65.8% and 44.9% for rural resp. urban Other 
employees. 
11 For Malays we have 6.2% in rural areas and 14.7% in urban areas, for Chinese: respectively 6.3% and 
11.9%, for Indians: 4.0% resp. 10.7%, and for the Other: 3.1% resp. 7.4%. 
12 Information of the number of hours worked per week is —unfortunately— not available. Therefore we 
cannot calculate an index for the wage rate per hour. 
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Table 2.4 Distribution of compensation of employees per skill-type, 2000 
 
 Rural Urban 
 Malays Chinese Indians Other Malays Chinese Indians Other 
Low-skilled employees          
Income shares (1) 3.74 2.29 0.98 1.11 2.45 6.64 1.38 0.65 
Employment shares (2) 12.57 4.56 1.65 4.09 4.26 9.28 1.87 1.22 
Ratio (3)=(1)/(2) 0.30 0.50 0.59 0.27 0.58 0.72 0.74 0.53 
Medium-skilled employees          
Income shares (4) 9.70 3.11 1.22 1.35 16.00 15.39 3.64 1.36 
Employment shares (5) 13.78 2.87 1.27 1.95 14.44 12.19 3.23 1.29 
Ratio (6)=(4)/(5) 0.70 1.08 0.96 0.69 1.11 1.26 1.13 1.05 
High-skilled employees          
Income shares (7) 4.19 1.60 0.25 0.41 9.63 10.49 1.93 0.49 
Employment shares (8) 1.75 0.50 0.12 0.19 3.22 2.91 0.61 0.20 
Ratio (9)=(7)/(8) 2.39 3.20 2.08 2.16 2.99 3.60 3.16 2.45 




The differences in the wage rates per employee between the ethnic groups are 
quite consistent across skill-types. In general, we find that the Chinese are paid the 
highest wage rate, followed by the Indians, then by the Malays, while the Other have 
the lowest wage rate. The exception is the wage rate for low-skilled Indian employees 
(both rural and urban). A note of caution seems to be in place when linking the wage 
rates per skill-type from Table 2.4 to overall wage rates in row 14 of Table 2.3. For 
example, in Table 2.4 we observe that the wage rate for urban Indian employees is 
larger than that of the Malay urban employees, for each skill-type. Still, the overall 
wage rate of the urban Malay employees is larger than that of the urban Indian 
employees. The reason is that only 19% of the urban Malay employees is low-skilled, 
while it is 33% in the Indian case. 
 
The next step in unravelling the inequalities in the labor market is by analyzing 
the differences across industries. The total output of each industry is given in the SAM 
in Appendix 2.1 in row 48 and columns 1-10. It follows that industry 3 
(Manufacturing) is responsible for 55% of the total Malaysian output. However, only 
21% of this is paid to factors and only 27% of these factor payments is for labor 
compensation. In contrast to this, industry 10 (Government services) produces only 
4% of the total output in Malaysia, but 60% of its output is for factor payments and no 
less than 95% of these factor payments are for labor compensation. Despite their 
different structure, both industries thus account for a comparable share (30% for 
industry 3 and 24% for industry 10) of the total labor compensation. 
 
Table 2.5 gives the distribution of the labor compensation (in panel A) and the 
employment (in panel B) across industries and ethnic groups. Taking the ratios of the 
figures in both panels yields the compensation per employee (or wage rate). From 
panel B, it follows that industries 1 (Agriculture), 3, 6 (Wholesale, hotels & 
restaurants), and 10 account for 70% of all employment. One of the most striking 
differences is between industries 1 and 10, which are quite comparable in terms of 
output and total factor payments (see Appendix 2.1). In Agriculture, however, 83% of 
the factor payments go to capital (and thus only 17% to labor), whereas in 




Table 2.5 Percentages of income and employment, and wage rates, by industry (2000) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
A. % of income            
Rural 
Malays 0.78  0.18  5.47  0.16  1.06  0.86  1.09  0.92  0.22  5.89  16.64  
Chinese 0.72  0.07  2.15  0.01  1.00  0.82  0.54  0.52  0.17  0.59  6.59  
Indians 0.26  0.04  1.08  0.03  0.11  0.10  0.24  0.14  0.02  0.30  2.31  
Other 0.59  0.04  0.44  0.03  0.17  0.13  0.16  0.11  0.07  0.98  2.71  
Urban 
Malays 0.18  0.36  6.14  0.45  1.26  1.68  2.24  3.27  0.37  10.55  26.51  
Chinese 1.03  0.19  9.37  0.14  4.34  5.29  1.48  4.78  0.77  3.23  30.61  
Indians 0.08  0.08  2.24  0.13  0.39  0.61  0.63  0.94  0.14  1.33  6.56  
Other 0.12  0.05  0.39  0.05  0.24  0.20  0.21  0.21  0.09  0.80  2.36  
Non-citizen 0.38  0.30  2.33  0.01  0.65  0.54  0.20  0.44  0.06  0.80  5.72  
Total 4.16  1.30  29.60  1.01  9.22  10.24  6.78  11.33  1.91  24.46  100.00  
B. % of employment 
Rural 
Malays 7.21  0.11  7.74  0.10  1.80  3.40  1.07  0.68  1.46  3.23  26.80  
Chinese 1.39  0.03  1.90  0.03  0.83  1.53  0.31  0.25  1.06  0.23  7.56  
Indians 0.67  0.03  1.21  0.05  0.11  0.24  0.18  0.11  0.14  0.15  2.89  
Other 2.96  0.03  0.78  0.02  0.33  0.48  0.23  0.12  0.41  0.56  5.93  
Urban 
Malays 0.58  0.12  6.28  0.14  1.36  3.54  1.34  1.61  1.53  4.40  20.90  
Chinese 0.79  0.04  6.00  0.06  2.95  5.97  0.88  1.85  3.65  1.05  23.26  
Indians 0.16  0.03  2.19  0.06  0.29  0.77  0.40  0.55  0.49  0.52  5.45  
Other 0.14  0.03  0.51  0.05  0.29  0.46  0.18  0.16  0.40  0.37  2.59  
Non-citizen 1.41  0.05  1.00  0.44  0.14  0.64  0.39  0.05  0.45  0.04  4.63  
Total 15.32  0.47  27.61  0.96  8.10  17.04  4.98  5.38  9.59  10.56  100.00  
C. Wage rates (A/B)            
Rural 
Malays 0.11  1.70  0.71  1.51  0.59  0.25  1.02  1.35  0.15  1.83  0.62  
Chinese 0.52  2.21  1.13  0.43  1.20  0.54  1.74  2.06  0.16  2.51  0.87  
Indians 0.39  1.38  0.89  0.55  1.02  0.43  1.32  1.20  0.15  1.99  0.80  
Other 0.20  1.09  0.56  1.40  0.51  0.27  0.68  0.89  0.18  1.74  0.46  
Urban 
Malays 0.31  2.91  0.98  3.19  0.93  0.48  1.68  2.03  0.24  2.40  1.27  
Chinese 1.30  4.46  1.56  2.52  1.47  0.89  1.68  2.58  0.21  3.07  1.32  
Indians 0.53  3.12  1.02  2.08  1.35  0.80  1.56  1.71  0.28  2.55  1.20  
Other 0.83  1.59  0.77  1.12  0.83  0.43  1.15  1.35  0.22  2.17  0.91  
Non-citizen 0.27  5.46  2.33  0.02  4.61  0.85  0.52  9.35  0.14  18.79  1.24  
Total  0.27  2.73  1.07  1.06  1.14  0.60  1.36  2.10  0.20  2.32  1.00  
Notes: (1) Agriculture; (2) Mining & quarrying; (3) Manufacturing; (4) Electricity, gas & water; (5) Building 
& construction; (6) Wholesale, hotels & restaurants; (7) Transport & communication; (8) Financial, real 




share in total labor compensation in panel A of Table 5 for industry 10 is almost six 
times as large as the share for industry 1. In addition, the employment in industry 1 is 
45% larger than in industry 10. Together this explains why the average wage rate in 
industry 10 is more than eight times as large as the one in industry 1. 
 
The main observations from Table 2.5 are: that there are large differences in the 
average wage rates across industries (the ratio between the largest and the smallest 
being more than 10!); that there are—as already noted before—substantial differences 
between rural and urban wages; and that in almost all cases the wage rate for Chinese 
is considerably larger than that for Malays and Indians.  
 
Focusing on the four industries (1, 3, 6, 10) that are most important in terms of 
employment, we see that the rural Malays, the urban Malays and the urban Chinese 
in these four industries make up for 50% of all employment. Agriculture (industry 1) is 
dominated by rural Malays and their wage rate is extremely low (11% of the overall 
average wage rate). Also Government services (industry 10) are dominated by the 
Malays, but the wage rate in this industry is more than twice the overall average. The 
three groups have comparable shares of employment in Manufacturing (industry 3), 
but the wage rate of the urban Chinese is 59% and 120% larger than that of the urban 
resp. rural Malays. In Wholesale, hotels & restaurants (industry 6), the urban Chinese 
hold the largest employment share (35%, in comparison to 20% for rural and for 
urban Malays). The average wage rate in this industry is substantially lower than the 
overall rate, but for the urban Chinese it is 85% and 256% larger than for urban resp. 
rural Malays. These observations may help to sketch the overall picture of the income 
distribution differences in Malaysia. 
 
In addition there are some “extreme” results that require explanation. For 
example, industries 2 (Mining & quarrying) and 4 (Electricity, gas & water) are 
characterized by large capital intensities. Of their factor payments, no less than, 
respectively, 97% and 91% is for capital. However, of the workers that are employed in 
these industries, an unexpectedly large part (12% in industry 2, 46% in industry 4) is 
non-citizen. Also observe that the largest wage rates—up to 19 times the overall 
average wage rate—are for non-citizens. Such extreme wage rates are observed in 
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industries with very few employed non-citizens (0.1% of total employment or less), i.e. 
industries 2, 5, 8, and 10. In many cases, this refers to a relatively small number of 
foreign employees (e.g. advisers, technical experts) who are paid salaries that are at 
least comparable to what they might have earned in their home country. For 
Malaysian standards, however, such salaries are massive. In the industries with 
relatively large shares of non-citizen labor (Agriculture, 1; Wholesale, hotels & 
restaurants, 6), the foreign workers earn more or less the average wage rate in that 
industry. Industry 3 (Manufacturing) clearly is a mix of the two types, many foreign 
workers earning an average wage rate but also a considerable group of foreign 
“experts” with very high salaries.  
 
The most extreme result is the wage rate (0.02) of the non-citizens in industry 
4. There are good reasons that make a low wage rate plausible. For instance, almost 
half of the employees in this sector is non-citizen and many of them will receive their 
salary from headquarters abroad. Yet, the extremity of this outcome is difficult to 
explain. It should be stressed that part of the SAM is estimated using information from 
different sources. In particular when the share (e.g. in income, or population, or 
employment) is small for a certain cell in the SAM, the percentage estimation error 
may become relatively large. At the detailed level of individual cells, one should 
therefore realize that taking ratios in such cases may produce outliers that cannot be 
given a reasonable explanation. 
 
2.5.3 Summary of most important findings  
 
The general conclusion from the previous subsections is that there are six main 
causes for the inequality in the income per capita across ethnic groups. First, the 
wage rates per hour in rural areas are substantially lower than in urban areas. 
Second, the number of hours worked per (non-)employee is smaller in rural areas than 
in urban areas. This explains why the gap in income per (non-)employee between rural 
and urban areas is even larger.  Third, the Malays (and the Other) have a relatively 
large share of their employment in rural areas, whereas the Chinese (and the Indians) 
mainly work in urban areas where most of the commercial and industrial activities 
take place. Fourth, in general, the wage rate per employee for the Other is lower than 
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for the Malays, which is lower than for the Indians, which is lower than for the 
Chinese. These four factors explain why the income earned by Chinese employees is 
the largest. Fifth, the Other (and to some extent also the Indian) compensate their low 
income for employees by income for non-employees (i.e. self-employed). Sixth, the 
Malays and Indians have a relatively large ratio for the population over labor. This 
indicates that there are relatively many persons in a household per worker (either 
employed or self-employed), which means that the income has to be divided over 
relatively many people. 
 
2.6 A Comparison of the Income Distributions in 1970 and 2000  
 
Given the availability of a SAM for Malaysia for 1970 (see Pyatt and Round, 1984), this 
section discusses the changes in income distribution between 1970 and 2000. In line 
with Table 2.3, Table 2.6 summarizes the outcomes for the distribution of income in 
1970 and their changes across ethnic groups. Rows 1-5 give the share of each ethnic 
group in a certain income component and in the total income. For example, the rural 
Malays earned 22% of the compensation of employees in 1970. The numbers in 
parentheses indicate the change in the share between 1970 and 2000. For rural 
Malays, their share in the compensation of employees has declined by 5%-points in 
2000 (so in 2000 their share was 17.63%). The sum over the ethnic groups equals 100 
for the shares and 0 for the change in shares. The final column on the right shows the 
share of each source of income in total income. For example, the compensation of 
employees constituted 49% of total income, which increased by 10% in 2000. Rows 6 
and 7 give the shares in 1970 and the changes between 1970-2000 in population and 
in labor across ethnic groups. Rows 8-10 show the participation rates, the per capita 
incomes and the remuneration rates, respectively. Numbers in parentheses show 
ratios between 2000 and 1970. For example, the per capita income of rural Malays 
was 60% of the average per capita income in Malaysia in 1970 and was only 80% of 
that (i.e. 48%) in 2000. 
 
  Three important aspects about Table 2.6 should be kept in mind while 
discussing the findings, because the data for 1970 are not entirely comparable to 
those for 2000. First, the distinction of ethnic groups in 1970 was only available for 
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West Malaysia, but not for East Malaysia. In 1970, the income and population in West 
Malaysia was 84.35% and 84.41% of the total, respectively. In order to compare the 
two years, we have assumed that the ethnic distribution (for income, population and 
labor) in 1970 for West Malaysia also applies to East Malaysia. Second, in the 
distributions of income, population and labor in 1970, only households of citizens 
were taken into account. For our comparison, we thus have left out the citizens from 
our 2000 data (similar to what we have done for Table 2.4). This adjustment implies 
that the outcomes that may be obtained from Table 2.6 differ slightly from those 
reported in Table 2.3. Finally, several types of information were lacking for 1970, so 
that a comparison in each and every detail is not possible. For example, the 
disaggregation of labor into employees and non-employees, the distinction between 
skill groups, and the lengths of the working weeks were not available for 1970.13  
 
2.6.1 The situation in 1970    
 
Before examining changes over time, we focus on the distribution in 1970. 89% of 
total income in Malaysia was due the compensation of employees (49%) and the 
unincorporated business profits (40%). Income from self-employment was an 
important source of income in rural areas and for urban Chinese. Note that 76% of the 
population was living in rural areas (with 72% of all labor) and that the urban 
population was dominated by the Chinese. The total income of the rural households 
was only 52%, which implies that they had an income per capita that was well below 
average (except for the small group of other ethnic minorities). The opposite obviously 
held for the urban households where 24% of the population had 48% of the total 
income. The ratios of urban to rural income per capita were 2.78 for Malays, 2.42 for 
Chinese and 2.56 for Indians. The explanation for these inequalities is that the  
                                          
13Due to normalizing all numbers in Table 2.6 to averages for the grand average over Malaysian 
households, complicated and data-intensive deflation procedures are not needed to compare degrees of 
inequality between 1970 and 2000. If, however, trends in inequality regarding purchasing power should 
be our main point of interest, SAMs expressed in prices for a common year would be needed. Prices for 
products mainly consumed by poor households (or households with a specific ethnic background) might 
have developed differently from prices of products predominantly bought by richer households. We 
consider such an analysis as beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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Table 2.6 Distribution of household income, population and labor in 1970, and the comparison with 2000 
 
 Rural Urban 
Total 
  Malays Chinese Indians Other Malays Chinese Indians Other 
A. Sources of incomes           
Compensation of employees (1) 
22.40 15.08 7.86 1.34 16.00 27.17 6.24 3.91 48.87 
(-4.77) (-8.08) (-5.41) (1.53) (12.09) (5.34) (0.71) (-1.41) (10.01) 
Unincorporated business profits (2) 
36.15 20.67 3.61 0.32 5.22 26.89 6.09 1.05 40.03 
(-19.77) (-13.30) (-0.60) (3.11) (19.76) (7.36) (1.65) (1.80) (-8.34) 
Sub-total (3)=(1)+(2) 
28.59 17.59 5.95 0.88 11.15 27.04 6.17 2.62 88.90 
(-11.40) (-10.47) (-3.30) (2.19) (15.85) (6.08) (1.05) (0.00) (1.67) 
Transfers (4) 
20.72 19.58 3.23 0.10 12.07 40.21 3.42 0.67 11.10 
(-1.60) (-14.32) (-0.31) (3.51) (22.48) (-14.81) (2.68) (2.38) (-1.67) 
Total (5)=(3)+(4) 
27.72 17.82 5.65 0.79 11.25 28.51 5.87 2.41 100 
(-10.34) (-10.86) (-2.97) (2.32) (16.46) (3.89) (1.25) (0.26) (0.00) 
B. Population and per-capita income          
Population (6) 
46.28 21.39 7.54 0.53 6.72 14.21 3.06 0.27  
(-10.13) (-13.73) (-4.59) (1.67) (17.08) (6.57) (2.43) (0.69)  
Labor (7) 
44.59) 19.86 6.87 0.58 7.00 17.28 3.49 0.32  
(-11.30) (-11.24) (-4.23) (4.36) (13.08) (6.21) (1.42) (1.69)  
Population per laborer [ratio (6)/(7)] (8) 
1.04 1.08 1.10 0.92 0.96 0.82 0.88 0.83  
(1.05) (0.82) (1.02) (0.49) (1.24) (1.08) (1.28) (0.57)  
Per-capita income [ratio (5)/(6)] (9) 
0.60 0.83 0.75 1.48 1.67 2.01 1.92 9.02  
(0.80) (1.09) (1.21) (0.95) (0.70) (0.78) (0.68) (0.31)  
Per-capita labor income [ratio (3)/(7)]  (10) 
0.64 0.89 0.87 1.51 1.59 1.57 1.77 8.12  
(0.81) (0.93) (1.16) (0.41) (0.84) (0.90) (0.83) (0.16)  
Notes: Numbers in parentheses indicate the change over time as measured in 2000. In rows (1)-(7) they give the differences between the values in 
2000 and in 1970. In rows (8)-(10), they give the ratios between the values in 2000 and in 1970.  
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remuneration rates and the rates with population per laborer were both above average 
for urban households and below average for rural households. 
 
For the distribution among major ethnic groups, we observe that the per capita 
income was the lowest for the Malays, the largest for the Chinese, with the Indians in 
between. Setting the per capita income of the rural Malays at 100, the income of rural 
Chinese was 138 and of rural Indians 125. For urban households, the differences were 
smaller, 120 for Chinese and 115 for Indians (setting the urban Malays at 100). The 
low per capita income for the rural Malays is mainly explained by their low 
remuneration rate (even if their labor participation rate was larger for rural Malays 
than for Chinese and Indians). The indexes for Chinese and Indian remuneration rates 
were 139 and 136 (setting rural Malays at 100). Note that the rural Indian 
remuneration rate in row 10 was comparable to that of the Chinese, but their per 
capita income in row 9 was much lower than that of the Chinese. This was caused by 
the fact that rural Indians obtain very little income from transfers. 
 
For urban households, the remuneration rates were very comparable, with 
indexes of 98 for Chinese and 111 for Indians (with urban Malays set at 100). 
However, the labour participation rates differed markedly, indicating that the number 
of non-participating household members was larger for the rural Malays than for the 
Chinese and the Indians. Further, in explaining the differences in per capita income it 
should pointed out that the urban Chinese received a very large part of the transfers. 
 
2.6.2 The changes between 1970 and 2000   
 
Between 1970 and 2000, significant shifts in population and labor have been 
observed. The share of Malays has increased by 7%-points which matches the 
decrease in the share of the Chinese and the share of the Indians has decreased by 
2%-points which equals to increase in the share of the Other. Also a drastic shift has 
taken place in the distribution of population and labor over rural and urban areas. 
Whereas 76% of the population and 72% of the labor was in rural areas in 1970, both 
shares have decreased to 49% in 2000. This tendency to concentrate population and 




i.e. the transition from agricultural (essentially rural) to industrial (essentially urban) 
activities. The higher wages paid in the urban economic activities caused a migration 
from rural to urban areas. For example, in 1970, 60% of all employment was in the 
agricultural sector and only 10% in the manufacturing sector (see Fernandez et al., 
1975). In 2000, only 15% of all employment was in the agricultural sector and 28% in 
the manufacturing sector (see Table 2.5).  
 
The major shift of labor covers another shift that has occurred between 1970 
and 2000. The last column in Table 2.6 shows that the share of compensation of 
employees has risen to 59% (an increase by 10%-points) and the unincorporated 
business profits have fallen to 32% (a reduction of 8%-points). Although we have no 
detailed data, this shift is caused (at least to a very large extent) by a shift from self-
employment to employment.    
 
Another interesting observation is with respect to income gaps between the 
ethnic groups. For rural households, the indexes of per capita income of Chinese and 
Indians (setting the per capita income of rural Malays at 100) rose from 138 and 125 
in 1970 to 190 and 188 in 2000. This indicates that the gap of the Chinese and 
Indians with the Malays has substantially widened, and that the gap between the 
Chinese and the Indians has been closed. The explanation is that the remuneration 
rate has substantially decreased for the Malays, slightly decreased for the Chinese, 
and increased for the Indians. At the same time, the population per laborer ratio has 
increased slightly for the Malays, substantially decreased for the Chinese, and 
remained more or less the same for the Indians. Together, this implies for the income 
per capita that the Chinese and Indians have gained over time when compared to the 
Malays and that the Indians have gained when compared to the Chinese. 
 
For the per capita income of urban households, the index for Chinese increased 
from 120 to 134 (i.e. a small widening of the gap with the Malays), but the index for 
the Indians slightly decreased from 115 to 112. Note that the small gap between urban 
Chinese and Indians in 1970 has considerably grown. Both the Malays and the 
Indians exhibited a similar decline in their remuneration rates and a similar increase 




the population per laborer ratio increased considerably less. This implies that the 
Chinese have gained over time, when compared to the Malays and the Indians. 
 
From the figures in rows 5 and 6 of Table 2.6, it also follows that the gap 
between urban and rural incomes has substantially declined. Let the Malaysian 
average per capita income be set equal to 100. In 1970, the ratio between average 
urban per capita income (198) and average rural per capita income (69) was 2.88. In 
2000, the average per capita incomes were 137 for urban and 62 for rural areas, and 
their ratio was 2.23, which is reduction of 23%.  
 
A general conclusion drawn from the discussion above is that population and 
labor have shifted from rural to urban areas between 1970 and 2000. This has 
improved (i.e. reduced) the large gap in per capita income between rural and urban 
households. At the same time, however, it has increased the existing gaps in per 
capita income between the ethnic groups. In particular the position of the Malays has 
been further deteriorated. 
 
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter we have discussed the distribution of income across ethnic groups in 
the rural and urban areas of Malaysia in 2000, using a SAM framework. The income 
inequality across ethnic groups was largely explained by the inequality in the 
compensation of employees. Analyzing the employment structure indicated that the 
unequal distribution of labor compensation was mainly due to the inequality in the 
employment shares and the inequality in the wage rates. For two largest groups (i.e. 
Malays and Chinese), we found that (i) the Malays are dominant in the rural areas and 
both groups are of a comparable size in urban areas, (ii) the rural wage rates per hour 
are lower than the urban wage rates, (iii) the rural wage rates per hour for the Malays 
are lower than those for Chinese, the urban wage rates per hour are the same, (iv) 
Chinese employees work more hours per week than Malays, so that that both the rural 
and urban wage rates per employee are larger for Chinese than for Malays, and (v) the 
population per laborer is considerably larger for Malays than for Chinese, implying 




Chinese employee’s compensation has. The wage rate differences (rural versus urban, 
and Malays versus Chinese) were consistently found in all production sectors. Because 
almost 60% of all household income is obtained from paid employment, it should be 
focal in overcoming ethnic income inequality.  
 
 The comparison between 1970 and 2000 showed that the inequality in per 
capita income between rural and urban areas has declined. This was caused by the 
fact that (i) the per capita income in urban areas decreased (when compared to the 
overall national average), and (ii) the per capita income in rural areas increased, except 
for the Malays. Although the income gap between rural and urban Malaysia has 
become smaller over time, the situation for the rural Malays (in comparison with the 
average citizen) has seriously worsened between 1970 and 2000. Despite the fact that 
a major shift has taken place from rural to urban areas in terms of population and 
production, the rural Malays still account for 35% of the population in 2000. Our 
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Appendix 2.1 Disaggregated SAM for Malaysia, 2000 (MR million) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11-37 
Agriculture, livestock, forestry & fishery 1 3,335 0 16,468 0 34 2,113 17 80 250 8 0 
Mining & quarrying 2 4 523 12,990 0 1,436 5 0 47 41 1 0 
Manufacturing 3 5,771 1,097 91,410 1,938 12,629 4,977 5,856 2,303 1,002 2,725 0 
Electricity, gas & water 4 145 85 8,059 909 192 1,655 537 1,005 221 803 0 
Buildings & constructions 5 74 98 1,400 91 196 667 117 354 189 233 0 
Wholesale & trade and hotel & restaurant 6 1,325 407 31,052 487 2,622 3,030 3,034 1,304 461 1,076 0 
Transport & communications 7 322 592 5,364 133 1,011 1,784 5,022 2,895 287 911 0 
Financial, real estate & business services 8 276 738 8,018 1,427 2,737 7,038 4,527 15,621 703 2,348 0 
Other services 9 74 38 185 25 62 255 412 197 511 405 0 
Government services 10 19 13 5 40 10 1 2 16 22 411 0 
Factors 11-37 23,068 37,753 101,797 10,696 13,129 41,799 19,793 48,901 4,955 23,737 0 
Households 38-46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 141,404 
Sum of other accounts 47 3,139 4,515 218,558 1,635 11,034 9,927 12,727 9,869 1,816 6,637 190,735 
TOTAL 48 37,552 43,858 495,306 17,380 45,091 73,252 52,044 82,592 10,457 39,296 332,139 
             
  38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 
Agriculture 1 1,857 605 266 235 1,828 1,895 531 145 308 7,577 37,552 
Mining & quarrying 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28,811 43,858 
Manufacturing 3 10,158 1,781 795 948 11,693 9,514 2,494 659 922 326,635 495,306 
Electricity, gas & water 4 212 423 15 416 394 1,722 19 412 154 5 17,380 
Buildings & constructions 5 13 6 0 52 61 165 1 83 0 41,293 45,091 
Wholesale hotel & restaurant 6 2,533 1,197 586 119 4,072 5,579 1,314 144 826 12,085 73,252 
Transport & communications 7 4,352 134 5 146 4,088 2,935 950 162 555 20,395 52,044 
Financial, real estate & business services 8 2,190 2,293 327 1,992 4,271 10,317 1,366 1,545 995 13,863 82,592 
Other services 9 761 530 115 77 1,211 2,591 330 62 331 2,284 10,457 
Government services 10 694 380 183 44 1,143 1,730 517 70 40 33,955 39,296 
Factors 11-37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,510 332,139 
Rural - Malays 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,633 25,396 
Rural - Chinese 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 725 10,161 
Rural - Indians 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 402 3,907 
Rural - Other 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 496 4,554 
Urban - Malay 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,759 40,514 
Urban - Chinese 43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,497 47,360 
Urban - Indians 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 840 10,412 
Urban - Other 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 419 3,892 
Non-citizen 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 865 9,844 
Sum of other accounts 47 2,626 2,812 1,616 527 11,752 10,913 2,889 609 5,713 294,236 804,286 
TOTAL 48 25,396 10,161 3,907 4,554 40,514 47,360 10,412 3,892 9,844 804,286 2,189,293 
 55 
 
Appendix 2.1 Disaggregated SAM for Malaysia, 2000 (MR million), continued 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11-46 47 48 
Labor-Rural-Malays-Low 11 446 45 1,225 37 336 230 241 127 47 519 0 56 3,310 
Labor-Rural-Malays-Medium 12 255 49 3,396 98 448 522 625 356 126 2,571 0 141 8,588 
Labor-Rural-Malays-High 13 19 72 426 11 195 41 142 369 31 2,344 0 60 3,712 
Labor-Rural-Chinese-Low 14 416 27 513 8 483 230 166 50 44 50 0 37 2,024 
Labor-Rural-Chinese-Medium 15 240 34 1,046 5 298 436 174 161 91 215 0 51 2,749 
Labor-Rural-Chinese-High 16 13 - 426 - 140 90 155 271 24 277 0 26 1,421 
Labor-Rural-Indians-Low 17 179 11 425 6 40 31 75 42 5 40 0 15 868 
Labor-Rural-Indians-Medium 18 65 16 505 16 40 57 120 65 14 165 0 19 1,080 
Labor-Rural-Indians-High 19 - 7 65 5 21 5 26 21 - 71 0 4 224 
Labor-Rural-Other-Low 20 378 13 177 7 92 50 67 30 23 134 0 15 986 
Labor-Rural-Other-Medium 21 167 22 216 18 55 66 73 54 38 470 0 19 1,198 
Labor-Rural-Other-High 22 - - 13 - 6 5 5 16 7 302 0 6 359 
Labor-Urban-Malays-Low 23 72 20 720 43 250 222 201 131 33 443 0 37 2,173 
Labor-Urban-Malays-Medium 24 67 148 3,980 268 508 1,089 1,287 1,368 253 4,978 0 232 14,178 
Labor-Urban-Malays-High 25 27 163 968 106 408 243 580 1,515 53 4,316 0 147 8,527 
Labor-Urban-Chinese-Low 26 325 30 1,731 26 1,521 1,322 339 185 193 87 0 119 5,878 
Labor-Urban-Chinese-Medium 27 448 33 4,222 84 1,682 2,816 743 1,823 396 1,119 0 261 13,626 
Labor-Urban-Chinese-High 28 176 109 2,694 24 798 743 279 2,404 122 1,776 0 164 9,291 
Labor-Urban-Indians-Low 29 43 8 556 11 99 116 169 106 27 65 0 21 1,222 
Labor-Urban-Indians-Medium 30 31 34 1,283 96 119 405 295 361 79 463 0 56 3,223 
Labor-Urban-Indians-High 31 2 34 227 10 141 44 113 398 19 697 0 30 1,714 
Labor-Urban-Other-Low 32 39 8 130 5 103 71 54 38 20 100 0 10 579 
Labor-Urban-Other-Medium 33 21 33 199 34 112 103 96 108 47 430 0 21 1,204 
Labor-Urban-Other-High 34 50 4 32 9 9 10 42 48 14 206 0 7 430 
Labor-Non-citizen 35 355 275 2,146 10 603 503 188 409 56 734 0 101 5,380 
Capital-Unincorporated business profit 36 4,084 7,337 15,812 2,073 982 6,868 2,875 8,162 678 247 0 1,455 50,572 









Appendix 2.1 Disaggregated SAM for Malaysia, 2000 (MR million), continued 
  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Production activities 1-10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Factors 11-37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rural - Malays 38 3,217 8,348 3,608 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rural - Chinese 39 0 0 0 1,967 2,672 1,381 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rural - Indians 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 844 1,050 217 0 0 0 0 0 
Rural - Other 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 958 1,164 349 0 0 
Urban - Malays 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,112 13,780 
Urban - Chinese 43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Urban - Indians 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Urban - Other 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Non-citizen 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sum of other accounts 47 93 241 104 57 77 40 24 30 6 28 34 10 61 397 
TOTAL 48 3,310 8,588 3,712 2,024 2,749 1,421 868 1,080 224 986 1,198 359 2,173 14,178 
                
  25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37  
Production activities 1-10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Factors 11-37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Rural - Malays 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,591 0  
Rural - Chinese 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,415 0  
Rural - Indians 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,394 0  
Rural - Other 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,586 0  
Urban - Malays 42 8,288 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11,574 0  
Urban - Chinese 43 0 5,713 13,244 9,031 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15,875 0  
Urban - Indians 44 0 0 0 0 1,187 3,133 1,666 0 0 0 0 3,586 0  
Urban - Other 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 563 1,170 418 0 1,322 0  
Non-citizen 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,229 3,749 0  
Sum of other accounts 47 239 165 382 260 34 90 48 16 34 12 151 480 187,623  

















3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter focuses on the growth of household incomes in Malaysia between 1970 
and 2000, and on the inequality in its distribution across ethnic groups. The changes 
in household incomes are disentangled into their underlying determinants, using a so-
called structural decomposition analysis (SDA, see e.g. Dietzenbacher and Los, 1998). 
Traditionally, SDA has been developed for applications based on input-output tables. 
Because such tables focus primarily on analyses related to production, they do not 
cover all relevant aspects related to income distribution. Social accounting matrices 
(SAMs), however, are socio-economic systems that do include such information. We 
will therefore apply SDA to SAMs, which requires a non-trivial extension of the 
methodology and which—to our knowledge—is novel. One interesting aspect of the 
application is that it integrates into a single decomposition the primary effects of 
income generation (through the production structure and demand) and the secondary 
effects of income re-distribution (e.g. through institutional transfers).  
 
  Two SAMs are available for Malaysia (for 1970 and 2000) and both include 
detailed information on ethnic groups. For Malaysian citizens, a distinction is made 
between the groups of Malays, Chinese, Indians and a group of ethnic minorities 
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(indicated as ‘Others’).1 The results in this chapter thus aim at providing insights into 
the causes of the changes in income in general and its distribution across ethnic 
groups in particular. Although decompositions of income changes at an aggregate level 
have been conducted (see, e.g., Oosterhaven and van der Linden, 1997; Oosterhaven 
and Hoen, 1998) we are not aware of any attempts at decomposing income changes at 
the level of disaggregated household groups.   
 
  It should be emphasized that the period of analysis was an interesting period 
from a policy point of view. 1970 was the starting point of Malaysia’s transformation 
from development strategies with an emphasis purely on economic growth towards 
policies that aimed at combining growth with reducing income inequality between 
ethnic groups. This policy shift was a result of the bloody communal riots in May 
1969. They highlighted the dangers that a multi-racial society runs, once ethnic 
prejudices become exacerbated by economic imbalances. Our analysis thus provides 
also some insights into the effects of three decades of policy reforms.  
 
  The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section briefly 
reviews the economic policies that were implemented between 1970 and 2000, and 
links them to income growth and its distribution over ethnic groups. Section 3.3 
briefly explains the general structures of our SAMs and the procedures used to inflate 
the 1970 SAM into prices of 2000. Section 3.4 discusses the technical details of our 
decomposition analyses that are applied to the SAMs and Section 3.5 presents the 
results. Finally, Section 3.6 summarizes and draws conclusions. 
 
  
                                          
1 The Malaysian citizens are divided into the Malay (indigenous, 53% in 2000), Chinese (26%), Indian 
(8%), and a group of other ethnic minorities (13%). Next to the citizens, there is also the group of non-
citizens, which is approximately 21% smaller than the group of Indian. 
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3.2 Economic Policies, Growth and Income Inequality, 1970-2000 
 
Although the economic expansion during the post-independence period (i.e. 1957-
1969) was respectable, it failed to make a substantial contribution towards reducing 
the differences in economic welfare between the Malays (the indigenous group that is 
the poorest on average), the Chinese, and the Indians. In particular two features were 
characteristic for this period. First, the economic policy in the post-independence 
period continued to be one of laisser-faire, just as it had been before the 
independence. There was little attempt to re-distribute wealth towards the 
economically dispossessed. Second, although the political power was dominated by the 
Malays, the economic activities were run mostly by the non-Malays. For all ethnic 
groups, this led to the question whether their interests were sufficiently safeguarded in 
Malaysia. The disenchantment that had been growing among all segments of the 
population ultimately erupted in the bloody ethnic riots in May 1969. As a result, 
economic policies shifted from a planning that entirely focused on growth, towards 
policies that focused on growth combined with a more equal income distribution. This 
policy shift was formalized in the New Economic Policies (NEP) for the period 1971-
1990 (see, Economic Planning Unit, various years). 
 
   Aiming at achieving national integration and unity, the objectives of the NEP 
were: (i) to eradicate poverty (irrespective of ethnic groups) and (ii) to restructure the 
society attempting to eliminate the identification of ethnic groups by economic 
function.2 For the first objective, the overall development strategy was reformulated by 
emphasizing export-oriented industrialization and setting up ambitious rural and 
urban development programs. For the second objective, long-term targets were 
established to (a) increase the Malays ownership of shares in limited companies, and 
                                          
2 During the British colonial period (1786-1942), Chinese and Indian immigrants were brought into 
Malaysia to work mainly in commerce, mining, and on the rubber plantations. Under the colonial labor 
policy of ‘divide and rule’ that was introduced by the British, the Chinese and Indians were segregated 
from each other and from the Malays by economic activity and geographical location. The Chinese and 
Indians were engaged in modern commercial and industrial activities (which were essentially located in 
urban areas), whereas the Malays were engaged in traditional activities such as peasant agriculture and 
fishing (which were essentially rural). The Malays were only allowed to involve in modern economic 
activities as civil servant, i.e. in police and military forces (for more information see Faaland et al., 2003).  
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(b) increase the proportion of Malays at managerial positions. The strategies that were 
formulated to pursue (a) included the promotion of Malays participation in business 
by providing them privileged access to the private sector (e.g. through the introduction 
of a quota system). An expansion of the public sector (where the Malays held most of 
the key positions) was the main strategy to pursue (b). Also the Industrial 
Coordination Act (ICA) was introduced to strengthen Malays participation in medium- 
and large-scale enterprises by requiring that the composition of employees reflected 
the composition of ethnic groups in society.  
 
  To evaluate the implications of the NEP policies on economic growth, we present 
value added growth rates by broad sectors and their percentage shares to total value 
added in Panels A and B of Table 3.1. We observe that during the period of NEP (i.e. 
1970-1990) the economy expanded at an average rate of 12% per year. It should be 
stressed that all figures are in current prices. Given an average inflation rate of 
somewhat more than 4% per year, the real growth would amount to approximately 
8%, which is still considerable. The rapid growth during this period was accompanied 
by a substantial transformation of the economic structure from an agricultural basis 
(reducing its share from 32% in 1970 to 15% in 1990) to an industrial basis (of 
manufacturing, and mining and quarrying, increasing its share from 20% in 1970 to 
36% in 1990). The expansion of the manufacturing sector is strongly accompanied by 
an outward policy orientation, i.e. by export-led growth. The contribution of 
manufacturing to total exports increased rapidly from 12% in 1970 to 85% in 1990 
(Zakariah and Ahmad, 1999). Especially in the early 1970s and 1980s, the export 
growth was largely due to resource-based products such as petroleum products, 
processed foods and chemical products (these three groups of products accounted for 
77% of total resource-based exports in 1985).3 
 
  
                                          
3 Although processed foods contribute largely to exports, it has limited backward linkages with the 
agricultural sector because it depends substantially on imported inputs. This explains why a growing 
share of manufacturing exports is not contradicted by the declining share of agriculture in the generation 
of value added. 
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Table 3.1 Value added growth and percentage share by sector, 1970-2000 
 Selected periods 
A. Average annual growth rates (%) 
  1970-1990 1990-2000 1970-2000 
  Agriculture  8.13 5.25 7.16 
  Mining and quarrying  15.59 10.28 13.79 
  Manufacturing  15.38 14.52 15.09 
  Construction  12.08 11.57 11.91 
  Services  12.60 11.61 12.27 
      Private services  13.06 12.50 12.88 
      Public services  11.06 7.31 9.80 
  Total  12.32 11.50 12.04 
     
B. Percentage shares (%)     
  1970 1990 2000 
  Agriculture  32.03 14.97 8.41 
  Mining and quarrying  6.56 11.66 10.44 
  Manufacturing  13.92 23.84 31.14 
  Construction  4.01 3.84 3.87 
  Services  43.48 45.69 46.14 
      Private services  32.38 36.46 39.86 
      Public services  11.1 9.21 6.28 
Sources: Department of Statistics Malaysia (2004, 2006) and Economic Planning Unit (various years). 
Note: Based on value added data in current prices. 
 
  This export-led growth has led to considerable employment growth. Total 
employment increased at an average rate of 3.6% per year between 1970 and 1990, 
whereas population growth was only 2.6%. The share of manufacturing in total labor 
employment increased from 14% in the mid-1970s to over 26% in the mid-1990s 
(Athukorala and Menon, 2002). Malay employment benefitted from an expansion of 
the public sector (as shown in Table 3.1, its growth rate between 1970 and 1990 was 
comparable to that of the other sectors). For all Malay workers, the share that is 
employed in the public sector increased in this period from 15% to 28%, whereas the 
share of Chinese workers in the public sector only increased by 1 percentage-point 
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(from 7% to 8%) and that of Indian workers remained unchanged at 17% (see 
Appendix 3.1). 
 
  Next, we link the changes in economic structure during the period of NEP to the 
income inequality between ethnic groups. There are several measures for income 
inequality of which the Gini coefficient and Theil’s inequality index are the most 
commonly used (see, World Bank, 2000). The Gini measure does not lend itself for a 
decomposition by population groups. For the purpose of inter-group inequalities, we 
have thus calculated the inequality of household income between ethnic groups by 
using the Theil entropy (1967) index.4Let the population be divided into a number of 
groups, i = 1, …,n (in this chapter Malays, Chinese, Indians, and Other). The Theil 


















         (3.1) 
 
where 𝑞𝑖 gives the household income of group i as a share of the total household 
income, 𝑛𝑖 the share of group i in the population. 
 
  Each column in the rows 1 − 3 in Table 3.2 indicates the contribution of each 
household group to the income inequality in 1970, 1990 (both expressed in 2000 
constant prices) and 2000. The total index of inequality between the groups is given in 
the last column (total). For example, the share of the Malays in total household income 
is smaller than their share in total population, which implies that their contribution is 
negative. The opposite is the case for the Chinese (i.e. the share in household income 
is larger than the share in population) and their contribution to the Theil index is thus 
positive. Note that if the share in household income equals the share in population, 
                                          
4 There are two Theil inequality measures: the Theil entropy index and the Theil mean log deviation index. 
They differ in their sensitivity to inequality, where the former employs income shares as weights and the 
latter uses population shares as weights. As a consequence of this, the Theil entropy index is more 
sensitive to income changes in richer parts of the population, while Theil’s mean log deviation changes 
relatively more if there are changes in incomes of poorer households. We use the entropy index because it 
is more popular in the literature.     
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the contribution to the Theil index equals zero. If this applies to all ethnic groups, 
household income is spread over the ethnic groups in an egalitarian way and the Theil 
index will be zero. That is, T is 0 if 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖 for all i. 
 
  In 1970, the Malays contributed negatively to the inequality index whereas the 
Chinese, the Indians and the Other contributed positively. Among the major ethnic 
groups, the Malays were clearly poorer than any other group and the Chinese in 
particular. A significant improvement in the distribution of income has taken place for 
the Malays between 1970 and 1990, when the negative contribution reduced from -
0.120 to -0.075. At the same time, however, the positive contribution of the Chinese to 
inequality further increased and the position of the (relatively small group of the) 
Other changed from above to below average per capita income. Taken together, this 
resulted in the rise of the total inequality index from 0.058 in 1970 to 0.088 in 1990. 
It follows from the growth rates in Table 3.2 that average income per capita increased 
in the period 1970-1990 by 62% for the total population, by 85% for the Malays, by 
95% for the Chinese, by 73% for the Indians, and it reduced by 86% for the Other. For 
the Chinese, the term log⁡(𝑞𝑖/𝑛𝑖) in (3.1) was positive and increased, which was due to 
the relatively slow population growth. The Chinese income grew somewhat less than 
the overall average income which implied that the Chinese share in total household 
income (i.e. 𝑞𝑖) has remained more or less the same (46% in 1970 and 45% in 1990). 
Consequently, the (positive) Chinese contribution to income inequality has further 
increased. The growth in Malays income per capita was above the average national 
growth implying that log⁡(𝑞𝑖/𝑛𝑖) became less negative. At the same time, the above 
average income growth for the Malays also led to an increase of their income share 𝑞𝑖. 
The improvement in the average Malays income per capita, however, was the stronger 
force of the two so that the (negative) Malay contribution to income inequality became 





Table 3.2 Income inequalities measured by Theil index, 1970-2000 (in 2000 constant 
prices) 
   Malays  Chinese Indians Other  Total  
A. Inequality of household income per capita       
Inequality 1970 (1) -0.120 0.130 0.003 0.045 0.058 
Inequality 1990 (2) -0.075 0.206 0.008 -0.051 0.088 
Inequality 2000 (3) -0.076 0.162 0.024 -0.047 0.064 
Average annual growth 1970-1990 (%)       
Income (4) 5.96 5.33 4.41 7.82 5.59 
   Population (5) 2.77 1.86 1.58 18.88 3.06 
Average annual growth 1990-2000 (%)       
Income (6) 5.06 2.94 5.52 6.02 4.26 
   Population (7) 2.88 1.42 1.88 1.50 2.22 
Average annual growth 1970-2000 (%)       
Income (8) 5.66 4.53 4.78 7.22 5.15 
   Population (9) 2.81 1.71 1.68 12.78 2.78 
B. Inequality of labor income per worker       
Inequality in 1970 (10) -0.114 0.106 0.005 0.065 0.062 
Inequality in 1990 (11) n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Inequality in 2000 (12) -0.057 0.101 0.009 -0.028 0.025 
Average annual growth in labor income (1970-2000) (13) 5.30 4.10 4.18 5.54  
Average annual growth in employment (1970-2000) (14) 3.93 3.25 3.24 12.22  
Source: Economic Planning Unit (various years) and Pyatt and Round (1984). 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
 
  It should be mentioned that the results for Other in 1970 should be interpreted 
with caution. First, data for income and population in 1970 are not entirely 
comparable to those in 1990 and 2000 due to a lack of data for east Malaysia (see 
Section 3.3.1 for further discussion). For example, the disaggregation of households 
according to ethnic groups was not available for east Malaysia. We have therefore 
assumed that the distribution of income and population of west Malaysia also applies 
to east Malaysia. Although the income and the population of west Malaysia account 
for about 85% of the total, this assumption may not be entirely accurate (in particular 
the population of Other was only 0.7% in west Malaysia but 9.3% in east Malaysia, see 
Teik, 2005). Second, the SAM has been estimated using various sources and when the 
share of income and population is small for a certain cell in the SAM, the estimation 
error may become relatively large. Taking ratios may in such cases produce outliers 




  During the period of 1991-2000, the economy was driven by the National 
Development Policy (NDP). It sought to maximize economic growth through a policy 
that allowed for free play of market mechanisms and active participation of private 
sectors (see Economic Planning Unit, various years). For example, the Promotion 
Investment Act was introduced in the late 1980s in order to attract more foreign 
capital inflows and provided more generous incentives to foreign investors. The 
reforms also involved a gradual process of privatization and restructuring of state-
owned enterprises. These market-oriented policy reforms were accompanied by a 
strong focus on maintaining macro-economic stability and meeting the infrastructure 
needs for a rapidly expanding economy.  
 
  Also the approach that the government had adopted—in the period 1970-
1990—towards income distribution was changed, especially the policies related to the 
Malay. The support now came in the form of assistance to the Malays in their 
competition with other ethnic groups, without making them rely too much on the 
government. The government thus relaxed regulations on foreign equity participation 
in the country and liberalized parts of the Industrial Coordination Act. For example, 
the requirement for industries to create an employment structure that reflected the 
ethnic composition of society was abandoned.  
 
  Economic growth was still driven by the manufacturing sector, but the 
emphasis had changed from a resource-based to a non-resource-based export-
orientation. Consequently, by the late 1990s, the share of resource-based exports 
declined whereas the share of non-resource-based exports (such as electronics, 
electrical machinery, and appliances) rose sharply as the economy moved into the 
promotion of heavy industries (Zakariah and Ahmad, 1999). The major structural shift 
within the manufacturing sector, and perhaps in the economy as a whole, was the 
emergence of electric and electronic sub-sectors as the leading export sectors. Their 
share in the total exports increased significantly from 9% in 1978 to 53% in 2000 
(Department of Statistics Malaysia, DOSM, 2004). As a consequence, agriculture as 
the traditional engine of growth became less significant, with an annual growth rate 
that dropped from 8% in the period 1970-1990 to 5% in the period 1990-2000 (see 
Panel A of Table 3.1). 
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  Income inequality for the period of the NDP shows an improvement when 
compared to the period of the NEP. The Theil index of income inequality between the 
ethnic groups decreased from 0.088 in 1990 to 0.064 in 2000, as follows from rows 2 
and 3 in Table 3.2. The income share 𝑞𝑖 of the Chinese decreased but their population 
share 𝑛𝑖 decreased more. This implied a fall in the contribution of the Chinese 
households to the Theil inequality index, i.e. a fall in )/log( iii nqq .In contrast, the 
contribution of the Indian group increased due to an increase in its income share. The 
contribution to income inequality of the Malays and the Other remained more or less 
the same. Overall, the consequences of economic growth and the transformations 
between 1970 and 2000 could not improve the distribution of income (which is 
measured in 2000 constant prices).  
 
The lower part of Table 3.2 gives the inequality in labor income per worker. 
Although labor income per worker is clearly related to the wage rate, it is not the 
same. Saari et al. (2011) show that labor participation rates and numbers of working 
hours vary substantially across ethnic groups, as a consequence of which labor 
incomes would have differed considerably even if wage rates would have been 
identical. The labor income inequalities in rows 10 and 12 are obtained by taking the 
share of group i in total labor income as 𝑞𝑖 in equation (3.1) and taking the share of 
group i in total employment as 𝑛𝑖. The labor income inequality is related to the 
household income inequality. For example, the ethnic groups’ contributions to labor 
income inequality and to household income inequality exhibit the same pattern but 
less variance, both in 1970 and in 2000. This is because approximately two-thirds of 
household income consists of labor income (labor income constitutes about 69% of 
income in 1970 and 61% in 2000). Observe, however, that labor inequality is much 
smaller than household income inequality in 2000, whereas they were similar in 1970. 
Part (but certainly not all) of the differences between household income and labor 
income inequalities can be attributed to differences in non-wage income. 
 
Rows 10 and 12 show that the contributions to labor income inequality for the 
Chinese and the Indian groups have remained almost unchanged between 1970 and 
2000. In both years, the Chinese share in labor income was clearly larger than the 
employment share, indicating that their labor income per worker was above the 
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national average. The Indian labor income per worker was more or less equal to the 
national average in both years. The labor income per worker for the Malays was well 
below average in 1970, but improved substantially. The Other saw a change in their 
position from a labor income per worker that was above average in 1970 to one that 
was below average in 2000. 
 
  There are two components that contribute to the change in labor income per 
worker inequality, i.e. the change in labor income and in employment. These changes 
are for the period 1970-2000 given in rows 13 and 14. One of the aims in this chapter 
is to identify the factors (or determinants) that have contributed to the variation in 
labor income and employment changes, and how these determinants have affected 
incomes differently across ethnic groups. From a policy point of view, the analysis 
would—admittedly—have been more insightful if we had been able to break the 
analyses into two sub-periods, i.e. 1970-1990 (the NEP period) and 1990-2000 (the 
NDP period). Unfortunately, however, the unavailability of a SAM for 1990 limits our 
analyses to the period between 1970 and 2000 as a whole. 
 
3.3 Social Accounting Matrices and Deflation Procedures 
 
3.3.1 The 1970 and 2000 SAMs 
 
For decomposing the income changes, we have used the Malaysian SAM for 1970 (see 
Pyatt and Round, 1984, for details) and the SAM for 2000 (see Saari et al., 2007).5 In 
general, the structures of a SAM may vary, depending on the policy focus and the data 
availability. Also the 1970 and 2000 SAMs are not consistent with each other in terms 
of structure and classification. Specifically, the 1970 SAM comprises the following 11 
sets of accounts: wants; factors of production; households; two accounts for 
production, one with commodities, one with activities; companies; government; 
consolidated capital; two accounts for the rest of the world, one with transactions on 
the current account, one with transactions on the capital account; and indirect taxes. 
                                          
5 The 1970 SAM includes separate accounts for Peninsular Malaysia in the west and the states of Sabah 
and Sarawak in east Malaysia. For this study, we have aggregated them so as to yield a single national 
SAM that is comparable to the 2000 SAM. 
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The 2000 SAM contains only nine sets of accounts, because it has only a single 
account for production and because it does not contain an account for wants. An 
overview of the original accounts in the two SAMs is given in Appendix 3.2. 
 
 The next step is to harmonize the 1970 and 2000 SAM, resulting in versions 
that are comparable. There are four aspects that require somewhat more explanation. 
First, the difference—between the 1970 and the 2000 SAM—in the treatment of the 
consumption of commodities by households. In the 2000 SAM, this consumption is (as 
usual) listed directly in the household account as an expenditure to the production 
account. In the 1970 SAM, however, household needs (e.g. for food, clothing, housing, 
education, medical services) appear in a special account that lists 20 of such wants. 
Each of these wants requires a bundle of commodities. For example, the want for 
medical services is fulfilled by the commodities other agricultural products, books, 
chemicals, other manufactured goods, education and health, and government services. 
The idea for the introduction of a wants account was to reclassify commodities 
according to household purposes. This reflects a policy interest during the 1970s and 
1980s in the issue of household basic needs (see, e.g., Perkins, 1978, for China; 
Kouwenaar, 1988, for Ecuador). To ensure the comparability of the 1970 and 2000 
SAMs, the wants account has been removed and household consumption has been 
converted into the typical consumption of commodities. The conversion procedure was 
as follows. The 1970 SAM lists a 20×21 matrix C and its element 𝑐𝑖𝑗 gives the 
expenditures of household group j (= 1, …, 21) on want i (= 1, …, 20). From the SAM, 
we have obtained the 26×20 shares matrix H, with typical element ℎ𝑘𝑖 indicating the 
amount of Malaysian ringgit (MR) spent on commodity k (= 1, …, 26) for each MR 
spent on want i.  The 26×21 matrix HC then gives the consumption of the 21 
household groups on each of the 26 commodities. 
 
Second, the two SAMs differ in the way they treat production. The 2000 SAM 
includes a symmetric input-output table, which implies that it is assumed that each 
industry produces only one commodity and each commodity is produced by only one 
industry. Under this assumption, it is not necessary to make a distinction between 
commodities and activities (or industries). The 1970 SAM, on the other hand, includes 
make and use matrices. These were introduced in United Nations (1968) and do not 
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require that each industry produces one and only one commodity. In general, they are 
rectangular and the make matrix gives for each industry the output of all the different 
commodities it has produced. The use matrix gives for each industry the input of 
commodities. For the purpose of this study, the 1970 make and use matrices have 
been converted into a symmetric input-output table using the industry technology 
assumption (see e.g. Miller and Blair, 2009, Chapter 5).6 
 
A third aspect is that the data for the two SAMs are not entirely comparable 
because certain data for 1970 are lacking and thus not included in the 1970 SAM. 
Information for income disaggregated according to ethnic groups is for 1970 only 
available for west Malaysia (which has a share of 84% in the total income), but not for 
east Malaysia. For the harmonization of the two SAMs, the income of east Malaysia is 
distributed over the ethnic groups by assuming that the composition of ethnic groups 
in east Malaysia is the same as in west Malaysia. A similar approach is used in the 
case of the factors of production (in particular labor). Because data for non-citizen 
households are not available for 1970, we have left the non-citizen households also 
out of the 2000 dataset. 
 
Fourth, differences also exist in terms of classifications and definition of 
production sectors, factors of production and households. For the purpose of 
consistency, the 1970 SAM was reconciled and reclassified by following closely the 
design and classification of the 2000 SAM. In its turn, the 2000 SAM had to be 
considerably aggregated in its production accounts. As a result, the harmonized 
versions of the 1970 and 2000 SAM are outlined in Table 3.3. They consist of 48 
detailed accounts: 17 production activities (commodities, or industries); 18 factors of 
production (16 types of labor, i.e. 4 ethnic groups × 2 skills × 2 geographical locations, 
and 2 types of capital, i.e. unincorporated business profits and corporate business 
profits); 8 household groups (4 ethnic groups × 2 geographical locations); and single 
(i.e. aggregate) accounts for companies, government, consolidated capital, rest of the 
world (current and capital), and indirect taxes.  
                                          
6We have applied the industry technology assumption, which is consistent with the assumption used by 
the Department of Statistics Malaysia. 
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Table 3.3 Schematic representation of the Malaysian SAMs for 1970 and 2000 
    Expenditures  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
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Notes: (PPI) = producer price index; (IPI) = import price index; (D) = redistribution; (R) = residual estimates; (S) = current value shares; (IPD) = 
implicit price deflators for value added and for type of GDP expenditure; (RAS) = updated by the RAS procedure.  
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3.3.2 Deflation procedures  
 
In order to reveal the real changes in the variables, we express the harmonized version 
of the 1970 SAM in 2000 constant prices through deflation procedures using the 
available price indices. Although it may not be common to deflate (or actually inflate) 
older money flows to a more recent period, our choice is consistent with the current 
government practice in which most of the published figures are expressed in prices of 
the most recent year (see Economic Planning Unit, various years). The price indices 
that have been used are the producer price index (PPI) and the import price index (IPI) 
which are available for 10 aggregate sectors.7 Further, we use the ‘indirect price 
deflators’ (IPD) obtained from DOSM (2004, 2006) for value added, for certain types of 
GDP expenditures (e.g. household consumption) and for a few other aggregates. The 
IPD is a deflator that is indirectly obtained from published data in constant prices. For 
example, the IPD for value added was derived from published value added data for the 
period 1970-2000, using three different base years (1970, 1978, and 1987). The data 
have been re-based to a common base year after which the IPD was obtained. The 
other price indices (PPI and IPI) were also obtained from DOSM (2004, 2006). The 
available price indices, however, are not sufficient to deflate all transactions in the 
1970 SAM. Consequently, several transactions in constant prices are obtained by 
residual imputation or by estimation.  
 
The deflation procedures are summarized in Table 3.3 by adding a superscript 
to each transaction. For the production activities (in account 1), the transactions in 
row 1 contain the intermediate demands (T1,1), household consumption (T1,3), 
government consumption (T1,5), investment expenditures (T1,6) and exports (T1,7). They 
are deflated by using the PPIs, which gives the total gross output (y1 ) in constant 
prices. This total gross output is equal to the total gross input (y1
′ ).8 For transactions 
                                          
7 The sectors are: (1) food and livestock; (2) beverages and tobacco; (3) inedible crude materials except 
fuels; (4) mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials; (5) animal and vegetable oils and fats; (6) 
chemicals and related products; (7) manufactured goods classified chiefly by material; (8) machinery and 
transport equipment; (9) miscellaneous manufactured goods; and (10) other commodities and services. 
8 In a SAM, the corresponding row and column totals of the matrix must be equal to each other, 
consistent with the accounting principle that the sum of receipts (incomes) equals the sum of outlays 
(expenditures) for each account. 
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in column 1, the imports (T7,1) are deflated by applying the IPIs. The commodity taxes 
(T9,1) are adjusted proportionately to the gross output. That is, we apply the sectoral 
shares of these taxes in the gross output (all in current prices) to the sectoral gross 
output in constant prices.9 This procedure is indicated by the superscript S (i.e. using 
current value shares). Given the total gross input and all but one input component, 
the totals of the sectoral values added (i.e. the column sums of T2,1) are obtained as 
residuals. Next, these totals are distributed over the 18 value added categories (i.e. 16 
labors and 2 capital inputs) using current value shares (additional information on, for 
example, indexes of wage rates is lacking). These two steps are indicated in Table 3.3 
by the superscripts R (i.e. residuals) and S.  
 
  For the factors of the production account (account 2), transactions in row 2 
contain factor incomes for 18 value added categories (T2,1) and the vector with factor 
incomes received from abroad (T2,7). In 1970 SAM, vector T2,7 contains only corporate 
business profits. That is, no transactions for compensation of employees and 
unincorporated business profits were recorded, implying that the first 17 elements of 
vector T2,7 are zero. Consequently, the first 17 elements of the vector y2  with total 
factor incomes are known. Element 18 (for corporate business profits) in y2  is deflated 
with the IPD for value added, after which the corporate business profits from abroad 
are then obtained residually.  
 
  For the transactions in column 2, the compensation of employees and the 
unincorporated business profits for households (T3,2) are obtained as follows. In 1970 
SAM, there is no compensation of employees and the unincorporated business profits 
paid abroad (implying that the first 17 elements in the row vector T7,2 are zero). This 
implies that the total incomes for the compensation of employees and the 
unincorporated business profits are redistributed according to the ownership of the 
factor. The labor income earned by, for example, rural skilled Malay employees and 
rural unskilled Malay employees goes entirely to the rural Malay households. The 
procedure is the same for the compensation of employees in the other seven household 
groups and is indicated in Table 3.3 by superscript D. The unincorporated business 
profits are essentially income from self-employment and they are distributed over the 
                                          
9 Note that the sum of these commodity taxes are equal to the indirect taxes as indicated in (T5,9). 
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household groups by using current value shares. Finally, the corporate business 
profits are divided over the companies (T4,2) and the rest of the world (as factor 
incomes paid abroad, T7,2), using current value shares.  
 
  Next, the net investments abroad (T8,6) in the consolidated capital account 
(account 6) are determined residually. Because aggregate savings (y6 ) in constant 
prices are obtained from applying the appropriate IPD, also the aggregate investments 
(y6
′ ) in constant prices are known. Subtracting the deflated investment expenditures 
(T1,6) yields the net investments abroad. It is important to note that net investments 
abroad and the current account deficit of the rest of the world ROW (i.e. T7,8) are the 
same. If Malaysian exports are larger than its imports, the balance on the current 
account will show a surplus for Malaysia and a deficit for the ROW (i.e. T7,8> 0). The 
balance on the capital account will thus show a deficit for Malaysia and a surplus for 
the ROW. It is recorded in the SAM as a transaction from the capital account of the 
ROW to its current account (and equals the deficit on the ROW’s current account). The 
deficit of the Malaysian capital account implies that Malaysian net investments abroad 
are positive. Hence, (T8,6) = (T7,8) which implies that the total capital paid abroad (y8) is 
now also known.  
 
  The final step in the deflation process is to determine the remainder. Note that 
by applying the appropriate IPDs, we have the total y3 , …, y7  (and thus y3
′ , …,y7
′ ) in 
constant prices. The deflated transactions that are still unknown are in the 12×12 
matrix formed by the intersection of the rows and columns of the accounts 3, …, 7. 
Because all other transactions are known (as are the totals), we can calculate the 
margins (i.e. row sums and column sums) of this 12×12 matrix. The final step then is 
to apply the RAS updating procedure to this 12×12 matrix in current prices, given its 
margins in constant prices (see Dietzenbacher and Hoen, 1998). It should be stressed 
that also other balancing techniques could have been used, such as cross entropy 
methods (see Robinson et al., 2001). Such alternative methods are typically more 
general than RAS, in the sense that they allow the use of all sorts of additional 
information and can deal with scattered and inconsistent data. If such “extras” do not 




3.4 Structural Decomposition Analyses 
 
Three decomposition analyses are involved in this study. First, we decompose the 
changes in household incomes and the changes in labor incomes. The second 
decomposition is for the changes in employment. Third, we analyze the sources of the 
changes in Theil’s inequality index for labor income per worker. 
 
3.4.1 Decomposition of the changes in income 
 
Within the context of a SAM, a number of studies have decomposed the economy-wide 
multiplier effects on income (reflecting the endogenous components of the model). For 
example, Pyatt and Round (1979) introduced the multiplicative decomposition, Stone 
(1985) developed the additive decomposition which was extended by Defourney and 
Thorbecke (1984) with a structural path analysis, and Thorbecke and Jung (1996) 
used a multiplicative decomposition for a certain sub-account in a SAM. These studies 
were decompositions of SAM multipliers at a single point of time. Recently, Llop (2007) 
analyzed the changes in SAM multipliers over time. In order to provide a full 
description of the changes in income, however, not only the changes in the 
endogenous components (i.e. the SAM multipliers) matter, but also the changes in the 
exogenous components. This study attempts to fill this gap by disentangling the 
changes in income into the changes in the endogenous and the exogenous parts (and 
their constituent components). For this we will use a structural decomposition 
analysis that has become familiar within the input-output literature. 
 
We start by defining the first four accounts (production, factors, households, 
and companies) as endogenous and the remaining five accounts as exogenous.10 Using 



















































































    (3.2) 
                                          
10 See Pyatt (2001) for useful comments on the choice of endogenous and exogenous accounts. 
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where the matrices (or vectors, or scalars)
1ˆ  jijij yTA  give the average expenditure 
propensities for the endogenous accounts. That is, the average share of the income in 
account j that goes to account i. The model in (3.2) can also be written as 
 
xBzz            (3.3) 
 
which is the standard SAM model, with z denoting the vector of incomes for the 
endogenous accounts, B the square matrix with average expenditure propensities for 
the endogenous accounts and x the vector of exogenous expenditures or incomes. In 
the current case, B  is a 44×44 matrix that consists of the following submatrices: 11A  
the 17×17 matrix with domestically produced intermediate input coefficients (reflecting 
the input-output linkages); 21A  the 18×17 matrix with value added (factor income) 
coefficients; 32A the 8×18 matrix with income coefficients for households; 42A the 1×18 
matrix (row vector)with income coefficients for companies; 13A  the 17×8 matrix with 
the coefficients of domestic consumption by households; and 34A  the 8×1 matrix 
(column vector) representing the coefficients for the distribution of the companies’ 
profits to the households.  
 
  For the vector of exogenous components )(x , we would like to separate certain 
components. These are, the split of final demands for domestic products into 
government consumption )( gx , investments )( sx , exports )( ex , the factor incomes 
from abroad )( fx , and the domestic and foreign institutional transfers )( hx . Using 























































































x hfesg  
 




)( hfesg xxxxxBzz   .      (3.4) 
  
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) are solved as 
 
)( hfesg xxxxxMMxz        (3.5) 
 
with
1)(  BIM the inverse matrix with SAM multipliers. Equation (3.5) shows that 
the incomes of the endogenous accounts can be obtained by simply post-multiplying 
the inverse matrix M with the vector x of exogenous incomes or expenditures.  
 
When SAMs for two different points in time (say 0 and 1) are available, we can 
decompose the changes in endogenous incomes over time by taking the first difference 
of (3.5): 
 
001101 xMxMzzz   
)()()()( 01010101 xMxMxxMxMM     (3.6a) 
)()()()( 10011001 xMxMxxMxMM     (3.6b) 
 
Accordingly, the change in incomes between the base year (0) and the end year (1) can 
be decomposed into the effects that are due to changes in the endogenous )( M and in 
the exogenous )( x components of income. 
 
The issue of the non-uniqueness of structural decomposition forms has received 
considerable attention in the literature. For example, (3.6a) and (3.6b) are equivalent 
expressions but produce different outcomes because they apply different weights for 
the two components (or determinants). For the case with more than two determinants, 
Dietzenbacher and Los (1998) show that the average of the two polar decompositions—
similar to (3.6a) and (3.6b)—yield a very good approximation of the average of all the 
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1 xxMxMMz         (3.7) 
 
The change in the multiplier matrix M, can be expressed in terms of the change in the 
average expenditure propensities matrix A, as follows. 
 010101 )]()[)(Δ MBIBIMMMM 0011 )( MBBM   and similarly 
1010 )(Δ MBBMM  . Therefore,  
 
1001 )Δ()Δ(Δ MBMMBMM          (3.8) 
 






1 zBMzBMxMBMxMBMxxM   (3.9) 
 
Combining the elements of equations (3.7) and (3.9), we have 
 ])Δ()Δ([Δ 10012




gxMM        (3.10b) 
   
 )Δ)(( 102
1
sxMM         (3.10c) 
 )Δ)(( 102
1
exMM         (3.10d) 
 )Δ)(( 102
1
fxMM        (3.10e) 
)Δ)(( 102
1
hxMM          (3.10f) 
 
According to (3.10), the change in the incomes of the endogenous accounts can be 
decomposed into the effects that are determined by the changes in: (3.10a) average 
expenditure propensities for the endogenous accounts; (3.10b) government 
                                          
11 Recently, de Boer (2008) proposed the use of the so-called Montgomery decomposition as an alternative 
for the average of the polar decompositions or the average of all decompositions. His results, however, 
show only modest differences between the three alternatives. 
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consumption; (3.10c) investments; (3.10d) exports; (3.10e) factor income transfers 
from abroad; and (3.10f) institutional income transfers.  
 
  Note that the matrix B contains several submatrices, which allows us to 
decompose the change in the average expenditure propensities into its constituent 
parts. As a consequence, we can establish the effects of changing interdependencies 




1 zBMzBM    
  ])(d)(d[ 111001112
1 zAMzAM       (3.11a) 
 ])(d)(d[ 121002112
1 zAMzAM       (3.11b) 
 ])(d)(d[ 113001312
1 zAMzAM       (3.11c) 
 ])(d)(d[ 134003412
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and similar definitions for 21dA , 13dA and 34dA . Equations (3.11) break down the 
change in the average expenditure propensities into the effects of: (3.11a) changes in 
the use of domestically produced intermediate inputs; (3.11b) changes in the 
compensation of labor and capital; (3.11c) changes in consumption coefficients; 
(3.11d) changes in the distribution of companies’ profits to households; and (3.11e) 
changes in the income coefficients for the households and companies. Combining 
equations (3.10) and (3.11), decomposes the change in incomes into 10 separate 
determinants. Notice that each of the 10 decomposition forms yields a 44-element 
vector. The first 17 elements give the changes in production outputs, the second 18 
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elements reveal the changes in factor incomes, the next 8 elements list the changes in 
household incomes and the last element gives the change in the income of companies. 
 
  For the interpretation of the empirical results, it is important to discuss the role 
of imports. Although imports are not included in our model (3.2), they may affect the 
coefficient changes ∆𝐀11 and ∆𝐀21. For a small and open economy like Malaysia, 
policies that stimulate export growth also increase imports. For example, exports and 
imports have increased on average by 12% and 13% per year between 1987 and 2000 
(in 1987 prices) so that the ratio of exports over imports decreased from 1.28 to 1.10 
(see Department of Statistics Malaysia, various years). Export activities are mostly 
driven by multinational corporations (MNCs) that were offered favorable tax incentives 
(e.g. exemption from import duties) and infrastructure facilities (e.g. free trade 
industrial zones). These activities rely heavily on imported inputs that have no or few 
backward linkages to domestically-owned industries, in particular small and medium 
sized enterprises (see, Hobday, 2001). Import growth may therefore have two effects. 
First, if domestically produced inputs are substituted for imported inputs, the matrix 
𝐀11will decrease.Second, if offshoring activities (and thus the outputs of certain 
industries) increase largely and if only relatively little domestic inputs and factors are 
used, the coefficients in 𝐀11 and 𝐀21 (measuring inputs per unit of output) will 
decrease. 
 
  One way to account for the use of imports in our modeling formulation is to 
introduce a matrix of technical coefficients (with the sum of domestically produced 
and imported inputs) and a matrix of so-called trade coefficients (with the share of 
imports for each input) that can be derived from the full matrix of imports (see 
Oosterhaven and van der Linden, 1997). However, this standard solution is not 
possible because a full matrix of imports is not available for 1970 (when imports were 
treated as non-competitive and given in a row vector). Alternatively, an approach 
developed by Dietzenbacher and Los (2000) for a different case may be applied but 
would require further methodological development, which is beyond scope of this 
study. In any case, it should be taken into account that some of our interpretations 
(especially about the effects of changes in 𝐀21, which we call changes in factor 
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compensation per unit of gross output) are incomplete because we cannot quantify the 
role that imports have on certain coefficients.  
 
3.4.2 Decomposition of the changes in employment 
 
In order to decompose the change in employment )Δ( e , we have compiled data on 
employment across production sectors for the periods 1970 and 2000. The main data 
source for employment in 1970 is Pyatt and Round (1984) and figures for employment 
in 2000 can be obtained from the household income survey (see Department of 
Statistics Malaysia, 2001). However, employment data for 1970 appear not to be 
entirely comparable to those for 2000. First, employment data for ethnic groups was 
only available in 1970 for west Malaysia, but not for east Malaysia. Total employment 
in east Malaysia was about 17% of the total employment in Malaysia (see Economic 
Planning Unit, various years). To make the comparison possible, we have assumed 
that the 1970 ethnic distribution of employment for west Malaysia applied also to east 
Malaysia. Second, employment data for 1970 for different skills are not comparable to 
data for 2000, while also data are lacking. We therefore focus on aggregated 
employment (i.e. no distinction according to skill types) and have eight employment 
categories (4 ethnic groups × 2 geographical locations).  
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where L  is the 8×44 matrix with labor coefficients (i.e. labor per unit of output). Note 
that labor coefficients only apply to the 17 production sectors. L thus consists of two 
sub-matrices: an 8×17 matrix with the actual labor coefficients and an 8×27 matrix 
that is entirely zero. Equation (3.12a) gives the effect on the changes in employment 
due to changes in the use of labor per unit of output. The interpretation of equations 
(3.12b) – (3.12g) is similar to the interpretation of equations (3.10). Note  that (3.12b) 
can be further decomposed in the same fashion as (3.10a) was further decomposed in 
(3.11).  
 
3.4.3 Decomposition of the change in Theil’s inequality index 
 
To measure the inequality between the ethnic groups in terms of household income 
per capita and labor income per worker, we have adopted the Theil (1967) index of 























qT             
 
where 𝑞𝑖
1 gives the share of group i in total labor income and𝑛𝑖
1the share of group i in 
total employment. Similar to (3.6a) and (3.6b), the change in the Theil index between 















































































































































































































q         (3.13b) 
 
The first two terms in (3.13a) and (3.13b) indicate the effect on the Theil index of the 
changes in the labor income shares ( iq ), whereas the last two terms in (3.13a) and 
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qn  (3.15) 
 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
 
When discussing income inequality, often income per capita is taken into account. We 
will therefore start our analyses (in Section 3.5.1) with a very simple decomposition of 
changes in income per capita into changes in household incomes and changes in 
population. Given our interest in the effects of policy reforms, we will focus on income 
changes for ethnic groups. Section 3.5.2 studies changes in household incomes and 
labor incomes (which account for 58% of the household income changes). Section 
3.5.3 gives the decomposition of Theil’s index for inequality in labor income. Our 
results show that changes in the employment structure play an important role. They 
are therefore further decomposed in section 3.5.4. 
 
3.5.1 Decomposing changes in income per capita 
 
Table 3.4 focuses on household income per capita and on the decomposition of its 
change over time. For each ethnic group, rows 1 and 2 show the household incomes in 
1970 and 2000, rows 3 and 4 give the population sizes, and rows 5 and 6 list the per 
capita incomes. The changes in per capita income between 1970 and 2000 and the 
average annual growth rates are given in rows 7 and 8. Using ?̅?𝑖
1 for the household 
income and ?̅?𝑖
1 for the population of group i in period 1 (= 2000), we have that the 




  Observe that the gap between per capita income for rural and for urban 
households has decreased considerably. The income gaps between the ethnic groups, 
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however, increased substantially, in particular for rural households. The changes (and 
thus the growth rates) in real per capita income were positive for the three major 
ethnic groups but incomes of the Chinese and Indians grew faster than those of the 
Malays. The changes in the Malaysian economy led to an increase in inequality of per 
capita income. Adapting equation (7) to the case at hand, straightforwardly yields for 
the two contributing components 
 





















and the results are given in rows 9 and 10 of Table 3.4. If only the household income 
would have changed as is actually observed, while at the same the population size 
would have remained unchanged, the per capita income of the average Malaysian 
would have increased by 8.4 thousand MR. The growth in the population, however, 
has an opposite effect and would have decreased the income of the average Malaysian 
person by 5.2 thousand MR. 
 
  The same pattern is observed for all urban household groups. They show a 
large positive contribution of income growth to the change in per capita income and an 
even larger negative contribution of population growth. Although the sizes of the two 
components differ, the sum of  the two opposing forces is fairly similar. For rural 
households, income growth and population growth contribute both positively to the 
change in per capita income of the Chinese and the Indians. These two effects are 
opposing each other for the Malays. The relatively high per capita income for the group 
of (in particular urban) Other in 1970 should be interpreted with caution. As 
mentioned earlier in Section 2, data reconciliation procedures may have led to results 
that cannot be given a reasonable explanation. Population growth is taken exogenous 


























A. Income levels (billion MR), population (million persons) and per capita income (thousand MR per person) 
Income 1970 (1) 8.92 5.63 1.75 0.27 3.60 9.44 1.74 0.76 32.11 
Income 2000 (2) 25.18 10.06 3.87 4.51 40.13 46.83 10.31 3.85 144.74 
Population 1970 (3) 4.45 2.06 0.72 0.05 0.65 1.37 0.29 0.03 9.61 
Population 2000 (4) 7.04 1.53 0.59 1.98 4.64 4.16 1.09 0.86 21.89 
Per capita income 1970  (5) 2.00 2.73 2.42 5.28 5.57 6.91 5.90 29.77 3.34 
Per capita income 2000  (6) 3.57 6.56 6.58 2.28 8.65 11.26 9.43 4.50 6.61 
B. Total changes in per capita income (1970-2000) 
Per capita income (7) 1.57 3.82 4.16 -3.00 3.09 4.35 3.53 -25.27 3.27 
Growth rate per capita income (%)a (8) 1.95 2.96 3.39 -2.76 1.48 1.64 1.57 -6.10 2.30 
C. Decomposition of per capita income changes (thousand MR per person) 
Contribution of changes in: 
Household income (9) 2.98 2.52 3.26 42.46 32.23 18.18 18.51 62.06 8.43 
Population (10) -1.41 1.30 0.90 -45.46 -29.15 -13.83 -14.98 -87.33 -5.16 
Notes: (a) average annual growth rate. (7) = (6) – (5) = (9) + (10). 
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3.5.2 Decomposing changes in household incomes and labor incomes 
 
This section presents and discusses the results for the decomposition of changes in 
household incomes and labor incomes. The calculations are based on equations (3.10) 
and (3.11) where ∆𝐳 is broken down into 10 components. Note that ∆𝐳 is a 44-element 
vector, see equations (3.2) and (3.3). The 8 household incomes (4 ethnic groups, rural 
and urban) are in the elements 36-43. The 16 labor incomes (4 ethnic groups, rural 
and urban, skilled and unskilled) are in the elements 18-33. 
 
  The levels of the household incomes in 1970 (in constant prices of 2000) and 
2000 are given in rows 1 and 2 of Table 3.5, the total changes and the average annual 
growth rates between 1970 and 2000 are given in rows 3 and 4. Urban households are 
found to benefit substantially more from the structural transformation of the economy 
than rural households. Whereas in 1970 the total household income of rural 
households was more or less the same as that of urban households, they were very 
different in 2000. The average annual growth in income for urban households was 
more than 3 times the growth rate for rural households. For the changes among the 
three major ethnic groups, we observe that relative income changes were the largest 
for the Malays, the smallest for the Chinese, with the Indians in between, which holds 
both for rural and urban areas. Setting the income growth rate of Malay households at 
100, the growth rates for Chinese and Indian households have indexes of 56 and 76 in 
rural areas, and 66 and 73 in urban areas.  
 
   Rows 5 to 14 in Table 3.5 show—for each ethnic group—the decomposition of 
the change in household income. Each row corresponds to one of the 10 components 
as given in equations (3.10) and (3.11). The contribution of each component is 
expressed as a percentage of the total income change (for the corresponding ethnic 
group). For example, the changes in the domestically produced intermediate input 
coefficients explain 20.1% of the 16.3 billion MR (BMR) income change for rural Malay 
households, which is equivalent to 3.3 BMR. Note that the sum over the 10 
























A. Income levels (billion MR)  
Income 1970 (1) 8.92 5.63 1.75 0.27 3.60 9.44 1.74 0.76 32.11 
Income 2000 (2) 25.18 10.06 3.87 4.51 40.13 46.83 10.31 3.85 144.74 
B. Total changes (1970-2000) 
Income (billion MR) (3) 16.26 4.43 2.12 4.24 36.53 37.39 8.57 3.09 112.63 
Growth rate in income (%)a (4) 3.52 1.96 2.67 9.84 8.38 5.49 6.12 5.54 5.15 
C. Decomposition of total income changes (%) 
Contribution of changes in: 
Intermediate inputs (ΔA11) (5) 20.1 38.9 29.2 -1.8 5.1 16.1 21.9 -12.6 13.2 
Compensation  of labor and capital (ΔA21) (6) -180.1 -559.5 -291.6 10.9 -19.2 -133.2 -95.0 -119.9 -114.0 
Income coefficients (ΔAinc) (7) -49.3 -104.4 -40.6 18.1 12.2 6.7 -6.6 12.6 -5.3 
Consumption coefficients (ΔA13) (8) -2.3 13.7 11.8 1.4 2.6 3.0 10.7 5.0 3.3 
Distributed profits (ΔA34) (9) -4.2 -68.3 -3.1 4.6 -0.3 -27.3 -0.8 3.6 -12.3 
Government consumption (Δxg) (10) 47.6 69.4 51.6 15.4 21.8 20.3 26.7 29.2 27.8 
Investments (Δxs) (11) 35.4 103.5 43.7 7.0 10.0 30.6 18.7 23.0 25.7 
Exports (Δxe) (12) 219.6 585.8 283.7 40.1 60.6 176.1 115.9 153.3 152.7 
Factor income transfers (Δxf) (13) 6.9 14.4 7.7 2.0 2.5 4.5 3.8 3.2 4.5 
Institutional transfers (Δxh) (14) 6.2 6.6 7.6 2.4 4.7 3.2 4.8 2.5 4.4 
Notes: (a) average annual growth rate. (3) = (2) – (1) and (5) + … (14) = 100. 
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  Two components—the expansion of the exports and the changes in the 
compensation for the use of labor and capital inputs—are by far the most important 
determinants for the changes in household income. For the contribution of the exports 
growth, if only the exports had changed in the way they actually have (and all other 
things would have remained unchanged) the income of rural households would have 
increased by 69 BMR and the income of urban households by 103 BMR. The 69 BMR 
contribution of export growth to the rural income increase (of 27 BMR) is relatively 
much more than the 103 BMR export growth contribution to the urban increase (of 86 
BMR). This explains why the percentages in row 12 of Table 3.5 are much larger for 
rural than for urban households. Export growth between 1970 and 2000 has had a 
substantial positive influence on the income situation for all households. In 
comparison to all the other developments, export growth was more important for rural 
than for urban households. Export growth alone would have led to a smaller gap in 
2000 between rural and urban household incomes. Among the three major ethnic 
groups, export growth has generated relatively the largest effect on income growth for 
the Chinese, followed by the Indians, while relatively the smallest effect was observed 
for Malay households.  
 
  For the contribution of the changes in the compensation of labor and capital 
inputs (per ringgit of output), the outcomes show a similar pattern as the outcomes for 
export growth except that they point in the opposite direction. Under the ceteris 
paribus clause, the changes in the compensation of factor inputs would have 
decreased rural household income by 60 BMR and urban household income by 69 
BMR. Again, in terms of percentage contributions to the income changes, the effect of 
factor compensation changes is much larger for rural than for urban households. 
Changes in the compensation of labor and capital inputs have had a negative impact 
on all household incomes, but—when compared to other developments—much more 
for rural than for urban households. Also the ordering between the three major ethnic 
groups is the same as for the effects of export growth. The negative effects were 
relatively the largest for the Chinese, followed by the Indians, and the Malays. 
 
  It follows that two very strong forces have been at work between 1970 and 2000 
in Malaysia. For both changes, the effects on rural household incomes were relatively 
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much stronger than the effects on urban household incomes. However, the forces 
work in opposite directions and the effects partly cancel each other out. The question 
is what the effect is of the resultant. Using the sum of rows 6 and 12, we can calculate 
that the combination of just these two effects would have led to an income growth of 
10 BMR for rural households and 34 BMR for urban households. This implies that the 
combination of export growth and changes in the compensation of labor and capital 
inputs contributed a very similar share of the income growth for rural (where the 
contribution is 37%) and urban households (where it is 40%). 
 
  At the national level, export growth and the changes in the compensation of 
labor and capital inputs contribute 39% of the overall growth in household income. 
Other sizeable components are government consumption (28%) and investments 
(26%). Observe that their effects on incomes of ethnic groups or on rural versus urban 
households are more evenly spread. The rest of the components show a small effect on 
income changes at the national level, each less than 15% and together they contribute 
only 7%.  
 
  Table 3.6 presents the changes in labor income and the contribution of changes 
in the compensation of labor and capital inputs (in column 3), changes in exports (in 
column 4), and all other changes taken together (in column 5). Observe in column 1 
that the growth in labor income across geographical locations and ethnic groups 
shows a large similarity with the growth in household income, i.e. urban workers and 
Malay labor show the largest income changes. Observe also that labor income changes 
for skilled workers are much larger than for unskilled workers (which are even 
negative for the three major ethnic groups in rural areas).  
 
  These outcomes can be explained from the shift in employment from unskilled 
to skilled labor. Is this shift due to significant changes in the production technologies 
from traditional activities (which are essentially labor-intensive) to ‘modern’ activities 
(which are essentially capital-intensive)? As indicated in an earlier stage, our model 
cannot examine explicitly to what extent the employment shift is due to the effects of 
technological change and to what extent to import substitution. Nevertheless, our data 
do indicate that it is a mix of both underlying causes. A comparison of the import 
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requirements per unit of output (obtained from vector T7,1) between 1970 and 2000 
shows that imports for almost all sectors (with the exception of Oils and fats, Meat and 
dairy, Mining products, Petroleum products, and Private sector services) have 
increased with an average of 65%. For the matrix T2,1, we find that the coefficient for 
capital income has increased by an average of 35% whereas that for labor income has 
decreased by 51%. Note, however, that there is a sharp distinction between unskilled 
labor (the income coefficient of which has reduced on average by 85%) and skilled 
labor (with an average increase of 18%). These observations suggest that labor income 
for unskilled workers was reduced due to both import substitution and ‘skill biased 
technological change’. The increases in the incomes for capital and skilled labor (which 
are complementary factors) are in line with this technological change.  
 
Table 3.6 Decomposition of changes in labor and capital incomes 1970-2000 
  




ΔA21 Δxe Other 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Rural-Malays-unskilled -1.60 -1.31 -1,227.7 949.5 178.2 
Rural-Malays-skilled 11.49 9.87 25.1 36.5 38.3 
Rural-Chinese-unskilled -1.05 -1.40 -1,528.4 1,211.4 217.0 
Rural-Chinese-skilled 3.52 6.61 -75.4 104.0 71.4 
Rural-Indians-unskilled -0.33 -1.06 -1,236.8 887.7 249.1 
Rural-Indians-skilled 1.14 7.35 -39.4 67.4 72.0 
Rural-other-unskilled 0.90 9.01 28.3 58.4 13.3 
Rural-other-skilled 1.37 7.53 25.8 28.0 46.2 
Urban-Malays-unskilled 0.32 0.54 -3,620.6 2,453.3 1,267.3 
Urban-Malays-skilled 21.42 10.62 29.3 32.2 38.5 
Urban-Chinese-unskilled 1.28 0.83 -3,063.8 2,314.1 849.7 
Urban-Chinese-skilled 20.49 8.14 -33.3 92.0 41.4 
Urban-Indians-unskilled 0.55 2.05 -873.7 583.1 390.6 
Urban-Indians-skilled 4.47 8.53 -12.9 55.5 57.3 
Urban-other-unskilled 0.48 6.17 -55.3 99.0 56.3 
Urban-other-skilled 1.03 3.41 -300.1 325.1 75.0 
Total labor 65.5 4.68 -151.9 172.7 79.2 
Total capital 218.0 9.07 2.2 73.6 24.2 
Notes: (2) indicates the average annual growth rates. (3) ΔA21 = changes in the compensation of labor and 
capital. (4)Δxe = changes in exports.(5) shows the total contribution of the other 8 components. (3) + (4) + 




  Using Malaysian manufacturing data, Tan (2004) confirms that technological 
change is biased towards the use of skilled workers such as professionals, technicians 
and managers. Our findings are also in line with the recent consensus that skill 
biased technological change is considered as the main explanation for income 
inequality (see for example, Bernard and Jensen, 1997; Kijima, 2006). Moreover, the 
‘modern’ activities are mostly concentrated in urban areas as industrial development 
in Malaysia is closely related to the transformations of urban areas (see Institute of 
Developing Economies, 1997). Urban skilled labor thus benefitted the most from the 
structural change in production technology. 
 
  In line with the ‘skill biased technological change’, column 3 indicates that the 
changes in the compensation of labor and capital inputs led to substantial decreases 
in the labor incomes of all groups of unskilled workers. For the groups of skilled 
workers, the decreases were much smaller (not only in terms of percentages but also 
in money terms). Note that the labor income of Malay skilled workers even increased 
(both in rural and in urban areas). Export growth led to large labor income increases, 
as was the case for household incomes. However, where the positive influence of 
export growth was able to offset the negative influence of changes in labor and capital 
input compensation in the case of household incomes, this does not apply to labor 
incomes. For the three major ethnic groups, we see that the combined effect on labor 
income is negative for (both rural and urban) unskilled workers. For the groups of 
skilled workers the combined effect is always positive. Our results suggest that an 
export promotion strategy in developing countries could potentially generate income 
and reduce inequality (see for example, Mohammad, 1981; Meschi and Vivarelli, 
2009). But our results also show that the net effect of export growth depends on two 
aspects: technological intensity (i.e. labor-intensive versus capital-intensive) and 
import requirements. A capital-intensive technology benefits skilled labor and a large 
reliance on imports generates leakages of the effects. 
 
  In summary, household income of the Malays and the labor income of skilled 
workers (and the Malays in particular) grew the most between 1970 and 2000. Export 
growth had a huge positive influence on this outcome. A very large negative influence 
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was exerted by the changes in the compensation of labor (and capital) inputs. Whereas 
total gross output increased from 90.2 BMR in 1970 (in 2000 prices) to 888.5 BMR in 
2000 (as follows from Table 3.8, which will be discussed later), labor payments grew 
only from 22.3 BMR in 1970 to 87.7 BMR in 2000. As a consequence, the average 
labor coefficient in 𝐀21 thus decreased from 0.25 in 1970 to 0.10 in 2000. Appendix 
3.1 contains the employment figures and shows that employment increased from 2.8 
million people in 1970 to 8.8 million in 2000. The output per worker therefore 
increased from 32.4 thousand MR per worker in 1970 to 100.7 in 2000.12 This, 
however, did not lead to a substantial increase in the annual wage rate, which was 8.0 
thousand MR per worker in 1970 and 9.9 in 2000. This explains why the changes in 
the labor compensation coefficients had such an enormous effect.  
 
  The figures in the previous paragraph were all at the national level (or overall 
averages) and thus hide information on shifts between ethnic groups, between rural 
and urban areas, and between skilled and unskilled labor. The figures in Appendix 3.1 
show that in particular the employment for urban Malays has increased very much 
(both in absolute and in relative sense). The coefficients in 𝐀21 decrease less (or 
increase more) for urban than for rural workers, less for skilled than for unskilled 
workers, and less for Malay than for Chinese or Indian workers.  
 
  The results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 also showed that the export growth had a 
relatively small percentage effect on income growth of the Malays when compared to 
the Indians and the Chinese. It appears from Appendix 3.1 that a large share of the 
Malays is employed in the public sector, which is focused primarily on the domestic 
market and is thus rather insensitive to changes in export demand. The share of 
Malay workers in the public services sectors (Education and health, and Government 
services) has increased from 15% in 1970 to 22% in 2000. The opposite holds for the 
Chinese and Indians. Their small share of employment in the public sector declined 
further—from 7% to 6% for the Chinese and from 17% to 12% for the Indians. Within 
                                          
12 In the presence of a large import dependency in 2000, one should be very careful in interpreting this 
change in output per worker as pure labor productivity growth. The large change in output per worker is 
partly caused by the growth in imports. At the same time, however, processing trade activities are not 




the public services, the share of skilled employment has risen from 25% in 1970 to 
90% in 2000. 
 
  The changes in Malaysia’s employment structure were a result of exogenous 
forces that erected direct and indirect barriers among ethnic groups, preventing long-
run equalizing tendencies in the market to occur over time. For example, the NEP 
strategy for restructuring the society was implemented through an expansion of the 
public services sectors where the priority had been given to the Malay. The output 
growth in the public services sectors was not as large as in other sectors because the 
public sector did not have an export orientation. These two aspects (public services 
favoring the employment of Malay workers and the lack of export orientation) explain 
why our results show that the changes in exports and in the compensation of labor 
and capital inputs generate relatively smaller percentage effects on income for the 
Malay than for the Chinese and the Indian.  
 
3.5.3 Decomposing changes in labor income inequality 
 
In the previous subsection we have discussed the sources of labor income changes for 
the individual ethnic groups without explicitly linking them to the issue of inequality 
in the distribution of income. This section examines the changes in labor income 
inequality. The results for Theil’s index of inequality (T) are given in Table 3.7. It gives 
each ethnic group’s contribution to the inequality index in 1970 (in row 1) and 2000 
(in row 2), and their difference (in row 3). For example, for rural Malays we find a large 
negative contribution in 1970 indicating that their income share was clearly smaller 
than their employment share. This is still the case in 2000, but to a much lesser 
extent and the difference in row 3 is positive. For urban Malays, we see a strong 
positive contribution to the inequality index in 1970 (with the labor income share 
larger than the employment share) which decreased in 2000. The difference in row 3 
between the contribution in 2000 and 1970 is thus negative. In both cases, however, 
have the changes over time enhanced equality, which is indicated by the + in 




  The main observation here is that all the rural households (except Other in 
1970) contribute negatively to the inequality whereas the urban households contribute 
positively, which holds for both periods. With their labor income shares being smaller 
than their employment shares, rural households are poorer than urban households. 
The differences between 1970 and 2000 indicate that the situation (in terms of 
inequality) has improved, the rural households have gained at the cost of urban 
households. Although there is still a gap between rural and urban households, it is 
smaller in 2000 than it was in 1970 as witnessed by the decline in the total inequality 
from 0.161 in 1970 to 0.061 in 2000. Among rural households, the Malays were and 
are the poorest, but their negative contribution has improved the most. Among urban 
households, the Chinese were and are the richest but their positive contribution to the 
Theil index has substantially reduced indicating a loss in their relatively advantageous 
position.  
 
  There are two components that contribute to the change in Theil’s inequality 
index: the change in the income share and the change in the employment share. The 
contribution of these two components is given in rows 5 and 6 of Table 3.7. Observe 
that the contributions work in opposite directions (except for urban Other) and that 
the change in employment shares has the largest effect. For urban Malays, for 
example, if the employment shares would have changed as they did while the income 
shares would have remained unchanged, the contribution to the Theil index would 
have dropped (by -0.247) from 0.083 in 1970 to -0.164 in 2000. Rural households 
(except Other) show a negative contribution to the inequality index in 1970, implying 
that their employment share is larger than their income share. The strong positive 
outcomes in row 6 for rural households point at a significant reduction in employment 
shares. For urban households, it is exactly the other way around, the results in row 6 
point at large increases in employment shares. The income shares for rural 
households (which were relatively low) have further declined (except for Other), but 
less than the employment shares, so that the combined effect is positive. For urban 
households, the income shares (which were already relatively large) have further 
increased, but less than the employment shares. The combined effect reduces the 




  Our results reflect the effect of a significant shift in Malaysia’s labor structure 
between 1970 and 2000. The concentration of labor in urbanized areas has mainly 
been driven by the shifts in economic structure, i.e. the transition from agricultural 
(essentially rural) to industrial (essentially urban) activities. In the early stage of 
development, agricultural activities are characterized by low average incomes whereas 
industrial activities yield higher average incomes. This income differential leads to 
migration from rural to urban areas. In a later stage of development, migration puts a 
downward pressure on the wage rates in urban areas, which in turn affects the 
aggregate urban income growth and the share of urban households in national labor 
income. 
 
  Focusing on the major ethnic groups, the inequality reduction is the largest for 
rural Malays and for urban Chinese. In both cases, there is a large difference between 
the change in income shares and employment shares. For the Indians we find that 
their income and employment shares are almost equal, which holds for both 1970 and 
2000. The changes for the Indians thus only had a negligible effect on the reduction of 
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Inequality in 1970 (1) -0.144 -0.031 -0.008 0.007 0.083 0.167 0.016 0.070 0.161 
Inequality in 2000 (2) -0.086 -0.005 -0.004 -0.023 0.055 0.110 0.015 -0.001 0.061 
Change in inequality (3) 0.058 0.026 0.004 -0.030 -0.028 -0.058 -0.001 -0.071 -0.100 
Contribution to equality (4) (+) (+) (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
Decomposition of total change           
Chg. in income share (Δyi) (5) -0.036 -0.088 -0.033 0.018 0.219 0.034 0.027 -0.012 0.127 
Chg. in employment share (Δni) (6) 0.095 0.115 0.037 -0.048 -0.247 -0.091 -0.028 -0.059 -0.227 
Notes: The results are derived from equations (14) and (15); (3) = (2) – (1) = (5) + (6); the contribution to equality in row (4) is positive (+) if the 
contribution in row 2 for 2000 is (in absolute sense) closer to zero than the contribution in row 1 for 1970. 
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3.5.4 Decomposing changes in production and employment 
 
Subsections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 pointed at the importance of the changes in Malaysia’s 
employment structure. This section thus focuses on the decomposition of employment 
for which the decomposition of gross outputs is an important determinant (and which 
is therefore discussed first). The production figures for 1970 (in prices of 2000) are 
given in Table 3.8, together with the changes (in BMR) over the period 1970-2000. 
National gross output increased from 90.2 BMR to 888.5 BMR. Industries that have 
witnessed an enormous growth (in both absolute and relative sense) are Machinery 
and vehicles (industry 11), Trade, transport and communication (14), Private sector 
services (15), and Other manufactured goods (9). The results show that their growth is 
strongly linked to the growth in exports. Other findings that are in line with the 
intuition are: transfers have little effect; government consumption is an important 
factor for the growth in Education and health (industry 16) and Government services 
(17); investments determine to a large part the output growth of Construction (13); 
and the consumption pattern shows a clear shift with a negative effect on the output 
of food-related industries (Other agricultural products, industry 1; Meats and dairy, 4; 














Changes ΔA11 ΔA21 ΔAinc ΔA13 ΔA34 Δxg Δxs Δxe Δxf Δxh 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Production sectors              
Other agricultural products (1) 5.06       4.14  -1.55  -15.75  -1.21  -7.25  -1.52  3.33  3.10  24.06  0.48  0.47  
Rubber products (2) 9.14       3.26  -2.14  -2.47  -0.11  -0.78  -0.25  0.64  1.12  7.11  0.07  0.07  
Oils and fats (3) 2.09     35.63  11.18  -2.83  -0.26  0.60  -0.25  1.06  0.13  25.65  0.17  0.17  
Meats and dairy (4) 4.53       4.96  1.22  -15.66  -1.13  -7.38  -1.63  3.36  3.70  21.53  0.48  0.47  
Wood and furniture (5) 5.05     27.62  -1.51  -2.01  -0.10  -0.88  -0.18  0.74  5.55  25.89  0.06  0.07  
Fish (6) 1.77       3.49  1.11  -6.47  -0.37  -1.74  -0.85  1.28  1.35  8.79  0.20  0.18  
Mining products (7) 8.33     35.38  -22.11  -3.29  -0.18  0.49  -0.32  1.38  9.10  50.01  0.15  0.16  
Food, drink and tobacco (8) 10.48       4.82  -0.95  -32.42  -2.93  -16.51  -2.93  6.77  5.96  45.92  0.96  0.93  
Other manufactured goods (9) 9.09   106.70  8.87  -23.23  -0.87  -6.66  -2.47  6.84  15.61  106.98  0.81  0.83  
Petroleum products (10) 7.96     24.14  -17.68  -10.79  -0.66  5.39  -1.04  3.64  4.64  39.73  0.44  0.47  
Machinery and vehicles (11) 6.08   253.73  -0.73  -10.52  -0.57  -1.42  -1.03  3.60  6.39  257.21  0.39  0.41  
Electricity and water (12) 1.10     15.92  3.36  -2.61  -0.13  1.22  -0.23  1.56  1.54  10.92  0.15  0.14  
Construction (13) 4.54     40.51  -6.80  -1.54  -0.08  1.66  -0.16  1.69  38.52  7.10  0.06  0.05  
Trade, transport and comm. (14) 1.96   101.15  26.66  -7.18  -0.12  5.49  -0.76  4.11  7.88  64.11  0.47  0.50  
Private sector services (15) 5.80   104.83  12.64  -17.71  -1.03  22.87  -1.73  10.58  9.75  67.20  1.17  1.09  
Education and health (16) 2.61     18.08  -0.01  -0.88  -0.05  2.49  -0.08  13.59  0.40  2.47  0.08  0.08  
Government services (17) 4.56     13.95  -0.49  -0.56  -0.03  -0.25  -0.06  14.02  0.14  1.13  0.02  0.02  
Notes: computed from equations (10) and (11); ΔA11 = changes in intermediate inputs; ΔA21 = changes in the compensation of labor and capital; 
ΔAinc = changes in income coefficients; ΔA13 = changes in consumption coefficients; ΔA34 = changes in distributed profits; Δxg = changes in 
government consumption; Δxs = changes in investments; Δxe = changes in exports; Δxf = changes in factor income transfers; Δxh = changes in 
institutional transfers.  
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 For well developed economies it is a common finding in SDAs that changes in 
the intermediate input coefficients generate little or no effect. This is because input 
coefficients reflect the domestic part of the production structure and are found to be 
fairly stable in developed economies. For countries that are in the middle of a 
developing process, input coefficients may be expected to change over time. This is 
also observed for Malaysia, where the effects in column ∆𝐀11 are found to be 
substantial for some industries. The results indicate that Malaysia’s production uses 
less inputs of (domestically produced) Mining (industry 7) and Petroleum (10) products 
and more inputs from the Trade, transport and communication (14) sector and Private 
sector services (15). 
 
 Another important role is for the changes in the compensation of labor and 
capital inputs (i.e. ∆𝐀21). It should be stressed that the elements of the matrix 𝐀21 give 
the labor costs (in MR) of employing, for example, an unskilled rural Malay worker per 
MR of gross output of, say, industry 2 (Rubber products). In subsection 3.5.2, we have 
already observed that the average labor productivity (gross output per worker) 
increased substantially, whereas the average wage rate increased only marginally. As a 
consequence, the labor costs per MR of gross output have—on average—seriously 
declined. The working of the SAM model is that an exogenously given final demand 
(such as exports) leads to production, which requires labor. The corresponding labor 
income flows to households, which affects their consumption. A decrease in the labor 
costs implies a lower income for households and thus less consumption. In its turn, 
this induces less production, less labor use, less income, less consumption, and so 
forth. Table 3.8 shows that the gross output in each and every industry is negatively 
affected. Note that some industries are struck very hard, which holds for the food-
related industries 1, 4, 6 and 10, but also for the Private sector services (15). 
 
 The decomposition of the changes in employment was given by the equations 
(3.12), where (3.12b) is further split according to equations (3.11). The changes in 
employment depend on the changes in the labor coefficients (workers per unit of gross 
output) and changes in the gross outputs (which can be split into the 10 determinants 
as in Table 3.9). This implies that the changes in the labor productivity play a double 
role when decomposing employment changes in Table 3.9. First, by changing the 
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compensation of labor and capital inputs (i.e. ∆𝐀21). Second, by changing the direct 
labor coefficients (i.e. ∆𝐋). Our results should be interpreted with caution, however. As 
previously mentioned in subsection 3.5.2, the role of imports may affect the use of 
labor and/or the output of a sector, and thus the change in the direct labor coefficient. 
We may therefore not be able to justify explicitly the extent to which the change in 
labor coefficients reflects the ‘true” changes in productivity.  
 
 In subsection 3.5.2, we have also seen that major shifts have taken place in 
Malaysia: from rural to urban areas; from unskilled to skilled labor; and the expansion 
of the public services sector favoring Malay workers. Note that these shifts are clearly 
reflected by the changes in labor productivities. These shifts show up as negative 
effects of ∆𝐀21 in row 4 of Table 3.9. Note that the changes in 𝐀21 have a substantial 
but indirect effect on gross outputs and employment. The shifts in labor productivities 
also correspond with the effects of ∆𝐋 on employment changes. This effect is more 
direct and therefore larger in absolute size. The results in rows 2 and 4 show that the 
decline of the labor coefficients (which is the reciprocal of the productivity) and the 
compensation to labor inputs exert a clear negative effect, which appears to be less for 
Malays than for the Indians and the Chinese and appears to be less in urban than in 
rural areas. 
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter we have examined the sources of income growth for all ethnic groups 
in Malaysia in the period 1970-2000. We have used a decomposition framework that 
splits the income growth into its underlying sources and applied this technique to the 
social accounting matrices of 1970 (expressed in prices of 2000) and 2000. We found 
for household income per capita (i) that the gap between rural and urban households 
decreased, and (ii) that the gap between the Malays on the one hand and the Chinese 
and the Indians on the other has increased. All groups registered positive income 
growth which was larger than population growth (which was even negative for the 























A. Sources of change in employment (%)         
Total change (million workers) (1) 1.29 0.11 0.06 0.55 1.85 1.56 0.40 0.22 
Contribution (%) of changes in:          
Labor coefficients (ΔL) (2) -239.6 -3,590.7 -1,150.1 59.7 -36.7 -352.3 -258.7 27.8 
Intermediate inputs (ΔA11) (3) 39.2 637.1 188.9 -2.7 20.5 83.9 71.1 6.9 
Compensation of labor and capital (ΔA21) (4) -130.6 -578.6 -253.2 -47.4 -17.5 -47.9 -37.0 -12.2 
Income coefficients (ΔAinc) (5) -8.7 -29.2 -14.1 -3.5 -0.9 -2.0 -1.5 -0.7 
Consumption coefficients (ΔA13) (6) -30.1 74.7 5.7 -18.8 5.2 20.8 19.7 1.8 
Distributed profits (ΔA34) (7) -13.1 -59.6 -25.4 -4.6 -1.8 -4.9 -3.7 -1.2 
Government consumption (Δxg) (8) 65.3 268.3 152.5 16.5 26.3 31.6 38.0 15.7 
Investments (Δxs) (9) 54.8 464.3 150.2 13.6 14.4 53.9 34.2 11.7 
Exports (Δxe) (10) 353.4 2,861.2 1,024.0 84.3 88.7 311.7 233.8 49.2 
Factor income transfers (Δxf) (11) 4.7 26.1 10.7 1.5 0.8 2.5 2.0 0.5 
Institutional transfers (Δxh) (12) 4.6 26.5 10.8 1.5 0.9 2.6 2.1 0.5 
Sources: the results in Panel A are obtained by applying equation (12). 
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The changes in household incomes were by far the largest for the urban 
Chinese and Malays, followed by the rural Malays (together explaining 80% of the total 
change in household income). For the decomposition of the changes in household 
incomes, two components stood out. If only the exports had changed in the way they 
actually have (and all other things would have remained unchanged) the household 
incomes would have largely increased. In the same fashion, changes in the 
compensation of labor and capital inputs had a large negative impact on all household 
incomes. Recall that the decline in the compensation of labor and capital may have 
had two causes that we could not discern in our analysis. These are import 
substitution effects (because exports mostly are offshoring activities that rely heavily 
on imported inputs, which substitute domestic value added), and skill biased 
technological change effects. For most ethnic groups, the combination of these two 
strong but opposing forces—i.e. changes in exports and changes in factor 
compensations—explained some 40% of the increase in household incomes. The 
decomposition of labor incomes provided additional details and pointed at differences 
between skilled and unskilled workers. Due to skill biased technological change in 
activities concentrating in rural areas, the changes in the compensation of labor and 
capital inputs led to large decreases in the labor incomes for all unskilled workers, to 
modest decreases for skilled workers, and even to increases for Malay skilled workers. 
Export growth led to large income increases for unskilled workers and modest 
increases for skilled workers. The combination of these two forces had a positive effect 
on the incomes of skilled workers but a negative effect for the unskilled workers. 
 
  For the three major ethnic groups, we found that the export growth and 
changes in the compensation of labor and capital inputs had relatively small 
percentage effects on income growth of the Malays when compared to the Indians and 
the Chinese. The underlying reason is that a large share of the Malays is employed in 
the public sector, with its focus on the domestic market and with a large share of 
skilled employment. This was a clear result of the policy to restructure the society 
through an expansion of the public services sectors where the priority had been given 
to skilled Malay workers and through the promotion of exports of labor-intensive 
products (which rely on unskilled workers). All unskilled workers benefited greatly 
from export growth but suffered more from the changes in the compensation of capital 
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and labor inputs, Chinese and Indian skilled workers suffered slightly from the 
changes in compensation of capital and labor inputs but benefited more from export 
growth, and Malay skilled workers benefited slightly from both types of changes.  
 
  The increases in labor income due to the changes in exports and in the 
compensation of capital and labor inputs amount to 7.08 billion MR for rural skilled 
Malays, 13.17 billion MR for urban skilled Malays, and 12.03 for urban skilled 
Chinese. Together, this is almost 50% of the total increase in labor income and almost 
30% of the total increase in household income in Malaysia. All in all, the policy 
reforms (i.e. expansion of the public services sector and export promotion for the 
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Employment in 1970 ('000)        
Public sector 131 23 19 4 83 54 31 4 
Private sector 1,111 530 172 13 112 427 66 5 
Total 1,242 553 191 16 195 481 97 9 
Employment in 1990 ('000)        
Public sector 281 18 14 68 471 120 70 46 
Private sector 1,097 368 163 514 802 1,220 254 122 
Total 1,378 386 177 231 1,273 1,340 324 168 
Employment in 2000 ('000)        
Public sector 428 31 20 75 584 140 69 48 
Private sector 2,101 627 236 493 1,458 1,901 426 183 
Total 2,529 658 256 568 2,042 2,041 495 232 




Appendix 3.2 Classification of accounts for the 1970 and 2000 SAMs 
Classification of the 1970 SAM Classification of the 2000 SAM 
1.   Wants 20 commodities   
2.   Factors 
East Malaysia – 4 factors: labor; 
unincorporated business capital; 
corporate business capital; and 
housing 
1. Factors 
27 factors: 24 categories of 
citizen labor (2 geographical 
locations x 4 ethnic groups x 
3 education levels); 1 category 
of non-citizen labor; 2 types 
of capital (unincorporated 
business capital and 
corporate business capital) 
West Malaysia – 9 factors: 6 
categories of labor (2 geographical 
locations x 3 education levels); 3 
types of capital (unincorporated 
business capital, corporate 
business capital, and housing) 
3.   Households 
East Malaysia – 1 household 
2. Households 
9 households: 8 for citizen 
households (2 geographical 
locations x 4 ethnic groups); 1 
for non-citizens 
West Malaysia – 20 households: 2 
geographical locations x 3 ethnic 
groups x 3 employment status; 2 
for other ethnic groups (rural and 
urban) 
4.   Production (commodities) 26 types of commodities 
3. Production 92 commodities/industries 
5.   Production (activities) 21 types of activities 
6.   Companies 1 account 4. Companies 1 account 
7.   Government 1 account 5. Government 1 account 
8.   Consolidated capital 1 account 6. Consolidated capital 1 account 
9.   Rest of the world (current) 1 account 7. Rest of the world (current) 1 account 
10. Rest of the world (capital) 1 account 8. Rest of the world (capital) 1 account 
11. Indirect taxes 1 account 9. Indirect taxes 1 account 






















Growth in production (or gross output) has empirically been found to be the most 
effective means to enhance the income of the poor and, thus, to alleviate poverty (see 
for instance, de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000; Adams Jr, 2004; Kraay, 2006; Loayza and 
Raddatz, 2010; Ferreira, et al., 2010). The reason is that the remuneration of the 
factors of production (and labor income in particular) represents the major source of 
household income. This remuneration accounts for 93% of household income in 
Indonesia (Thorbecke, 1991), for 80% in Vietnam (Tarp et al., 2002), and for 64% in 
Mexico (Blancas, 2006). A stimulus of production will therefore translate into 
increased household income. The composition of the growth in production, however, 
influences whether and to what extent the income of the poor is affected. This has 
become a major concern in the literature on the growth–poverty relationship (see for 
example, Suryahadi, et al., 2009; Loayza and Raddatz, 2010). 
 
  Although the growth implications for poverty reduction have been studied 
extensively, little attention has been paid to the contribution of the interdependencies 
between production sectors (or industries). For its own production, each sector 
                                          
1 A shorter version of this chapter is published in Economic Modelling, volume 42, page 146-158, 2014 
(joint with Erik Dietzenbacher and Bart Los). 
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depends on inputs from other sectors. The composition of output growth thus depends 
on the interdependencies between the sectors. For any poverty reduction that is 
directly associated with the output growth of a particular sector, the question 
therefore is how this relates indirectly to the output growth in other sectors? In other 
words, to what extent is it possible to increase the income of the workers (and, in 
particular, the income of the poorest workers) in one sector by targeting growth in 
other sectors?  
 
This chapter focuses on the growth–poverty relationship and explicitly examines 
the role of interdependencies between production sectors for poverty reduction. A 
social accounting matrix (SAM) multiplier analysis is applied to study the poverty 
alleviation impacts.2 Output growth is initiated in the demand-driven SAM framework 
by an increase in the exogenous final demands, which include government 
expenditures, investments, and exports. Following Thorbecke and Jung (1996) and 
Pyatt and Round (2006), the total income effects associated with increased final 
demands is decomposed into three effects. One of them covers the inter-industry 
output effects (i.e. the so-called transfer effects). In this chapter we take the analysis 
one step further and decompose the inter-industry output effects into the initial, the 
direct and the indirect effects. The initial effect shows how a one-unit increase in the 
exogenous final demand for a sector’s output leads to an immediate increase in the 
gross output of this sector by one unit. The direct effects capture the first-order effects 
and show how the increase in output leads to additional input requirements, and 
producing these inputs affects the output in the sector itself and in other sectors. The 
indirect effects measure how the first order effects give rise to second and higher-order 
effects. This is because the first-order effects increase the outputs, which induces 
further input requirements and thus further increases in gross outputs, and so on. 
Each of these three output effects has its own implication on household income and 
poverty reduction.  
 
For our empirical analysis, we use a SAM for Malaysia for 2000 that makes a 
distinction between the major ethnic groups. Our aim is to provide some insights into 
                                          
2 The SAM multiplier analysis has been highlighted in the World Bank’s toolkit as a useful way of 
evaluating poverty impacts (see Round, 2003).  
 111 
 
the effects—of growth in the exogenous final demands—on poverty across ethnic 
groups in Malaysia. The application of the SAM multiplier for poverty analyses is 
relevant for two reasons. First, it captures an inter-industry economy-wide approach 
to studying the relationship between growth and poverty alleviation. This makes it 
possible to examine the impacts of growth in a specific production sector on poverty 
alleviation. Second, it shows a clear link between the structure of production, the 
remuneration of the factors of production, and the ownership of these factors by 
households (which determines income and poverty).  
 
It should be noted that this chapter only focuses on the implications of final 
demand growth on poverty alleviation. It studies how the sectoral composition of this 
growth and the interdependencies between production sectors affect the capacity to 
reduce poverty. In other words, poverty reduction is performed within the context of a 
static demand-side analysis. Obviously, also supply-side determinants such as 
education, demographic changes, and changing social and economic conditions of the 
population may have a significant implication on poverty reduction. However, these 
changes typically take some time to become effective. We consider such a longer-term 
analysis beyond the scope of this study. In our analysis we will thus assume that 
there are no supply-side policy interventions (e.g. demographic changes or education) 
that may change the distribution of income. In addition, we also assume that supply 
of production factors (including labor from the various ethnic groups in both rural and 
urban regions) is sufficiently elastic to accommodate increases in demand without 
upward effects on factor prices.3    
 
 The next section sketches the background and explains why disaggregation 
across ethnic groups is important when studying poverty impacts for Malaysia. 
Section 4.3 explains the decomposition of the growth in output into the initial, direct, 
and indirect effects. Then, it further links the decomposed output growth to poverty 
measures so as to obtain the poverty alleviation effects. Section 4.4 briefly explains the 
data sources that have been used to run our analyses. Section 4.5 presents the results 
                                          
3 This seems to be a reasonable assumption, given that the overall labor participation in Malaysia (in 
2006) was 63%, 80% for male and 46% for female workers (see Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2007). 
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for the effects of growth in final demands on poverty alleviation. Finally, Section 4.6 
summarizes and concludes.   
 
4.2 Growth and Poverty across Ethnic Groups 
 
The Malaysian citizens are divided into the Malays (indigenous, 53% of the population 
in 2000), the Chinese (26%), the Indians (8%) and a group of other ethnic minorities 
(13%). Next to citizens, there is also the group of non-citizens, which is approximately 
21% smaller than the group of Indians. From a policy perspective, taking account of 
ethnicity in the analysis of income and poverty is important for Malaysia. This is 
because, since 1971, the government’s development strategies have included specific 
concerns for the standard of living among these socio-economic groups. The ethnic 
riots in May 1969 gave a clear signal to the government for the importance of policy 
reforms. This has led to a shift from development strategies with an emphasis purely 
on economic considerations towards policies based on the combination of economic 
and distributional strategies.  
 
The main cause for the ethnic riots was that the economic expansion during the 
period 1957-1969 (i.e. the post-independence period) failed to make a substantial 
contribution towards closing the gap in economic welfare between the Malays, who 
were the poorest on average, and the Chinese and Indians. There are two 
characteristics of the post-independence period that contributed to the ethnic unrests. 
First, the economic policy in this period continued along the principles of laisser-faire, 
just as it had been before the independence in 1957. There was no (or little) attempt to 
re-distribute wealth towards the economically dispossessed. Second, although the 
political power was dominated by the Malays, the economic activities were run mostly 
by the non-Malays. This led the non-Malays to question the extent to which their 
interests were safeguarded in Malaysia. The disenchantment that had been growing 
among all segments of the population ultimately erupted in the bloody ethnic riots of 
May 1969. 
 
Table 4.1 tabulates the head count poverty measure (which is defined as the 
number or “headcount” of households with an income below the poverty line income 
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as a percentage of the total number of households) for the country and for its ethnic 
groups in the period 1970 to 2004.4 For example, in 1976, 49.3% of all Malaysian 
households were poor and for the group of Malays this was even 64.8%. Table 4.1 also 
gives the average annual growth in gross domestic product (GDP) for the overall 
economy and for the broad economic sectors. For example, GDP grew with 15.5% on 
average in the period 1970-76, with 18.2% for 1976-79, and so forth. The average 
economic growth between 1970 and 2004 was around 11.5% per annum. The 
industrial sector (i.e. manufacturing and mining) grew the most in the period 1970-
2004 with an average of 12.6%, followed by services with 10.8% and agriculture with 
5.9%. This high economic growth obviously provided broad-based benefits for the 
poor. During this period, poverty for the Malays declined by 56.5% points (from 64.8% 
in 1970 to 8.3% in 2004), that of the Chinese reduced by 25.4% points (from 26.0% in 
1970 to 0.6% in 2004), and that of the Indians dropped by 36.3% points (from 39.2% 
in 1970 to 2.9% in 2004). This large poverty reduction for all ethnic groups led to a 
significant reduction in the national poverty rate. The policy reforms after the 1969 





                                          
4 For our calculations we have used different poverty line incomes (PLIs). They have been constructed by 
the Economic Planning Unit in Malaysia and take account of changes in incomes and prices over time. 
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Table 4.1 Head count poverty rates and gross domestic products (GDP) in current 
prices  
 
Poverty rates by ethnic groups (%)  Average annual GDP growth (%) 
Malaysia Malays Chinese Indians Others Overall Agriculture Industry Services 
1970 49.3 64.8 26.0 39.2 44.8     
1976 37.7 46.4 17.4 27.3 33.8 15.5    
1979 37.4 49.2 16.5 19.8 28.9 18.2    
1984 20.7 28.7 7.8 10.1 18.8 11.4    
1987 19.4 26.6 7.0 9.6 20.3 0.6    
1989 16.5 23.0 5.4 7.6 22.8 13.9 8.4 16.8 15.1 
1992 12.4 17.5 3.2 4.5 21.7 12.7 4.9 12.7 14.9 
1995 8.7 12.2 2.1 2.6 22.5 13.9 9.5 12.2 16.6 
1997 6.1 9.0 1.1 1.3 13.0 12.5 4.2 17.1 13.4 
1999 8.5 12.3 1.2 3.4 25.5 3.3 2.1 8.1 1.7 
2002 6.0 9.0 1.0 2.7 8.5 8.4 0.5 7.6 6.3 
2004 5.7 8.3 0.6 2.9 6.9 11.2 13.5 16.9 6.2 
Source: Economic Planning Unit (various years) and Department of Statistics Malaysia (2006). 
Notes:  Poverty rates refer to households.  
Value added figures by broad economic sectors are only available from 1987 onwards. 
Agriculture = livestock, forestry and fishing, and other agricultural products;  
Industry = manufacturing, and mining and quarrying;  
Services = utilities, building and construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, 
transport and communication, finance, real estate and business services, other private services 
and government services. 
 Average growth is calculated between years for which data are available. For example, average 
GDP growth is 13.9% per year in the period 1987-1989. 
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Examining the poverty reduction in relative terms, however, it appears that 
poverty for the Chinese and Indians has reduced faster than that of the Malays. It 
turns out that the gap between the poverty rates of the ethnic groups increased. 
Setting the poverty of Malays at unity, the (index for the) relative poverty of the 
Chinese decreased from 0.40 in 1970 to 0.07 in 2004 and that of the Indians from 
0.60 to 0.35. For example, the last figure indicates that the percentage of poor among 
the Indian households was approximately one third of the percentage of poor among 
the Malay households in 2004. This suggests that the economic growth did not 




4.3.1 Decomposition of output growth 
 
A social accounting matrix (SAM) is a framework that has been widely applied for the 
analyses of poverty and income distribution (see, for example, Thorbecke and Jung, 
1996; Khan, 1999; Llop and Manresa, 2004). It is a representation of the national 
accounts in matrix form. Typically, it incorporates whatever degree of detail is required 
for a certain study. In a SAM, incomes are recorded in row (i) for a certain recipient i 
while expenditures are given as outlays in the corresponding column. The 
corresponding row and column totals of the matrix must be the same, consistent with 
the accounting principle that the sum of incomes equals the sum of expenditures for 
each single account.  
 
The basic structure of the Malaysian SAM that has been applied in this study is 
illustrated in Table 4.2. The SAM contains nine groups of accounts. These are: 
production; factors of production; households; companies; government; consolidated 
capital; the current account for the rest of the world (RoW); the capital account for 
RoW; and indirect taxes. Given the purpose of the present study (i.e. 
interdependencies between production sectors and household income across ethnic 
groups), the SAM is detailed in the following way. (i) production (indicated by P in 
Table 4.2) is classified into 92 production sectors or industries; (ii) the factors of 
production (F) are disaggregated into 25 types of labor and two capital inputs; and (iii) 
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households and companies (H) are distinguished into nine household groups and a 
single aggregated account for the companies. (Section 4.4 contains a detailed 
description of the disaggregation.) Each of the five remaining accounts is in an 
aggregate form. 
 
Table 4.2 Schematic representation of the endogenous and exogenous accounts in the 



















































For our model, we define the first three accounts (production P, factors of production 
F, households and companies H) as endogenous and the remaining five accounts 
(government, consolidated capital, current account for RoW, capital account for RoW, 







































































       (4.1) 
 
where the matrices 1ˆ  jijij yTA  (i, j = P, F, H) give the average expenditure propensities 
for the endogenous accounts. That is, the average share of the income in account j 
that goes to account i. The model in (4.1) can also be written as 
 
xByy            (4.2) 
 
                                          
5 See Pyatt (2001) for useful comments on the choice of endogenous and exogenous accounts. 
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which is the standard SAM model, with y  denoting the vector of incomes for the 
endogenous accounts (
Py = gross output of the production sectors; Fy = factor 
incomes; Hy = incomes of households and companies), B  the square matrix with 
average expenditure propensities for the endogenous accounts, and x  the vector of 
exogenous expenditures or incomes. In (4.2), B  is a 129×129 matrix that consists of 
the following submatrices: PPA  the 92×92 matrix with the intermediate input 
coefficients (reflecting the input-output linkages); FPA  the 27×92 matrix with value 
added (factor) coefficients; HFA  the 10×27 matrix with income coefficients; PHA  the 
92×10 matrix with the coefficients of domestic consumption by households and 
companies (where the domestic consumption of companies is zero); and HHA  the 
10×10 matrix representing the coefficients for re-distribution between households and 
companies (in our case the companies’ profits that flow to each of the nine household 
groups). For the vector of exogenous components )(x , Px corresponds to final demands 
for industries’ production (government consumption, investments, and exports), Fx  
relates to factor incomes from abroad, Hx stands for institutional income transfers  
(domestic and foreign) for households and companies. 
 
In this model formulation, prices are assumed to be fixed and changes in the 
exogenous components lead to changes in the quantity levels. To keep the prices fixed, 
two additional assumptions are applied. First, there is excess supply of labor and 
other resources. Consequently, expanding production is not hindered by supply 
constraints (such as limits for qualified labor or imported inputs). Second, the average 
expenditure propensities for the endogenous accounts ( PPA , FPA , HFA  and HHA ) are 
assumed to be fixed. For PHA  
, however, it may be unrealistic to assume that average 
expenditure propensities also apply for any incremental income of households. To be 
more realistic, we replace it by a matrix of marginal expenditure propensities that are 
obtained from income and expenditure data for the different household groups. A 
detailed discussion of the derivation of the marginal expenditure propensities and the 





Equation (4.2) is solved as 
 
Mxy            (4.3) 
 
where 
1)(  BIM is the inverse matrix with SAM multipliers. The multipliers 
indicate the economy-wide effects on all endogenous accounts induced by an injection 
of any exogenous account.  
  
For policy purposes, it may be useful to decompose the multiplier matrix M  
into three separate effects, namely the transfer, the open-loop, and the closed-loop 
effect (see Pyatt and Round, 1979; 2006). This allows for a better understanding of the 
process of income generation as caused by growth in final demand. To derive the 
transfer, open-loop and closed-loop effects, let us define matrix B  as the sum of two 
matrices, B
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 or  
 
𝐲 = (𝐈 − ?̃?)−1𝐖𝐲 + (𝐈 − ?̃?)−1𝐱       (4.6) 
 
We define ?̂? = (𝐈 − ?̃?)−1𝐖 so that (6) becomes 𝐲 = ?̂?𝐲 +  (𝐈 − ?̃?)−1𝐱. Alternatively,  
 





𝐲 = (𝐈 − ?̂?)−1(𝐈 − ?̃?)−1𝐱        (4.8) 
 
Using the power series expression we have (𝐈 − ?̂?)−1 = (𝐈 + ?̂? + ?̂?2 + ?̂?3 + ⋯ ). At the 
same time, (𝐈 + ?̂? + ?̂?2 + ?̂?3 + ⋯ ) = (𝐈 − ?̂?𝑘+1)−1(𝐈 + ?̂? + ?̂?2 + ⋯ + ?̂?𝑘) for k = 0, 1, 2, …. 
This implies that (4.8) can be written as 
 
𝐲 = (𝐈 − ?̂?𝑘+1)−1(𝐈 + ?̂? + ?̂?2 + ⋯ + ?̂?𝑘)(𝐈 − ?̃?)−1𝐱     (4.9) 
 
A special case arises when k = 2 (or 5, 8, 11, …), because then ?̂?𝑘+1 and (𝐈 − ?̂?𝑘+1)−1 
are block-diagonal matrices. For k = 2 we rewrite (4.9) as 
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M  and 
)3(
M  are termed the transfer effect, the open-loop effect and 
the closed-loop effect, respectively. It follows that a change ∆𝐱 in exogenous 




M  and 
)3(
M , that is,  
 




Recall that the main concern of this study is to measure the impacts of changes in the 
exogenously given final demands. Matrix 
)1(
M  captures how the growth in the final 
demand of a sector affects the gross output of this particular sector and other sectors 
through the inter-industry linkages only. Matrix 
)2(
M  indicates how this growth in 
gross outputs impacts the income of the factors of production and the households and 
companies. Matrix 
)3(
M  provides the effects of the full circular income flows going 
round the system and back to its point of origin in a series of repeated cycles.  
 
  In the case of changes in the final demands for products from the production 
sectors only, we have PxΔ  while 𝐱𝐹 and 𝐱𝐻 are fixed (i.e. ∆𝐱𝐹 = ∆𝐱𝐻 = 0). The changes 
∆𝐱𝑃 first affect the gross outputs through the transfer effect, i.e. 𝐌𝑃𝑃
(1)(∆𝐱𝑃). Next, the 
open-loop effects show how these changes in gross outputs affect the other 
endogenous accounts, i.e. 𝐌𝐹𝑃
(2)
𝐌𝑃𝑃




for the households and companies. Subsequently, the extra income of for example 
households generates extra consumption, extra gross output, extra factor incomes and 
so forth. Taking all these closed-loop effects into account yields that the ultimate 
changes in gross outputs are given by 𝐌𝑃𝑃
(3)
𝐌𝑃𝑃














  It is important to note that the decomposition of the multiplier matrix M  does 
not require a split into three parts. The decomposition of M may contain as many (or 
few) sets of effects as one would like. The choice for this particular three-split is based 
on the partitioning of the matrix B (or Table 4.2), which exhibits a cyclic structure 
(Pyatt and Round, 1979). The idea is that an exogenous shock that affects one of the 
(groups of) endogenous accounts will affect all (groups of) endogenous accounts in 
subsequent rounds. For example, an exogenous stimulus that affects the P-accounts 
will in the next round affect the F-accounts. The changes in the F-accounts will affect 





  Focusing on the specific analysis of how growth in the final demands for 
products from the production sectors impacts the incomes of households and 







(1)(∆𝐱𝑃)         (4.12) 
 
Recall that the aim in this chapter is to measure the role of interdependencies between 
production sectors for household incomes and poverty reduction. For this purpose, we 
further decompose the matrix 𝐌𝑃𝑃
(1)
≡ (𝐈 − 𝐀𝑃𝑃)
−1with standard input-output 




−1 = (𝐈 + 𝐀𝑃𝑃 + 𝐀𝑃𝑃
2 + 𝐀𝑃𝑃







(1)−𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 𝐈 gives the initial effects, 𝐌𝑃𝑃




3 + ⋯ the sum of all indirect effects. The initial effect indicates that 
a one-unit increase in the final demand for a certain production sector leads to an 
immediate increase in the gross output of this sector by one unit (simply because the 
final demand must be produced). The direct effect shows how the one-unit increase in 
the gross output of this sector has first-order effects on the gross output in the sector 
itself and in other sectors. These first-order effects are because increasing the gross 
output in one sector requires inputs from (and thus production in) all sectors. The 
indirect effects measure how the first order effects give rise to second and higher-order 
effects. This is because the first-order increases in output require further inputs and 

















4.3.2 Linking the multiplier decomposition analysis to poverty 
 
In the previous sub-section, we have discussed the framework to measure the impact 
of growth in final demands on the incomes of household groups. In this sub-section, 
we further extend the framework by linking the SAM model to poverty measures. 
Assessing the impacts for poverty alleviation requires the adoption of an appropriate 
poverty measure. We will use the index proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 
(1984, hereafter FGT), which is often used in empirical work on poverty because of 
certain attractive properties. We distinguish k groups (such as rural Malay or urban 















(𝛼)        (4.15) 
 
where 𝑛𝑖 gives the “population” size of group i, 𝑚𝑖 gives the number of poor “people” in 
group i, i.e. with an income below the poverty line income (PLI) 𝑧𝑖, 𝑦𝑖𝑗 gives the income 
of poor person j in group i, and α is a parameter.
6  
 
For different values of α, the FGT index has a different interpretation. If α = 0 it 
equals the head count index and measures the proportion of the population in group i 
with a standard of living below the PLI (i.e. 𝑚𝑖/𝑛𝑖). The head count index, however, 
does not take into account the intensity of poverty because it remains unchanged if 
poor people become poorer. This is covered by the poverty gap index which is the case 
for α = 1. The poverty gap index measures the gap between the average income of the 
poor and the PLI. This index, however, does not change when the inequality among the 
poor changes. To this end, the distribution-sensitive index might be adopted which is 
the case for α = 2. For example, if a poor person transfers income to an even poorer 
person, the index will decrease (whereas the poverty gap index remains the same). 
 
                                          
6 As is common in similar studies in the poverty literature, the terms “population” and “people” refer to 
numbers of income recipients. Under the assumptions that all income of an individual household is 
divided equally over its members and that average household sizes of the poor and the non-poor are the 
same, “population” and “people” are the same as population and people in daily speech. 
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The FGT index for all people in the country is obtained as the weighted average 























Poverty in group i is measured by 𝑄𝑖
(𝛼)
 as defined in (4.15) and poverty at the country 
level is given by 𝑄(𝛼) ≡ ∑ 𝑄𝑖
(𝛼)𝑘
𝑖=1 . In our empirical analysis we will also use the poverty 






When analyzing changes in the FGT index (i.e. ∆𝑃𝑖
(𝛼)
) four factors play a role. 
First, incomes change due to changes in prices (including wage rates). Because we are 
interested in the short-run effects of a change in the exogenous final demands, prices 
are assumed to be fixed. The second factor is the size 𝑛𝑖 of the population in group i. 
Given the short-run nature of our study, we also assume that the population is fixed. 
The remaining two factors are the total income of group i (or the average income, as 
the population size is fixed) and the distribution of total income over the population in 
group i.  
 
 With respect to the distribution of income, if the distribution for example shifts 
in favor of the rich (leaving the total income fixed) the proportion of poor would 
increase. In the present study, we assume distribution neutrality within household 
groups, i.e. the distribution of income is assumed to fixed for urban Malays, for rural 
Chinese, etc. In applied general equilibrium and SAM analyses, it is quite common to 
assume a static intrasectoral distribution (see for example, Thorbecke and Jung, 
1996; Khan, 1999; Ravallion and Huppi, 2002). These studies measure the effects of 
poverty by applying sector-specific growth rates to a sector profile of poverty for a 
baseline, assuming distribution neutrality within the sectors. This assumption has 
been justified to some extent. For example, Kraay (2006) shows that—for 80 
developing countries—growth tends to be distribution-neutral on average. Similarly, 
Loayza and Raddatz (2010) indicate that growth improves the conditions of the poor 
mainly through impacts on their absolute income (and not via the distribution 
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channel) and therefore imply a fairly fixed income distribution. It should be mentioned 
though that the analyses of Kraay (2006) and Loayza and Raddatz (2010) were for 
national averages and the results for detailed household groups may differ. Since our 
analysis focuses on the short-run effects, we feel that the assumption of distributional 
neutrality within the sectors does not seem unreasonable. 
 
 This implies that changes in the FGT index are due to changes in the average 
income in group i. If we denote the average income as ?̅?𝑖, we may define 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ≡ 𝑦𝑖𝑗/?̅?𝑖 as 
the ratio of the income of individual j to the average income in group i. Due to 
distributional neutrality, we have that the ratios 𝑠𝑖𝑗 are fixed. Note that an increase 
(decrease) of the average income will also decrease (increase) the number of poor in 
group i. So, we have that 𝑚𝑖 depends on the average income, i.e. 𝑚𝑖(?̅?𝑖). As a 




























which is negative, indicating that an increase in the average income of group i yields a 
reduction in the FGT poverty index. 
  
In our empirical analysis, we will consider the effects of changes in the 
exogenous final demands for the production sectors on the total household income of 
each group i. Because the population is assumed constant, this gives us information 
with respect to ∆?̅?𝑖/?̅?𝑖. Multiplication with the poverty elasticity 𝜀𝑖
(𝛼)
 then gives the 














           (4.16) 
 
where ∆?̅?𝑖 is the component of ∆𝐲𝐻 in equation (4.14) that corresponds to ethnic group 
i.   
 
The estimation of the poverty elasticities 𝜀𝑖
(𝛼)
, the poverty indexes 𝑃𝑖
(𝛼)





/𝑄(𝛼) are based on the estimated Lorenz curve. The Lorenz 
curve graphically represents the relationship between the percentage of the population 
in group i and the percentage of the total income they receive. We specify a functional 
form for the Lorenz curve and use econometric methods to estimate the parameters of 
this functional form. The procedure for the estimation of the Lorenz curve is outlined 
in Appendix 4.2.  
 
4.4 Data Sources 
 
The major dataset that has been used in this study is a SAM for Malaysia for 2000 
(see Chapter 2 for details on its construction). As mentioned in Chapter 2, nine groups 
of accounts are distinguished in the SAM: production accounts, accounts for the 
factors of production, accounts for households, an account for companies, a 
government account, an account for consolidated capital, the current account for the 
rest of the world (RoW), the capital account for RoW, and an account for the indirect 
taxes. The first three are further disaggregated into detailed accounts, the others are 
all single accounts providing aggregated information. 
 
There are 92 production accounts based on the sector (or industry) 
classification used in the existing input-output tables for Malaysia. The accounts for 
factors of production, distinguish between labor and capital. Labor is split into citizens 
and non-citizens and there are 24 types of citizens (4 ethnic groups × 3 skill types × 2 
geographical areas = 24 categories). The four ethnic groups are the Malays, the 
Chinese, the Indians, and others (comprising dozens of ethnic minority groups which 
are mostly located in East Malaysia, such as groups of Iban, Kadazan, Bajau, Murut, 
Suluk). Skills are classified based on certificates obtained from school, college or 
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university. Those who do not have any formal education or a primary school certificate 
are classified as the low skill category, those with secondary school certificates (e.g. 
L.C.E., M.C.E. or H.S.C.) are assigned to the medium skill category, while those with 
at least a diploma or degree are considered as the high skill category. The geographical 
locations are rural and urban areas. For capital inputs, the SAM distinguishes 
between the inputs that are owned by households and by corporations. Together this 
yields 27 accounts for the factors of production.  
 
The criteria for classifying households and labor are inevitably inter-related 
given that characteristics of individuals are the essential ingredients common to both 
sets of accounts. Therefore, the classification of household follows closely that of labor, 
except that no distinction is made between skill types. This leads to nine different 
household groups (4 ethnic groups × 2 geographical areas + 1 non-citizen = 9). The 
fact that the number of labor types (24) receiving compensation in the production 
accounts is higher than the number of household groups (9) implies that we have to 
assume that workers of different skill types contribute additional income to a region-
specific ethnic group-specific wage fund, which is equally distributed among all 
households belonging to that ethnic group in that region (rural or urban). Even if only 
high-skilled, rich workers would earn more as a consequence of increased demand, 
also poorer households of the same ethnic group in the same region are assumed to 
benefit. This is a limitation caused by the lack of available data on skills in the HIS 
data, and implies the within-group distribution neutrality that we discussed before.     
   
  In addition to the SAM, the household income survey for 2001 (HIS, 
Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2001) has been used for the purpose of measuring 
poverty. In this respect, the income survey (i.e. HIS) is preferred over the expenditure 
survey (i.e. household expenditure survey, HES, see Department of Statistics 
Malaysia, 2000). Although it has generally been accepted that expenditures provide 
better welfare indicators than incomes, we preferred to use income information for two 
reasons. First, in the case of Malaysia, the income-based survey is more representative 
than the expenditure-based survey. Specifically, the HIS includes a sample of 170,903 
randomly selected households throughout the country whereas the HES only includes 
14,084 households. Second, the HIS is consistent with the official statistics published 
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by the Malaysian authorities. For the estimation of the expenditure elasticities (and 
therefore the marginal expenditure propensities), however, we have used the HES. 
 
  For the estimation of the poverty measures, we have used the new poverty line 
income (PLI) constructed by the Economic Planning Unit (2006).7 The methodology to 
determine the PLI follows the “cost of basic needs approach” and takes into account (i) 
the cost of a food basket that enables a household to meet a predetermined minimum 
daily nutritional requirement and (ii) the cost of basic non-food consumption (see Zin, 
2007). The rural PLI in 2006 has been set at 698 Malaysian Ringgit (MR) per month 
while the urban PLI has been set at MR 687 per month. We assume that the 2006 PLI 
also applied in 2000. 
 
4.5 Results and Discussions 
 
4.5.1 Impacts on aggregate poverty 
 





elasticities of poverty (i.e. 𝜀𝑖
(𝛼)
), the FGT poverty indexes (i.e. 𝑃𝑖
(𝛼)
) , the population 
share, and the total and the average income. Focusing on the major ethnic groups, we 
see that in urban areas each group has in general a lower share in poverty than in 
population. This indicates that the percentage of poor households is smaller than the 
national average and the Chinese are doing the best in this respect (their percentage 
poor being less than 75%—i.e. 0.135/0.18—of the national average). In rural areas, 
the situation is slightly different. For the rural Malays we see that their poverty share 
is clearly larger than their population share, for the rural Chinese we observe the 
opposite, while the findings for the rural Indians depend on the type of poverty share 
that is used (i.e. whether α is 0, 1, or 2). Clearly the rural Malays are doing worst in 
this respect, their percentage poor people is more than 40%—i.e. 0.439/0.30—larger 
than the national average. 
                                          
7 The Economic Planning Unit (EPU) has determined PLIs approximately every three years (using the 
latest HIS), starting in 1977. In 2005, the EPU reviewed the concept and measurement of poverty in order 
to take into account the social and economic changes that have taken place in Malaysia since 1977. The 
2006 PLI was determined according to the new guidelines. 
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A second, somewhat casual observation is that growth in income seems to affect 
poverty reduction less (more) when a particular household group has a small (large) 
average income. The magnitude of the elasticities of poverty in Table 4.3 shows that 
growth in income has the lowest impact on reducing the percentage poor for the 
Malays and the highest for the Chinese, with the Indians taking an intermediate 
position. Thorbecke and Jung (1996) and Khan (1999) also found this to be true for 
the case of Indonesia and South Africa (see Appendix 4.3). It seems that poverty is 
more sensitive to income growth when a household group is richer on average.  
 
The sensitivity of poverty reduction to income growth depends on the 
concentration of the population around (but below) the poverty line income (PLI). For 
example, if the majority of the poor is just below the PLI, income growth may reduce 
the percentage poor considerably. If, on the other hand, the majority of the poor is well 
below the PLI, income growth will have little effect on the percentage poor. As a matter 
of fact, Kraay (2006) shows that the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to 
income growth can be modeled as a function of population density at the poverty line.  
 
The FGT indexes 𝑃𝑖
(𝛼)
 provide useful information in this respect. 𝑃𝑖
(0)
 gives the 
percentage poor in the population of group i (e.g. 27.3% of the urban Malays has an 




  expresses the average distance for the poor 
in group i from the poverty line (e.g. for the urban Malays we have 0.092/0.273 = 
0.34, indicating that their poor have an income that is on average 34% lower than the 




 reflects the dispersion of incomes of the poor in group i. If we 








 implies that the poor in group i are 
on average poorer than the poor in group j (i.e. further from the PLI). Observe in Table 
4.3 that the percentage poor is very comparable for urban Malays and urban Indians. 
The poor urban Malays, however, are on average poorer than the poor urban Indians. 
As a consequence, the urban Indians respond stronger to income growth than urban 
Malays as reflected by the elasticities 𝜀𝑖
(0)
. A similar observation holds when comparing 
rural Malays and Indians. Note, however, that some cases cannot be explained from 




 is very similar for rural 
Malays (42% below PLI) and rural other (40%). Yet, their elasticities show large 
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=  0.25) than for rural other (0.18). We thus expect more poor 
rural Malays to be close to the PLI than rural other and therefore are a larger 
elasticity. 
 
  Observe that per capita income for the non-citizen households is fairly large 
(e.g. larger than for any other group of rural households) and may require additional 
explanation. The relatively high income is caused by the fact that foreign workers (in 
particular high skilled workers) have been paid at least what they might have earned 
in their home country. For Malaysian standards, however, such earnings are huge. It 
follows from our dataset that the wage rate for the average foreign worker is 25% 
larger than for the average local worker (see Saari et al., 2011).  
 
Next, we will discuss the main results for the effects of an increase in final 
demands on poverty reduction. For reasons of exposition, the results of poverty 
impacts are presented in Table 4.4 for 10 aggregated sectors instead of for the full 92 
sectors. This sectoral aggregation is in line with the aggregation that is used by the 
Economic Planning Unit in Malaysia (see Economic Planning Unit, 2006). In general, 
the degree of poverty alleviation depends on the poverty measure that is used. 
However, in relative terms (i.e. in terms of ordinal rankings) we observe that the degree 
of poverty alleviation across ethnic groups tends to be almost constant across poverty 
measures.8 For this reason the impacts of final demand growth on poverty alleviation 
are presented in Table 4.4 only for the head count measure. The results for the 
poverty gap and the distribution-sensitive measure are given in Appendix 4.4.  
 
                                          
8 Thorbecke and Jung (1996) find a similar result. That is, the ranking of sectors is almost constant for 
the head count, the poverty gap and the distribution-sensitive measure.  
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Table 4.3 Estimates for poverty profiles across ethnic groups, 2000 
 
Initial 




income     
Poverty share (𝜎𝑖
(𝛼)
) Elasticity of poverty (𝜀𝑖
(𝛼)



















α = 2 
 
 )( iy  )/( nni  )( iy  
Rural Malays 25,396 0.30 3.61 0.439 0.511 0.588 -1.223 -1.366 -1.414 0.482 0.204 0.119 
Rural Chinese 10,161 0.07 6.63 0.058 0.048 0.037 -1.574 -2.350 -3.086 0.284 0.085 0.033 
Rural Indians 3,907 0.03 6.65 0.042 0.032 0.022 -1.478 -2.615 -3.643 0.454 0.126 0.045 
Rural Other 4,554 0.09 2.30 0.013 0.014 0.012 -0.430 -1.497 -2.459 0.789 0.316 0.142 
Urban Malays 40,514 0.20 8.74 0.202 0.188 0.169 -1.547 -1.968 -2.377 0.273 0.092 0.042 
Urban Chinese 47,360 0.18 11.39 0.135 0.101 0.072 -1.808 -2.667 -3.510 0.195 0.053 0.019 
Urban Indians 10,412 0.05 9.53 0.051 0.039 0.027 -1.737 -2.653 -3.530 0.275 0.075 0.027 
Urban Other 3,892 0.04 4.55 0.003 0.002 0.001 -2.048 -3.896 -5.646 0.312 0.064 0.017 
Non-citizen 9,844 0.06 7.11 0.056 0.066 0.071 -0.939 -1.339 -1.662 0.482 0.206 0.113 




   The first column of Table 4.4 shows the number of poor people in the base year 
(i.e. 2000). Row 1 provides the level of sectoral final demand in the base year. Rows 2 
to 10 display the estimated poverty alleviation effects. These are computed for the case 
of a 1 billion MR (BMR) increase in the final demand for the products of a single sector 
i (= 1, …, 10), while the final demand levels in the other sectors remain unchanged. 
Fixing the amount by which the final demand level is changed (i.e. 1 BMR in our case), 
allows for a comparison of the poverty responses across sectors. As an alternative, one 
might have chosen to increase the final demand level of a sector by a fixed percentage. 
Both calculations have their pros and cons. The advantage of using a fixed size for the 
change is that a comparison across sectors is not blurred by the size of the sectors. A 
disadvantage of using a fixed size (of 1 BMR) for the change is that the effects are also 
calculated in cases where any final demand increase is unrealistic. Recall that the 
final demands consist of investments, government expenditures, and exports. For 
example, a 1 BMR increase in final demand equals a 0.3% increase for manufacturing 
(sector 3) and a 43.8% increase for other private services (9). The utility sector (4), 
however, has only very little final demand and a 1 BMR increase is almost 200 times 
its current final demand. This implies that the results should be interpreted with care, 
in particular in connection to issues of policy making. Row 11 indicates the total 
poverty effect. For example, 1 BMR extra final demand of agricultural products would 
lead to a 0.0836% reduction in the number of poor, which amounts to almost 1,730 
people. 
 
A first observation is that, for rural households, any sectoral final demand 
growth induces the largest poverty reduction for the Malays, the smallest for the 
Indians and the Chinese take the intermediate position. For urban households, 
poverty reduction is smallest for the Indians whereas the largest reduction is found for 
the Malays when the growth occurs in certain sectors and for the Chinese when it 
occurs in one of the other sectors. Appendix D shows that this pattern appears to be 
fairly consistent across poverty measures. 
 
A second observation is that, in general, the impacts of sectoral final demand 
growth on aggregate poverty reduction vary considerably across sectors. The results in 
Table 4.4 clearly indicate that a final demand increase in the government services 
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Table 4.4 Percentage change in numbers of poor arising from a 1 billion MR increase in final demand, 2000. 
    
Number 
of poor  
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5 Sector 6 Sector 7 Sector 8 Sector 9 Sector 10 
A. Initial final demand (MR million) (1)  7,578 28,811 326,635 5 41,293 12,085 20,395 13,863 2,284 33,955 
B. Poverty reduction (%)             
   Rural Malays (2) 908,542 0.1351 0.1029 0.0760 0.1118 0.1142 0.1118 0.1178 0.1133 0.1260 0.3754 
   Rural Chinese (3) 120,987 0.0347 0.0188 0.0143 0.0180 0.0317 0.0265 0.0233 0.0226 0.0303 0.0258 
   Rural Indians (4) 86,574 0.0235 0.0138 0.0106 0.0147 0.0123 0.0137 0.0169 0.0143 0.0137 0.0201 
   Rural other (5) 26,240 0.0030 0.0012 0.0007 0.0012 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0018 0.0036 
   Urban Malays (6) 418,731 0.0561 0.0621 0.0402 0.0763 0.0610 0.0708 0.0793 0.0875 0.0767 0.2452 
   Urban Chinese (7) 279,723 0.0596 0.0489 0.0373 0.0520 0.0827 0.0817 0.0541 0.0773 0.0804 0.0763 
   Urban Indians (8) 106,012 0.0181 0.0187 0.0135 0.0235 0.0197 0.0234 0.0246 0.0271 0.0264 0.0409 
   Urban other (9) 6,792 0.0018 0.0015 0.0009 0.0018 0.0018 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0026 0.0043 
   Non-citizen (10) 116,387 0.0158 0.0144 0.0085 0.0108 0.0148 0.0137 0.0102 0.0129 0.0121 0.0174 
   Total for all households (11) 2,069,989 0.0836 0.0678 0.0490 0.0750 0.0778 0.0785 0.0790 0.0819 0.0861 0.2301 
C. Component of value added (%)             
   Labor income (12)  16.62 3.35 26.84 8.74 64.78 22.61 31.59 21.38 35.57 95.09 
   Capital income (13)   83.38 96.65 73.16 91.26 35.22 77.39 68.41 78.62 64.57 4.91 
Notes: Sector 1 (agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing), Sector 2 (mining and quarrying), Sector 3 (manufacturing), Sector 4 (utilities), Sector 5 (building and construction), Sector 6 
(wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants), Sector 7 (transport and communication), Sector 8 (finance, real estate and business services), Sector 9 (other private services) and 
Sector 10 (government services). 
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sector (10) contributes the most to poverty reduction when compared to other sectors. 
For a 1 BMR increase in final demand of the public services sector, the number of poor 
reduces by 0.2301%. That is, by 4,764 people, of which almost 3,410 are rural Malays. 
Increased final demand in the manufacturing sector (3) displays the lowest poverty 
reduction, by 0.0490%. The contribution of a final demand increase in any of the other 
sectors does not vary extremely and ranges from 0.0678% for the mining and 
quarrying sector (2) to 0.0861% for other private services (9). These results provide 
additional support to the growing literature that finds that growth stimuli in different 
production sectors have heterogeneous effects on poverty reduction. 
 
In relation to the heterogeneity of the poverty effect, two different viewpoints 
have been proposed. The studies by Quizon and Binswanger (1986) for India, Warr 
and Wang (1999) for Taiwan, and Ferreira, et al. (2010) for Brazil, all find that growth 
in the non-agricultural sectors has the largest impact on poverty reduction. The 
contrasting view—that agricultural growth is the most ‘promising’ for poverty 
alleviation—has been documented in Thorbecke and Jung (1996) and Sumarto and 
Suryahadi (2007) for Indonesia, Khan (1999) for South Africa, Christiaensen and 
Demery (2007) for Africa, and Ravallion and Chen (2007) for China.9 Our own results 
show by far the largest effect for final demand growth in a non-agricultural sector 
(namely government services). At the same time, however, the agricultural sector 
performs second best of the rest and clearly much better than manufacturing for 
example.  
 
This raises the question why final demand growth in some sectors contributes 
more to poverty alleviation than growth in other sectors? It has been emphasized in 
the literature that sectors that are more labor-intensive tend to have stronger effects 
on poverty alleviation (see, for example, Khan and Thorbecke, 1988; James and Khan, 
1997; Loayza and Raddatz, 2010). The reason is that labor income constitutes the 
largest part of household incomes. It then follows immediately that growth in labor-
intensive sectors benefits workers, household incomes, and poverty reduction more 
than growth in other sectors. This is partially supported by the results in this study. 
                                          
9 Notice that, among these studies, Thorbecke and Jung (1996) and Khan (1999) apply a similar modeling 
approach (i.e. using a SAM) as employed in the present study.  
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Rows 12 and 13 of Table 4.4 present the shares of labor income (respectively capital 
income) in the value added of a sector in 2000. This reflects the labor and capital 
intensity of a sector. The government services sector (sector 10) is the most labor-
intensive sector with a labor income contribution of 95% to the sector’s value added. 
In contrast, in sectors that are highly capital-intensive—such as mining and quarrying 
(sector 2) and utilities (4)—labor income contributes only 3% and 8%, respectively, to 
the value added. This explains why the government services sector is the most 
poverty-reducing sector while the mining and quarrying and utilities sectors seem to 
help poverty reduction only little.10  
 
Just looking at the share of labor income in a sector’s value added, however, 
only provides part of the story. For example, the sectors manufacturing (3) and 
building and construction (5) have larger shares of labor income in value added (27% 
and 65%, respectively) than the agricultural sector (17%). Yet, the poverty reduction 
due to a growth in final demand in one of these two sectors is clearly smaller than it is 
for agriculture. The explanation is that we also need to take the interdependencies 
between the production sectors into account. For the government services (sector 10) 
for example, it turns out that growth in its final demand essentially leads to growth in 
this sector’s output. The sector’s enormous labor intensity suffices in that case to 
explain the outstanding poverty reduction. A final demand increase in building and 
construction (sector 5) or manufacturing (3) on the other hand yields output growth in 
many sectors. Poverty reduction then depends on (i) the composition of output growth 
across sectors, (ii) the value added to output ratio in each of the sectors, and (iii) their 
labor income shares in value added. The results in Table 4.4 take the 
interdependencies between sectors and the consequences for poverty reduction into 
full account. For the agricultural sector, we find that it largely depends on itself and 
                                          
10 A similar reasoning may explain—at least to some extent—why Thorbecke and Jung (1996) and Khan 
(1999) found such an important role for agriculture. The present study uses a SAM for 2000, when 
industrialization had become effective in Malaysia. In contrast, Thorbecke and Jung (1996) used a SAM 
for 1980 for Indonesia and Khan (1999) used the 1986 SAM for South Africa, a period in which 
production was much more labor-intensive. For example, using the SAM for Indonesia in 1980 (which is 
available from Keuning and de Ruijter, 1990), we calculated that labor income contributed no less than 
45% to the value added of the agricultural sector (which is quite different from the 17% that we observe 
for Malaysia in 2000). 
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has much value added per unit of output. These two components clearly outweigh the 
small labor income shares in agriculture’s value added. 
 
4.5.2 Decomposition of poverty impacts  
 
Of all poor people in Malaysia, 44% are in rural Malay households and another  20% 
in urban Malay households. Our results in Table 4.4 showed that any increase in final 
demand generates by far the highest poverty reduction (as percentage change of the 
poor) for the rural Malays. The urban Malays and urban Chinese follow next, albeit at 
a considerable distance. Looking within the rows of Table 4.4, we see that poverty for 
the rural and the urban Malays is reduced the most if the stimulus of the final 
demand is for government services. For the rural Chinese and Indians a final demand 
increase in agriculture has the largest effect, for the urban Chinese this applies to 
building and construction, and for the urban Indians to government services.  
 
It should be stressed that these results indicate the potential for poverty 
reduction through an increase of the final demands. An ex-post evaluation of actual 
changes, however, often requires also other explanations. For example, if the results in 
Table 4.4 are viewed against the findings for 1999-2004 in Table 4.1, it must be 
concluded that other changes have taken place than just increases in final demands. 
The number of poor decreased between 1999 and 2004 by 50% for the Chinese and 
only by 33% for the Malays.11   
 
Although growth is usually driven by some “key” sectors, the benefits of growth 
for poverty reduction can be spread over the economy if the sectors have a higher 
degree of interdependency. To quantify this, we link equations (4.14) and (4.16) and 
decompose the poverty reduction (as caused by an increase in final demand) into the 
reduction that is determined by the initial, the direct and the indirect effects. The 
contribution of the three separate effects for reducing the number of poor is displayed 
in Table 4.5. Notice that only the results at the national level are presented, not for 
each ethnic group separately. The reason is that the results for the individual ethnic 
                                          
11 The results in Tables 4.1 and 4.4 are not entirely comparable. Table 4.1 is based on household incomes 
while Table 4.4 is based on income recipients. 
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groups are very similar. This is illustrated in Figures 4.1a and 4.1b that display the 
contribution of the initial effect for each ethnic group. The largest variation is found 
for final demand growth in building and construction where the initial effects range 
from 55% for the rural Indian to 74% for the rural Chinese. The smallest variation is 
for the final demand stimulus in mining and quarrying where the initial effect shows 
an extremely small range, i.e. from 90% to 93%.  
 
Column 1 in Table 4.5 gives the total poverty reduction for a 1 BMR increase in 
final demand and is expressed as the decrease in the number of poor people. The 
contributions of the initial, direct and indirect effects are expressed as a percentage of 
the total reduction. For example, growth in the final demand for agricultural products 
reduces the number of poor by 1,730, 76% of which stems from the initial effect, 16% 
from the direct effect, and 8% from the indirect effects. Table 4.5 shows that the initial 
effect is responsible for most of the poverty reduction, explaining about two-thirds. In 
particular, the initial effect that follows from a final demand increase in the mining 
and quarrying sector (sector 2) or in government services (sector 10) contributes more 
than 90% to the total poverty reduction. Recall that the initial effect captures only the 
effect of the immediate output growth in the particular sector and no sectoral linkages 
are involved at this stage. These two sectors hardly depend on inputs from other 
sectors so that a stimulus of their final demands does not spill over and thereby 




Table 4.5 Decomposition of the change in the number of poor due to a 1 billion MR 












 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sector 1 (agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing)      1,730  76.38 15.83 7.78 
Sector 2 (mining and quarrying)      1,403  91.64 5.87 2.49 
Sector 3 (manufacturing)        1,014  54.72 30.35 14.92 
Sector 4 (utilities)        1,553  73.39 18.09 8.52 
Sector 5 (building and construction)        1,611  63.93 23.40 12.67 
Sector 6 (wholesale and retail trade, hotels and 
restaurants) 
       1,626  72.63 19.00 8.36 
Sector 7 (transport and communication)        1,635  66.44 22.49 11.07 
Sector 8 (finance, real estate and business services)        1,696  72.55 19.40 8.04 
Sector 9 (other private services)        1,782  70.06 20.61 9.33 
Sector 10 (government services)        4,764  92.36 5.42 2.22 
 
Figure 4.1a Contribution of the initial effect on poverty reduction across rural groups 
(%) 
 
Notes: Sector 1 (agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing), Sector 2 (mining and quarrying), Sector 3 
(manufacturing), Sector 4 (utilities), Sector 5 (building and construction), Sector 6 (wholesale and retail 
trade, hotels and restaurants), Sector 7 (transport and communication), Sector 8 (finance, real estate and 
business services), Sector 9 (other private services) and Sector 10 (government services). 

















Figure 4.1b Contribution of the initial effect on poverty reduction across urban groups 
(%) 
 
Notes: Sector 1 (agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing), Sector 2 (mining and quarrying), Sector 3 
(manufacturing), Sector 4 (utilities), Sector 5 (building and construction), Sector 6 (wholesale and retail 
trade, hotels and restaurants), Sector 7 (transport and communication), Sector 8 (finance, real estate and 
business services), Sector 9 (other private services) and Sector 10 (government services). 
 
This lack of spillover effects also holds for poverty reduction. Consider an 
increase in the final demand for government services, for example. The household 
income of, for example, rural Malays will increase and leads to poverty alleviation. 
However, because of the absence of sectoral linkages, household incomes will increase 
in particular for those working in the government services sector. Households that 
depend on income earned in another sector will not be affected (or only very little). A 
large initial effect thus implies that the effects are to a large extent linked only to the 
sector itself (i.e. where the final demand increase took place). 
 
Table 4.5 shows that manufacturing (sector 3) is the sector with the smallest 
initial effect. Because this sector depends strongly on inputs from other sectors, the 
effects of a final demand increase will spill over and affect the output, value added and 
income generated in other sectors. Poverty reduction will thus affect not only members 

















of households with an income from the manufacturing sector but also those with an 
income from other sectors. 
 
 From a policy perspective, one might not only be interested in which final 
demand increase generates the largest effect, but also in the spillovers. In this respect 
do the results in Table 4.5 sketch a somewhat varied picture. Compare, for example, 
mining and quarrying (sector 2) with transport and communication (7). If the question 
would be in which sector to increase the final demand, the answer would be transport 
and communication. The effects are larger and have spilled over more to other sectors. 
This is a case that might be described as “killing two birds with one stone”. 
Unfortunately, this is not possible when maximizing the effects. The sector with the 
largest effect in size is government services (sector 10) which, however, has one of the 
smallest spillover effects. On the other hand, manufacturing (sector 3) has the largest 
spillover effects but the smallest effect in size. 
 
A different policy for reducing poverty would be to target growth in the sector 
that employs the largest number of poor. Recall that growth in the highly labor-
intensive sector of government services has the largest impact on poverty reduction for 
the economy and in particular for the Malay. However, it can be calculated that the 
number of poor households that are engaged in the public services sector is relatively 
low and that the number of poor is estimated at 92 thousand people (or 4% of the total 
number of poor). In comparison, agriculture is the sector with the largest share in the 
amount of poor. This sector employs 34% of the poor households, which is equivalent 
to 798,000 poor people (or 39% of the total number of poor). 
 
 It should be stressed that the methods proposed in this chapter are able to 
indicate what the effects are of a final demand increase in a certain sector. The choice 
of the “best” strategy is beyond the scope of this chapter and depends on the definition 
of “best” and thus on political considerations. For example, should one maximize the 
size of the overall effect, aim at a specific ethnic group, or promote a spread of the 




In addition, it should be mentioned that certain aspects cannot be covered. For 
example, it is well known that Malaysia has a substantial informal sector that employs 
many poor people (often women, in particular in rural areas). Expanding the SAM with 
the informal sector would benefit the poverty analysis but requires a considerable 
amount of data that are currently not available. For the same reason is it not possible 
to do some fine-tuning for the stimuli (investments, public expenditures or exports). 
For example, an export stimulus in a certain industry might induce extra exports of 
the capital-intensive products in that industry. However, if the stimulus (in the same 
industry) would stem from extra government expenditures it might focus on the labor-
intensive products in that industry. Even though we distinguish 92 industries in our 
SAM, it should be realized that no distinction can be made between goods and services 
within the same industry. Finally, it should be mentioned that certain medium- or 
long-run consequences are not included in our analysis. That is, if extra final 
demands are due to extra exports, foreigners pay for this. However, if the extra final 
demands are brought about by increased government spending, Malaysia will have to 
pay for this. This might happen through extra taxes which may affect poverty. 
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this study, we have examined the relationship between the growth of the exogenous 
final demand for a sector’s production and poverty reduction in Malaysia. We have 
used a model that is based on the social accounting matrix (SAM) for Malaysia in 
2000. The SAM distinguishes the three major ethnic groups (Malays, Chinese, and 
Indians) and rural and urban areas. The model works as follows. An increase in the 
final demand of a certain sector yields gross output growth in all sectors due to the 
interdependencies between the sectors of production. In a SAM this is linked to 
income generation and income distribution which yields the growth in household 
income of each ethnic group (e.g. the rural Malays). This implies a reduction in poverty 
as measured by three different poverty indexes, one of which is the number of poor in 
an ethnic group. 
 
Our main results showed that for rural households any sectoral final demand 
growth induces poverty reduction that is largest for the Malays, smallest for the 
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Indians, with the Chinese taking the intermediate position. For urban households the 
largest reduction was found for the Malays or the Chinese (depending on the sector in 
which the stimulus takes place) and the smallest for the Indians. The results did not 
depend on the specific poverty measure that was used. Another key finding was that 
the total poverty reduction was by far the largest when the final demand for 
government services was increased. 
 
An explanation that has been emphasized in the literature is that growth in 
sectors with a higher labor-intensity has stronger effects on poverty alleviation (see, for 
example, Khan and Thorbecke, 1988; James and Khan, 1997; Loayza and Raddatz, 
2010). Because labor income contributes the largest part to household incomes, 
growth in a labor-intensive sector benefits workers, household incomes, and poverty 
reduction more than growth in another sector. This line of reasoning suffices to 
explain the large poverty reduction when final demand for government services is 
increased. We have indicated that in several other cases, however, such a simple 
explanation does not suffice. For example, the share of labor income in value added is 
one of the smallest in the agricultural sector whereas poverty reduction due to a 
stimulus of its final demands is one of the largest. 
 
The interdependencies between the production sectors make the situation 
much more complex in general. An increase in the final demand for some sector will 
induce output growth in all sectors. The amount of poverty reduction then depends on 
(i) the composition of output growth across sectors, and (ii) for each sector the effect of 
output growth on household incomes (and thus poverty reduction). It is thus 
important to take full account of the intersectoral production linkages.  
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Appendix 4.1 Estimation of expenditure elasticities and marginal expenditure 
propensities 
 
The SAM in Table 4.2 allows us to calculate the average expenditure propensities for 
households. In matrix notation we have 𝐀𝑃𝐻 = 𝐓𝑃𝐻?̂?𝐻
−1, or 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝑡𝑖𝑗/𝑦𝑗 with 𝑡𝑖𝑗 the 
expenditures of household group j on product i and 𝑦𝑗 the total household income of 
this group. In our empirical analysis, we would like to replace the average expenditure 
propensities by the marginal propensities d𝑡𝑖𝑗/d𝑦𝑗. The expenditure elasticities are 













marginal expenditure propensity (MEP)
average expenditure propensity (AEP)
                         (A1) 
             
(see also Khan and Thorbecke, 1988, and Thorbecke and Jung, 1996). This implies 
that if the expenditure elasticities are known, the marginal expenditure propensities 
are simply obtained by multiplying the average expenditure propensities with the 
corresponding expenditure elasticities. The next step is to estimate the expenditure 
elasticities. 
 
A major constraint in estimating the elasticites is typically the unavailability or 
limited coverage of household expenditure data. This has led to a number of 
approaches that have been applied in such circumstances. For example, the estimates 
in Khan and Thorbecke (1988) were based on expert opinions and on “borrowing” 
elasticities from the existing literature. In another study, Pieters (2010) estimated the 
expenditure elasticities simply by taking the difference in average expenditure 
propensities between the SAMs for two different points in times.   
 
We estimate the expenditure elasticities using the available household 
expenditure survey (HES). For the approximation, we apply a ratio semi- logarithmic 





𝑡𝑖𝑗(𝑘) 𝑞𝑗(𝑘)⁄ = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏𝑖𝑗log [𝑞𝑗(𝑘)]        (A2) 
 
where the expenditures by individual household k in group j are given by 𝑞𝑗(𝑘) and 
where the left-hand side gives the share that is spent on product i.12 Adding-up 
requires that ∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑗(𝑘) 𝑞𝑗(𝑘)⁄ = 1𝑖 , which is satisfied provided 
 
∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑖 = 1, ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑖 = 0         (A3) 
 
Equation (A2) was estimated by ordinary least squares based on a cross-section of 
household data from the HES for 2000. We distinguished nine groups of households j 
and 76 groups of commodities i. Notice that although our SAM includes 92 sectoral 
commodities, only 76 commodities are actually consumed by households. The other 
16 commodities (such as rubber primary products, metal ore, and iron and steel) are 
used as inputs by industries or exported. 
  
The estimation yields ?̂?𝑖𝑗 and ?̂?𝑖𝑗. Evaluating equation (A2) at the sample mean then 
gives 
 
𝑡𝑖𝑗 𝑞𝑗⁄ = ?̂?𝑖𝑗 + ?̂?𝑖𝑗log [𝑞𝑗]         (A4) 
 
It follows from (A4) that (d𝑡𝑖𝑗/d𝑞𝑗) = ?̂?𝑖𝑗 + ?̂?𝑖𝑗log [𝑞𝑗] + ?̂?𝑖𝑗 = 𝑡𝑖𝑗 𝑞𝑗⁄ + ?̂?𝑖𝑗 (see for example, 
Leser, 1963; Massell and Heyer, 1969; Delgado, et al., 1998; Hendriks and Lyne, 
2003). For the elasticity we then have (d𝑡𝑖𝑗/d𝑞𝑗)/(𝑡𝑖𝑗 𝑞𝑗⁄ ) = 1 + ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑞𝑗/𝑡𝑖𝑗. Note that the 
incomes from the HES differ from those reported in the SAM, so that 𝑦𝑗 = 𝛾𝑗𝑞𝑗. This 
does not affect the elasticity: 
 
                                          
12 It should be noted that 𝑞𝑗(𝑘) from the HES gives the income that is entirely spent on consumption of 
domestically produced goods and services. In contrast, 𝑦𝑗 in equation (A1) gives total household income. 
About 75% of this is spent on consumption of domestic products and the rest is allocated to saving and 





















Using data from the HES 2000, our estimates for the expenditure elasticities are thus 
obtained as 
 
?̂?𝑖𝑗 = 1 + ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑞𝑗/𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 1 + ?̂?𝑖𝑗/𝑤𝑖𝑗       (A5) 
 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the expenditure share. 
 
It should be stressed that, in principle, there are several functional forms 
available for estimating the expenditure elasticities but the choice of an appropriate 
form depends on how “rich” the data are. For example, the application of Deaton and 
Muellbauer’s (1980) AIDS (almost ideal demand system) is generally a difficult task 
when price information is not available, which is one of the limitations that applies in 
our case. Also, time-series are available in Malaysia only for aggregate consumption 
but not for any disaggregation (neither by type of commodities nor by groups of 
households). The HES that we have used in our analysis provides data for the 
consumption of commodities by individual households, but prices are not available.  
 
 Given the data limitations, the ratio semi-logarithmic and double-logarithmic 
forms would be viable options for the estimation of the elasticities. The ratio semi-
logarithmic, however, is preferred because it satisfies the adding-up restriction, i.e. the 
sum of expenditure shares over commodities equals one for each household k in group 
j, see (A3). In contrast, the adding-up restriction cannot be accommodated by the 
double-logarithmic form (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 2007). 
 
   Using the estimated expenditure elasticities to calculate the marginal 
expenditure propensities according to (A1) will change the matrix 𝐀𝑃𝐻 in (1). Table A1 
gives the expenditure elasticities 𝛽𝑖𝑗 that have been calculated with equation (A5). In 
line with the constraint in (A3), we find that some elasticities are larger than one while 
others are smaller than one. The elasticities for the manufacturing (3) and the building 
and construction sector (5) are larger than one for all ethnic groups, the elasticities for 
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other private services (sector 9) are mixed, and for the other sectors are the elasticities 
essentially smaller than one. Using equation (A1) together with the estimated 
expenditure elasticities 𝛽𝑖𝑗 and the average expenditure propensities (AEPs), gives the 
marginal expenditure propensities (MEPs). Observe that for all ethnic groups the sum 
of the MEPs is smaller than the sum of the AEPs. For example, for the direct effects we 
find that any additional MR of rural Malay income induces 0.8107 MR extra 
consumption whereas on average this is 0.8966 MR per MR of rural Malay income. 
 
  A consequence of replacing the AEPs in 𝐀𝑃𝐻 by MEPs is that the multiplier 
matrix M in (4.3) will change. Given our interest—the effects of final demand changes 
on household income and, subsequently, poverty—we will only present the differences 
for the submatrix 𝐌𝐻𝑃. Table A2 displays the differences in the income multipliers 
(𝐌𝐻𝑃) for the two model versions—using average expenditure propensities and 
marginal expenditure propensities. For example, a one billion MR increase in the final 
demand for agricultural products, increases the household income of rural Malay with 
2.17 million MR less when marginal expenditure propensities (MEPs) are used than 
when average expenditure propensities (AEPs) are used (i.e. the increases are 59.43 
and 61.60 million MR, respectively). The results clearly indicate that the multiplier 
differences between the two models are considerable. Using average expenditure 
propensities substantially overestimates the income effects for all household groups 















Table A1 Estimated expenditure elasticities, average expenditure propensities and 
marginal expenditure propensities. 
 
RM RC RI RO UM UC UI UO N-C 
A. Expenditure elasticities (𝛽𝑖𝑗)          
  Agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing 0.9717 0.8501 0.9468 0.7293 0.9108 0.8861 1.0570 0.6665 0.7293 
  Mining and quarrying 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  Manufacturing 1.1710 1.2136 1.1473 1.1790 1.1221 1.2067 1.1785 1.1467 1.1790 
  Utilities 0.4719 0.3799 0.4987 0.6252 0.3479 0.2916 0.4549 0.7999 0.6252 
  Buildings and construction 1.6280 1.7407 1.5180 1.5004 1.1000 1.0140 1.6767 1.5645 1.5004 
  Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and 
restaurants 
0.5520 0.7038 0.5809 1.0198 0.6529 0.7653 0.5123 1.3384 1.0198 
  Transport and communication 0.5787 0.6664 0.6784 0.8697 0.6635 0.3725 0.8172 0.7759 0.8697 
  Finance, real estate and business services 0.7352 0.7819 0.8199 0.8424 0.6775 0.7356 0.5916 0.7387 0.8424 
  Other private services 0.9338 1.0000 1.1441 1.0458 0.9570 0.7599 1.2406 1.1490 1.0458 
  Government services 0.7645 1.0000 0.8136 0.9814 0.9163 0.9932 0.5983 1.3294 0.9814 
  Total 0.9042 0.8819 0.9006 0.9126 0.8852 0.8360 0.8624 0.8946 0.9578 
          
B. Average expenditure propensities (AEP)          
  Agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing 0.0731 0.0595 0.0680 0.0515 0.0451 0.0400 0.0510 0.0373 0.0312 
  Mining and quarrying 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  Manufacturing 0.4000 0.1753 0.2035 0.2081 0.2886 0.2009 0.2396 0.1693 0.0937 
  Utilities 0.0083 0.0416 0.0037 0.0912 0.0097 0.0364 0.0019 0.1058 0.0156 
  Buildings and construction 0.0005 0.0006 0.0001 0.0113 0.0015 0.0035 0.0001 0.0214 0.0000 
  Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and 
restaurants 
0.0997 0.1178 0.1500 0.0261 0.1005 0.1178 0.1262 0.0371 0.0839 
  Transport and communication 0.1714 0.0132 0.0012 0.0320 0.1009 0.0620 0.0913 0.0415 0.0564 
  Finance, real estate and business services 0.0862 0.2256 0.0838 0.4374 0.1054 0.2178 0.1312 0.3971 0.1011 
  Other private services 0.0299 0.0522 0.0293 0.0169 0.0299 0.0547 0.0317 0.0160 0.0336 
  Government services 0.0273 0.0374 0.0469 0.0097 0.0282 0.0365 0.0497 0.0180 0.0040 
  Total 0.8966 0.7233 0.5864 0.8842 0.7099 0.7696 0.7225 0.8436 0.4196 
          
C. Marginal expenditure propensities (MEP)          
  Agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing 0.0711 0.0506 0.0643 0.0376 0.0411 0.0355 0.0539 0.0249 0.0228 
  Mining and quarrying 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  Manufacturing 0.4684 0.2127 0.2335 0.2453 0.3239 0.2424 0.2823 0.1942 0.1105 
  Utilities 0.0039 0.0158 0.0019 0.0570 0.0034 0.0106 0.0009 0.0846 0.0098 
  Buildings and construction 0.0008 0.0010 0.0001 0.0170 0.0017 0.0035 0.0001 0.0335 0.0000 
  Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and 
restaurants 
0.0551 0.0829 0.0871 0.0266 0.0656 0.0901 0.0647 0.0496 0.0855 
  Transport and communication 0.0992 0.0088 0.0008 0.0279 0.0670 0.0231 0.0746 0.0322 0.0491 
  Finance, real estate and business services 0.0634 0.1764 0.0687 0.3684 0.0714 0.1602 0.0776 0.2933 0.0852 
  Other private services 0.0280 0.0522 0.0336 0.0176 0.0286 0.0416 0.0393 0.0184 0.0351 
  Government services 0.0209 0.0374 0.0381 0.0095 0.0258 0.0363 0.0297 0.0239 0.0040 
  Total 0.8107 0.6379 0.5281 0.8070 0.6285 0.6433 0.6231 0.7547 0.4019 
Notes: RM = rural Malays, RC = rural Chinese, RI = rural Indians, RO = rural other, UM = urban Malays, 
UC = urban Chinese, UI = urban Indians, UO = urban other and N-C = non-citizen. 
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Table A2 Differences in 𝐌𝐇𝐏 between the applying average and marginal expenditure 
propensities for households (million MR) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Rural Malays -2.17 -1.78 -1.28 -1.98 -2.35 -2.40 -2.08 -2.46 -2.54 -4.50 
Rural Chinese -1.04 -0.85 -0.61 -0.94 -1.13 -1.15 -0.99 -1.17 -1.22 -2.14 
Rural Indians -0.36 -0.30 -0.21 -0.33 -0.39 -0.40 -0.34 -0.41 -0.42 -0.74 
Rural others -0.44 -0.36 -0.26 -0.40 -0.48 -0.49 -0.42 -0.50 -0.51 -0.90 
Urban Malays -4.24 -3.48 -2.50 -3.87 -4.59 -4.69 -4.06 -4.80 -4.98 -8.81 
Urban Chinese -5.36 -4.39 -3.15 -4.87 -5.84 -5.95 -5.13 -6.08 -6.31 -11.02 
Urban Indians -1.16 -0.95 -0.68 -1.05 -1.26 -1.29 -1.11 -1.31 -1.36 -2.39 
Urban others -0.43 -0.35 -0.25 -0.39 -0.47 -0.48 -0.41 -0.49 -0.51 -0.89 
Non-citizen -0.87 -0.71 -0.51 -0.79 -0.94 -0.96 -0.83 -0.98 -1.02 -1.77 
Notes: (1) agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing; (2) mining and quarrying; (3) manufacturing;  
(4) utilities; (5) building and construction; (6) wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants;  
(7) transport and communication; (8) finance, real estate and business services; (9) other private services;  






















Appendix 4.2 Estimation of Lorenz curve and poverty measures 
 
A Lorenz curve maps the cumulative income distribution as a function of the 
cumulative population distribution. Let L represent the cumulative income 
distribution and p the cumulative population distribution, then L(p) expresses that L% 
of the income accrues to the bottom p% of the population, where income per capita is 
ordered from the lowest to the highest. Figure B1 depicts an example of the Lorenz 
curve for rural Other households, derived from the grouped data in Table B1 using 10 
income classes. For example, 9% of the rural Other fall in the lowest income class (RM 
0 – RM 1999) and together they approximately have 2% of the income of the rural 
Other. The 45 degree line indicates the perfect equality line, where everyone has the 








































Cumulative population distribution (p) 





Table B1 Distribution of income for rural Other households 






ip  iL  
0 – 1,999 9.03 114.10 0.0903 0.0160 
2,000 – 3,999 22.64 260.18 0.3166 0.1072 
4,000 – 5,999  23.88 402.20 0.5554 0.2559 
6,000 – 7,999  11.92 585.32 0.6745 0.3640 
8,000 – 9,999  10.18 749.98 0.7763 0.4822 
10,000 – 11,999  7.87 903.79 0.8550 0.5924 
12,000 – 13,999  4.66 1,070.70 0.9015 0.6696 
14,000 – 15,999  2.31 1,269.17 0.9247 0.7151 
16,000 – 17,999  2.50 1,405.52 0.9497 0.7695 
More than 18,000 5.03 2,956.70 1.0000 1.0000 
Source: computed from the HIS (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2001). 
  
 Once the Lorenz curve and average income are known, it is feasible to compute 
poverty and inequality measures. In applied work, the Lorenz curve is frequently 
estimated from grouped data such as in Table B1. There are a number of functional 
forms available to specify the Lorenz curve, of which the Generalized Quadratic (GQ, 
Villasenor and Arnold, 1989) and the Beta (Kakwani, 1980) are commonly used and 
perform well in estimating poverty. In this study, we have chosen for the GQ 
parameterization because it provides a better fit towards the data than the Beta 
function and because the Beta function violates the conditions required for a valid 
Lorenz curve (i.e. it exhibits a negative slope at the origin). The estimation of the 
Lorenz curve and poverty estimates on the basis of GQ specification can be 
summarized by the following three steps (for a detailed discussion see Datt, 1998; 
Ramadas et al., 2002). 
 
Step 1: prepare data for the estimation of the Lorenz curve 
This step involves the construction of data for the population and income shares from 
the grouped data. The values for p and L are obtained as the cumulative proportion of 
population and cumulative share in aggregate income, respectively. For the group of 




Step 2: regression on the grouped data 
The GQ Lorenz curve for ethnic group i is given by the following quadratic form:      
 
𝐿𝑖(1 − 𝐿𝑖) = 𝑎𝑖(𝑝𝑖
2 − 𝐿𝑖) + 𝑏𝑖𝐿𝑖(𝑝𝑖 − 1) + 𝑐𝑖(𝑝𝑖 − 𝐿𝑖)     (B1) 
 
Values for p and L are available, thus the unknown parameters ia , ib  and ic  can be 
estimated by using ordinary least squares (OLS). Notice that the estimated line must 
pass through the origin (i.e. there is no intercept, see Figure B1). The number of 
observations equals the number of income groups minus one (because the last income 
group yields a zero condition because the two cumulative variables are both equal to 
one). For example, in the case of Table B1 the number of observations is nine since 
there are 10 income groups. Once the parameters ia , ib  and ic  have been estimated, 
(B1) can be re-written so as to yield an explicit functional form for the Lorenz curve. 





[𝑏𝑖𝑝𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 + (𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑖
2 + 𝑣𝑖𝑝𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖
2)1/2]
     
(B2) 
 
where 𝑒𝑖 = −(𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 + 1);  𝑢𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖
2 − 4𝑎𝑖;   𝑣𝑖 = 2𝑏𝑖𝑒𝑖 − 4𝑐𝑖 
           
Step 3: specify the average income (?̅?) and the poverty line income (z) 
To calculate the poverty measures as in (4.15), we need to specify average income for 
group i and the poverty line income (PLI). In our example in Table B1, the estimated 
average income is MR 645 per month, which is derived as ?̅?𝑖 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑘 , where 𝜏𝑖𝑘 gives 
the proportion of the population in group interval k (given in the second column of 
Table B1, for i = rural Other) and 𝑙𝑖𝑘 the per capita income in interval k (given in the 
third column of Table B1). Recall that the rural PLI has been set at MR 698 per month 
and the urban PLI has been set at MR 687 per month. Once 𝑧 and ?̅? have been 
identified, the head count (𝑃𝑖
(0)
), the poverty gap (𝑃𝑖
(1)
), and the distribution-sensitive 
(𝑃𝑖
(2)













]        (B3) 
 
 















) can be easily obtained by substituting 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖
(0)



























)]      (B5) 
 
 
where 𝑠1 = (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖)/(2𝑢𝑖); 𝑠2 = −(𝑟𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖)/(2𝑢𝑖)  
 
Next, calculation of the elasticity of the head count (𝜀𝑖
(0)
), the poverty gap (𝜀𝑖
(1)
) and the 
distribution-sensitive (𝜀𝑖
(2)
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        (B9) 
 
For computational purposes, we have used the POVCAL software program, which was 
specially developed for poverty analysis and distributed by the World Bank.13 It has 
been used extensively in poverty analyses (see for example, Bhalla, 2002; Chen and 




                                          
13Some of the functions of POVCAL are built into the PovcalNet website of the World Bank 
(http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp) which allows users to obtain poverty estimates 
for any country in the period covered for a specified poverty line. 
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Appendix 4.3 Estimates on poverty measures for Indonesia and South Africa 
Indonesia in 1980   South Africa in 1986 
 iy  
Elasticity of poverty (𝜀𝑖
(𝛼)
) Poverty share (𝜎𝑖
(𝛼)
)  
 iy  
Elasticity of poverty (𝜀𝑖
(𝛼)





α = 1 
 
α = 2 
 
α = 0 
 




  α = 0 
 
α = 1 
 
α = 2 
 
α = 0 
 
α = 1 
 
α = 2 
 
Agr. employees 101 -0.384 -0.733 -0.859 0.167 0.173 0.178  Rural low skilled 97 -1.456 -1.819 -1.936 0.316 0.325 0.351 
Small farmers 103 -0.431 -0.77 -0.893 0.433 0.448 0.459  Rural medium skilled 126 -2.152 -2.312 -3.162 0.215 0.221 0.236 
Medium farmers 219 -3.169 -2.916 -2.825 0.056 0.058 0.059  Rural high skilled 315 -2.836 -3.816 -4.215 0.142 0.149 0.151 
Large farmers  320 -5.553 -4.785 -4.507 0.038 0.040 0.041  Urban low skilled 115 -2.241 -2.522 -2.415 0.181 0.153 0.148 
Rural non-agr. low skilled 189 -2.461 -2.361 -2.325 0.183 0.172 0.165  Urban medium skilled 185 -2.539 -3.165 -3.029 0.095 0.092 0.098 
Rural non-agr. high skilled 240 -3.665 -3.305 -3.175 0.012 0.012 0.011  Urban high skilled 468 -4.217 -5.361 -6.122 0.049 0.052 0.046 
Urban low 307 -1.712 -5.815 -5.561 0.099 0.086 0.078          
Urban high 469 -6.533 -8.812 -8.259 0.012 0.010 0.010                   















Appendix 4.4 Percentage change in the poverty gap and distribution-sensitive measures from a 1 billion MR increase in 
final demand 
 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5 Sector 6 Sector 7 Sector 8 Sector 9 Sector 10 
A. Poverty gap (𝑷𝒊
(𝟏)
)           
  Rural Malays 0.1756 0.1337 0.0987 0.1453 0.1484 0.1453 0.1531 0.1473 0.1638 0.4879 
  Rural Chinese 0.0425 0.0230 0.0176 0.0221 0.0388 0.0325 0.0286 0.0277 0.0372 0.0316 
  Rural Indians 0.0316 0.0186 0.0142 0.0198 0.0166 0.0185 0.0227 0.0193 0.0185 0.0271 
  Rural other 0.0114 0.0046 0.0028 0.0047 0.0043 0.0047 0.0045 0.0045 0.0068 0.0139 
  Urban Malays 0.0661 0.0733 0.0474 0.0900 0.0719 0.0835 0.0935 0.1032 0.0904 0.2892 
  Urban Chinese 0.0660 0.0542 0.0413 0.0576 0.0915 0.0905 0.0599 0.0856 0.0890 0.0845 
  Urban Indians 0.0209 0.0215 0.0156 0.0270 0.0227 0.0270 0.0283 0.0312 0.0304 0.0471 
  Urban other 0.0019 0.0016 0.0009 0.0019 0.0019 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019 0.0028 0.0046 
  Non-citizen 0.0265 0.0241 0.0143 0.0182 0.0248 0.0230 0.0171 0.0217 0.0203 0.0292 
  Average all households 0.1059 0.0855 0.0618 0.0944 0.0976 0.0983 0.0993 0.1024 0.1080 0.2913 
B. Distribution-sensitive (𝑷𝒊
(𝟐)
)           
  Rural Malays 0.2094 0.1595 0.1177 0.1733 0.1769 0.1732 0.1826 0.1756 0.1953 0.5817 
  Rural Chinese 0.0432 0.0234 0.0179 0.0224 0.0394 0.0330 0.0291 0.0281 0.0377 0.0321 
  Rural Indians 0.0307 0.0180 0.0138 0.0192 0.0161 0.0179 0.0221 0.0188 0.0180 0.0263 
  Rural other 0.0165 0.0067 0.0041 0.0068 0.0063 0.0069 0.0065 0.0065 0.0099 0.0201 
  Urban Malays 0.0718 0.0795 0.0514 0.0977 0.0780 0.0907 0.1015 0.1120 0.0981 0.3138 
  Urban Chinese 0.0620 0.0509 0.0388 0.0541 0.0860 0.0850 0.0562 0.0804 0.0836 0.0793 
  Urban Indians 0.0197 0.0203 0.0147 0.0256 0.0215 0.0255 0.0267 0.0295 0.0287 0.0445 
  Urban other 0.0014 0.0012 0.0007 0.0015 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0021 0.0034 
  Non-citizen 0.0354 0.0321 0.0191 0.0242 0.0331 0.0307 0.0228 0.0289 0.0271 0.0389 
  Average all households 0.1218 0.0980 0.0708 0.1080 0.1111 0.1116 0.1136 0.1162 0.1230 0.3373 
Notes: Sector 1 (agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing), Sector 2 (mining and quarrying), Sector 3 (manufacturing), Sector 4 (utilities), Sector 5 
(building and construction), Sector 6 (wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants), Sector 7 (transport and communication), Sector 8 


















Several governments of developing countries have established subsidies on domestic 
petroleum products to keep prices well below international levels. For such 
governments, substantial increases in world prices raise a fundamental question: 
should domestic prices of petroleum products be adjusted upwards, or should 
government budgets be used to make up for the larger differences between 
international and domestic petroleum prices? Malaysia is a case in point. As the 
rightmost column of Table 5.1 illustrates, the world price of crude oil increased 
drastically in the period 2004-2008, at a compound annual rate of about 27% (in 
current prices). The magnitude of subsidies of petroleum products expressed as a 
share of gross domestic product (GDP) doubled from 0.7% in 2001 to 1.4% in 2007 
(Ministry of Finance, various years). Given the world price level of 2008, the Malaysian 
government would have had to increase its subsidies to a level equivalent to 2.3% of 
GDP if it had wanted to stick to the then prevailing policy.1 This policy was considered 
                                          
1 In Malaysia, petroleum products are taxed according to an automatic pricing formula. The sales tax on 
petroleum products is reduced to offset the differences between world prices and retail prices set by the 
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unsustainable, as a consequence of which the government raised the domestic price of 
petroleum several times during 2008. 
 
Economic efficiency considerations prescribe that domestic prices are not 
regulated and kept in line with world prices, inducing more supply and less demand. 
Equity considerations, however, usually focus on the unfavorable effects of 
deregulation of petroleum prices on income distributions. Households in lower 
quantiles of these distributions suffer more, because they generally spend above-
average fractions of their budgets on energy (see, for example, Saboohi, 2001; Silva et 
al., 2009). These conflicting recommendations ask for careful analyses of the extent to 
which income equality will be affected by energy price policies, taking country-specific 
issues into account. In the Malaysian case, changes in the relative incomes of 
households of different ethnic groups have traditionally been such an issue.2 Hence, 
the distributional effects across ethnic groups of changes in domestic petroleum prices 
will be the focal topic of this chapter.   
 
  
                                                                                                                                     
government. When the difference between the world prices and final retail prices exceeds the sales tax, 
the tax is completely eliminated and the products are explicitly subsidized. 
2 Income inequality between ethnic Malays, Chinese and Indians has been a concern over the past four 
decades, especially after ethnic riots in May 1969 (e.g., Heng, 1997; Shari, 2000; Faaland et al., 2003). 
The riots highlighted the dangers that can arise in a multiracial society when ethnic prejudices are 
exacerbated by income disparities (e.g., in 1970, incomes per capita for Chinese and Indians were 126% 
and 76% higher, respectively, than that of Malays). 
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A. Average price movements 
2004 1.37  0.81  1.43  36.05  
2005 1.50  1.08  1.47  50.64  
2006 1.90  1.58  1.80  61.08  
2007 1.90  1.58  1.80  69.08  
2008 2.18  2.13  1.75  94.45  
Sources: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (2010) and Ministry of Domestic 
Trade, Co-operatives and Consumerism (2010).  
 
Table 5.1 shows the changes in the domestic prices for petroleum-based fuels 
and the world price for crude oil, between 2004 and 2008. Diesel became 164% more 
expensive, while gasoline prices and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) increased by much 
less (59% and 23%, respectively). World crude oil prices increased about 162% during 
this period. The large differences between the price changes of gasoline and LPG on 
the one hand and the world price for oil on the other hand, clearly reflect the 
consequence of petroleum subsidies, although the subsidy rates have been reduced 
over time. Much more recent oil price hikes have compelled the Malaysian government 
to reconsider the petroleum subsidies, as part of ongoing economic reforms to 
rebalance fiscal priorities and to remove efficiency-reducing market distortions. 
 
Deregulation of petroleum prices may significantly reduce real incomes of 
Malaysian households, because consumption of products that require a lot of energy 
constitutes a considerable share of household budgets. This holds in particular for the 
generally poorer Malay households (see Table 5.2). Indirect effects make households 
even more vulnerable to oil price increases. This is because also non-petroleum 
products will become more expensive because the cost of the energy that is needed to 
produce these products will rise. The share of the income that is spent on petroleum 
and other energy-intensive products varies across ethnic groups. The effects of 









Malays Chinese Indians Others 
A. Energy-intensive products (%) 
     
 Fishing 17.26 2.89 2.04 2.52 1.84 
 Electricity and gas 8.36 1.05 4.48 0.33 10.03 
 Transport 7.21 4.76 1.96 3.08 2.32 
 Clay products 7.74 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.01 
 China, glass and pottery 6.76 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 Petroleum products 6.85 12.23 5.39 6.20 2.90 
 Industrial chemicals 5.36 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.09 
 Oils and fats 4.02 2.64 2.00 4.11 2.08 
B. Less energy-intensive products (%) 
     
 Foods and non-alcoholic beverages 1.03 10.63 8.39 13.00 8.83 
 Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 0.41 0.60 1.23 1.51 1.27 
 Clothing and footwear 0.63 5.13 3.37 4.58 3.58 
 Housing and water 1.34 3.21 2.81 2.52 3.42 
 Furnishings, household equipment and 
maintenance 
0.28 2.48 1.77 1.73 1.06 
 Health 0.41 2.23 2.83 4.45 0.88 
 Communication 0.09 11.62 5.04 6.65 1.89 
 Hotels & restaurants 0.86 11.08 14.03 15.83 1.40 
 Miscellaneous goods and services 0.61 29.26 44.52 33.27 58.40 
      
 Per capita income (MR)  4,784 8,801 7,380 11,640 
Source: computed from the social accounting matrix (see Saari et al., 2014). 
 
In our analysis, we estimate how the increase in petroleum prices in 2008 has 
impacted inequality across ethnic groups. During 2008, the government adjusted the 
domestic prices of petroleum products as many as eight times, while no adjustments 
had been necessary in 2007. The impacts are analyzed by using a social accounting 
matrix (SAM) model, which covers the entire economy and quantifies linkages between 
several production sectors and households of various ethnic groups. This study makes 
two contributions to the international literature on the link between energy prices and 
income. First, it revives the analysis of distributional aspects of energy price policies. 
These aspects received relatively much attention in energy studies about three 
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decades ago (see, for instance, Berndt and Morrison, 1979; Behrens, 1984; Common, 
1985), but were superseded in more recent studies by a focus on the aggregate income 
effects of changes in energy prices (see, for instance, Kratena, 2005; Welsch and 
Ochsen, 2005; Neuwahl et al., 2009). Our model and dataset do not only classify 
households according to ethnicity, but also make a distinction between their location 
in rural or urban areas. Second, we also refine the common static SAM-based models 
by specifying substitution possibilities among inputs into production processes, as 
well as among household consumption products. To capture substitution effects 
following changes in relative prices, elasticities of substitution are first calibrated on 
the benchmark dataset in the SAM and then incorporated into the SAM model.  
 
 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 explains technical details of the 
standard static SAM models for quantities and prices. The extensions to account for 
substitution effects as a consequence of changes in relative prices (and the actual 
procedure to determine these substitution elasticities) are discussed in Section 5.3. 
Section 5.4 details how shocks in petroleum prices are introduced in our analysis. 
Section 5.5 illustrates our main findings by presenting the distributional impacts of 
increases in petroleum prices. Section 5.6 concludes by providing some 
methodological remarks. 
 
5.2 The Standard Quantity and Price SAM Models 
 
A SAM is a comprehensive data framework that has been widely applied for analyses 
of income distribution and poverty (see, for example, Thorbecke and Jung, 1996; 
Khan, 1999; Llop and Manresa, 2004; Civardi et al., 2010; and Rada, 2010). It 
contains data from national accounts, but typically incorporates much more detail 
regarding monetary flows among sectors, between sectors and several types of 
households and the government, and between these domestic entities and the rest of 
the world. In a SAM, incomes are recorded in rows (i), while expenditures are 
contained in columns (j). The totals for rows and corresponding columns of the matrix 
must be identical, consistent with the accounting principle that the sum of incomes 
equals the sum of expenditures for each single account. The Malaysian SAM that we 
use in this study was taken from Chapter 2 and the simplified version of it was 
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published by Saari et al. (2014). The basic structure of the SAM is outlined in Table 
5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 Schematic representation of endogenous and exogenous accounts in the 
SAM  
 














Production (92 sectors) (1) T11 0 T13  x1  y1 
Factor of production (27 factors) (2) T21 0 0  x2  y2 




T32 T33  x3  y3 
Exogenous account (aggregated) (4) 𝐥1
′  𝐥2
′  𝐥3




′   𝑦4   
𝐓11 Intermediate input requirements 𝐱1 
Final demands (government consumption, 
investment and exports) 
𝐓13 Consumption of domestic products 𝐱2 Factor income received abroad 
𝐓21 Generation of value added 𝐱3 Domestic and international transfers 
𝐓32 Factor income distribution 𝑡  Imports, taxes and balance of payments 
𝐓33 Inter-institutional income transfer 𝐲1 Total output ( = 𝐲1
′ , total input) 
𝐥1
′  
Imports and taxes paid by production 
sectors 
𝐲2 
Total factor income ( = 𝐲2
′ , total factor 
outlay) 
𝐥2
′  Factor income paid abroad 𝐲3 Total income ( = 𝐲3
′ , total expenditure) 
𝐥3
′  
Consumption of imports, saving and taxes 
paid by households 
𝑦4 Total leakage ( = total injection) 
 
Our SAM lists 92 production sectors, 27 factors of production (25 types of labor 
inputs and two capital inputs), and 10 institutions (9 household groups and 
companies). For labor inputs, the first distinction is made between citizen and non-
citizen workers. Second, the citizen workers are further categorized according to their 
ethnicity: Malays, Chinese, Indians, and a group of minorities, labeled as Others. 
Third, a distinction is made based on skills (low, medium, high), according to 
educational attainment. Finally, workers are classified according to whether they are 
located in a rural or an urban area. Hence, we end up with 25 types of workers (non-
citizens, plus citizens of one of four ethnic groups, three skill levels and two location 




The classification of households closely follows the classification of labor, with 
the exception of skill types, for which we do not have data. This leads to nine 
household groups (four ethnic groups × two geographical areas + one non-citizen 
group). The remaining accounts of the SAM (government, consolidated capital, the 
current account, the capital account for the rest of the world, and indirect taxes) have 
been aggregated into a single account.  
 
 In our model, production activities (sectors), factors of production, and 
institutions (i.e. households and companies) are considered as accounts for which the 
cell values will be determined endogenously, as a function of SAM-based coefficients 
and values for the exogenous accounts. The remaining (aggregate) account is 
exogenous.3  For the purpose of multiplier modeling, the transactions (matrices T and 
vectors l) were converted into corresponding average expenditure propensities (i.e. 














































































     (5.1) 
 
 The average expenditure propensities consist of two parts: (i) those 
corresponding to the endogenous accounts, 
1ˆ  yTA , and (ii) those corresponding to 
the exogenous account, 
1ˆ  yla . The average propensities in a are normalized costs 
(e.g. per unit of production) that “leak” out as expenditure into any one of the five 
exogenous accounts. In our model, these leakages include imports and sales taxes. 
 
 In this chapter, we propose extended models that will be introduced after 
presenting the (standard) static SAM model. In the standard quantity model, the 
income levels y  in the endogenous accounts are obtained by post-multiplying the 
                                          
3 SAM models provide flexibility in assigning accounts to either the group of endogenous or the group of 
exogenous accounts. The choice depends on the type of analysis. 
4 Matrices will be denoted by bold capital symbols. Vectors are columns and represented by lowercase 
bold symbols. Scalars are indicated by lowercase italics. A prime denotes transposition and a hat refers to 
a diagonal matrix with the elements of a vector on the main diagonal. 
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SAM inverse matrix  
1)(  AIM  with a vector of exogenous income levels x :  
 
xMxAIxAyy  1)(        (5.2) 
 
where I is the identity matrix of appropriate dimensions and M is the multiplier 
matrix. Its typical element 𝑚𝑖𝑗 indicates the total income effect for the production 
sectors, factors of production or institutions in row i of a unit increase in the 
exogenous income j. In the static model, quantities can vary, but prices are assumed 
to remain fixed. This assumption basically implies that sufficient excess capacity and 
unused resources exist to meet additional demand without an upward pressure on 
prices. Furthermore, expenditure propensities are assumed not to change with 
income, which yields linear relationships between the income levels of the exogenous 
and endogenous accounts. 
 
The dual of this quantity model is a cost-push price model. The model is useful 
for the analysis of price shocks, in situations in which it is reasonable to assume that 
prices vary while quantities are fixed (i.e. demand is assumed to be perfectly inelastic 
to prices).5 This model can be written as (see Miller and Blair, 2009): 
 
aMaAIapAp  1)(       (5.3) 
 
Here, p  is the vector of price indexes for the endogenous accounts, A is the 
transposed matrix of average expenditure propensities and a is the vector of average 
expenditure coefficients expressing the per unit leakage. These leakages represent 
exogenous costs to the endogenous accounts and are the sums of the five exogenous 
cost components: payments to the government, savings, imports, investments abroad 
and indirect taxes. The base-year solution corresponds to the SAM from which the 
                                          
5 Applications of SAM models to study price formation are rather rare. The first (and as far as we know 
the only) attempt to analyze cost-push effects using a SAM price model is Roland-Holst and Sancho 
(1995). Extensive discussions about properties of price and quantity input-output models can be found in 
Oosterhaven (1996) and Dietzenbacher (1997). 
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coefficients were obtained. As a consequence, all prices are equal to unity.6 A price 
increase in one or more of the exogenous accounts (e.g. imports) will lead to higher 
values of a, which will then be reflected in higher prices for the endogenous accounts.   
 

















































































































































      (5.5) 
 
In the quantity model (5.4), 1y refers to production output, 2y denotes income 
levels of factors of production and 3y represents incomes of institutions. In the price 
model (5.5), 1p  refers to the price indexes of products, 2p  represents price indexes of 
factors of production (for example, the wage rate of high-skilled rural Malays) and 3p  
indicates price indexes for the expenditures of households and companies. The 
linkages among the SAM accounts play an important role in the price model: an 
increase in the price of imports, for example, induces producers using these imported 
products to set higher prices for their outputs. This leads to further price increases, 
because their outputs are used as intermediate inputs ( 11A ) and bought by 
households ( 13A ). These households will ask higher prices for the factors of 
production they supply ( 32A ), leading to further price changes. The solution to model 
(5.5) is the set of equilibrium price indexes associated with any set of exogenous per 
unit costs a. 
                                          
6 All coefficients are obtained from a consistent SAM. For any endogenous account, the coefficients 
therefore sum to one. In mathematical terms, we have for equation (3) 𝐀′𝐞 + 𝐚 = 𝐞, where e indicates the 
summation vector consisting of ones. An immediate consequence is that 𝐩 = 𝐞. 
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5.3 A SAM Model with Price-induced Substitution Effects 
 
To study the effects of an increase in the price of petroleum products in Malaysia, the 
standard price model described in the previous section is not helpful. Petroleum prices 
are endogenously determined in the standard SAM price model, while we consider 
exogenous changes in this price as a consequence of changing world prices and 
changing public policies regarding taxes and subsidies. Another less desirable 
implication of the standard model is that petroleum price hikes would not have any 
impact on product-specific demand for intermediate inputs and for consumption 
purposes, although prices of petroleum-intensive products will increase relative to 
those of non-petroleum-intensive products. We will first discuss the modifications 
needed to allow for substitution and then turn to the problem of fixing a price related 
to part of the endogenous accounts. 
 
In our extended model, we allow for price-induced substitution: a new set of 
prices leads to a new set of average expenditure propensities.7 The new average 
expenditure propensities can then be applied to calculate impacts on the income levels 
in other endogenous accounts, using the quantity model. This subsection explains our 
procedures for the generation of the new average expenditure propensities in the price-
induced model. 
 
In line with earlier work by Kolk (1983), Meyer (1989) and Kratena (2005), the 
substitution possibilities are incorporated by endogenously specifying changes in 
input demand and consumption of commodities as functions of changes in relative 
prices. We can model substitution in quantities as a consequence of relatively small 
price changes as in equation (5.6) 
   
                                          
7 The propensities change as a consequence of changes in relative prices that are not related to changes 
in endogenous prices, but only to exogenous shocks in world prices and subsidy rates. In this sense, our 
model is different from full-fledged computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. In a CGE model, the 
changes in quantities that follow the substitution processes caused by a change in the world petroleum 
price would lead to further price changes and substitution processes. Modeling these effects would 




?⃡? 11 = 𝐀11 ⊗ (𝐄 + 𝚺?̂?𝑝𝐄) 0 ?⃡? 13 = 𝐀13 ⊗ (𝐄 + 𝚯?̂?𝑝𝐄)
?⃡? 21 = 𝐀21 ⊗ (𝐄 + 𝚽?̂?𝑝𝐄) 0 0
0 𝐀32 𝐀33









 are the post-substitution coefficient sub-matrices, 
indicating new quantities. The symbol  stands for the Hadamard product, i.e. cell-by-
cell multiplication. E is a matrix of appropriate dimensions consisting of ones. The 
extent to which the post-substitution coefficient submatrices differ from the baseline 
submatrices A11, A21 and A13 depends on two factors: the proportional change in the 
prices of products (contained in the diagonal matrices pδˆ ; a value of 0.01 would 
represent a 1% increase of the price of the corresponding product), and the magnitude 
of elasticities of substitution (contained in the matrices Σ, Φand Θ). The typical 
element of Σ (σij), for instance, indicates the proportional change in the use of sector i’s 
output following a one-percent price change for j’s output. The elasticities in 𝚺?̂?𝑝𝐄, for 
example, indicate the proportional change in the use of product i due to all price 
changes (not only the price change for output j). These are assumed to be identical 
across all sectors k that use the output of i. Elements of Φand Θ give the proportional 
change in the use of value added (labor and capital), and consumption of products 
following one-percent changes in the prices.8 Appendix 5.1 gives a numerical example.  
 
 For the submatrices 32A  and 33A , the coefficients are considered as fixed. Matrix 
32A  represents the distribution of factor income on household factor endowments (see 
for example, Pyatt and Round, 1984). It ensures that the factor income of rural Malay 
employees, for example, is entirely directed to rural Malay households. This will not 
change with changes in relative prices. We also assume that the patterns of transfers 
among institutions (companies and households) remain unchanged, which is reflected 
in the stability of matrix 33A .  
 
                                          
8 This specification implies that we apply a linearized approximation of nonlinear substitution processes. 
The approximation error is small for relatively small changes in prices. 
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The post-substitution coefficient sub-matrices in equation (5.6) give the 
quantities after the price change, evaluated at original prices. They have to be 
multiplied with the new prices (i.e. price levels after the increase in prices of petroleum 
products) so that new cost shares can be derived. This yields 
 
?̅? = (𝐈 + ?̂?𝑝)?⃡? (𝐈 + ?̂?𝑝)
−1 
 
 A consequence, however, is that the leakage coefficients 𝐥 ≡ (𝐈 − 𝐀′)𝐞 would also 
change. That is, they would become (𝐈 − ?̅?′)𝐞. In order to prevent this and to make 
sure that the leakage coefficients remain the same, the columns in ?̅? are 
proportionally adapted, such that the resulting matrix has the same column sums as 
𝐀9. The new average expenditure propensities that reflect both changes in quantities 
and prices are given by 
 
?̃? = ?̅?(𝐞′?̂̅?)−1(𝐞′?̂?) = (𝐈 + ?̂?𝑝)?⃡? (𝐈 + ?̂?𝑝)
−1(𝐞′(𝐈 + ?̂?𝑝)?⃡? (𝐈 + ?̂?𝑝)−1
̂ )−1(𝐞′𝐀)̂  (5.7) 
 








        (5.8) 
 
 In equation (5.8), quantities of inputs (e.g. value added and intermediate inputs) 
have changed but the cost shares of inputs remain constant. Any change in input 
prices will be offset by an equal change in the quantity used. In what follows, we 
provide a more detailed discussion of the determination of the elasticities of 
substitution among intermediate inputs, factors of production and consumption of 
commodities as contained in the matrices Σ, Φand Θ, respectively (see equation (5.6)). 
Substitution among production inputs is modeled in a set of nested production 
functions, which is summarized in Figure 5.1. For each industry, such a nested 
production structure is specified. 
                                          
9 The assumption of stable cost shares of the accounts to which leakage occurs (mainly imports) implies 
that a Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed, in which imports and domestic inputs (including 
production factors) can be substituted for each other.   
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Nest 4: CD 
 
 





Nest 6: Leontief 
 
 
Nest 7: CD 
 
 
Notes: CD = Cobb-Douglas function.  
Output 
Petroleum 
Value added Intermediate inputs 
Labor Capital  Imported  Domestic 
Sectoral inputs 
Citizen Non-citizen 


















  In the top nest, gross output (Y) is modeled as a Cobb-Douglas function with 
three inputs, i.e. factors of production (which generate value added, Q), petroleum (E) 
and intermediate inputs (domestic and imported, M): 
 MEAQY  . This is a common 
specification that reflects the assumption that these three classes of inputs can 
substitute for each other. If stages of production processes are outsourced to other 
industries, own production factors are saved, while the use of intermediate inputs 
increases. Changes in relative wages of own workers and of workers in other 
industries are known to be a driver of such outsourcing decisions. Furthermore, 
changes in the price of petroleum products can induce switches from petroleum to 
other (energy or non-energy) inputs. Cobb-Douglas production functions allow for 
such substitution effects. They imply a unitary elasticity of substitution between any 
pair of inputs. This implies that cost shares of inputs remain constant because any 
change in input prices will be exactly offset by an equally large but opposite change in 







  The imposed unitary elasticity of substitution might be seen as very restrictive. 
The use of more flexible production functions (such as constant elasticity of 
substitution or translog production functions) would require econometric estimation 
procedures for which data are lacking in the context of the present study. Data on 
detailed input components (such as labor, capital, energy and non-energy materials) 
are not only available with limited coverage (i.e. only available for 17 manufacturing 
sectors and not for services sectors) but our focus on sector-level data also leads to an 
insufficient number of observations.10 In addition, a number of empirical estimates 
find that elasticities of substitution are often not significantly different from unity, 
suggesting that the Cobb-Douglas serves as a reasonable working hypothesis. An 
example of such a study is Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000), who show that unitary 
elasticities are empirically plausible for developing countries like Malaysia.    
 
                                          
10 Modeling the translog function with four inputs (energy, capital, labor and intermediate inputs) in three 
equations gives 12 coefficients (including a constant) to be estimated in a system of equations (see Berndt 




 To derive the matrix 11A

, pairwise elasticities of substitution for all intermediate 
inputs are required, but the elasticities derived from the first nest relate to the 
aggregated level only. The following approaches are taken as alternatives to the lack of 
data required to estimate elasticities of substitution for individual intermediate inputs. 
First, disaggregation of the intermediate inputs (M) into domestically produced and 
imported inputs is modeled using a Cobb-Douglas function in nest 2: 

MDMAMM  ,  
in which  DM  and MM  are domestic and imported intermediate inputs, and  and 
 are parameters. Domestic inputs that become more expensive are assumed to get 
used less intensively, while the use of imported inputs increase (ceteris paribus). 
Again, the elasticity of substitution is fixed at one. Second, it is common in applied 
general equilibrium analysis to split the total demand for domestic intermediate inputs 
into domestic intermediate inputs by sector-of-origin using Leontief production 
technologies (see for example, Kratena, 2005; Welsch and Ochsen, 2005). This 
assumption implies that substitution among domestically produced intermediate 
inputs is not possible at all. A quantity of a specific input should always be used in 
combination with fixed quantities of other inputs, irrespective of changes in relative 




, the elasticity of substitution for the factors that (taken together) 
produce aggregate value added can be derived from further disaggregating the value 
added generating production factors from Nest 1. First, in Nest 2, the uses of physical 
capital (K ) and aggregate labor ( L ) inputs are modeled as a Cobb-Douglas function, 
LAKQ  . In Nests 4 to 7, the aggregate labor input is split up into labor classified 
by citizenship status, skill level, geographical location and ethnic group. A Cobb-
Douglas function is used to disaggregate labor inputs by citizen ( LL ) and non-citizen (
FL ) workers in Nest 4, which is defined as 

FLLALL  .  
 
In Nest 5, a Leontief technology is assumed to split employment of citizens 
according to three skill types—low ( LLL ), medium ( LML ) and high ( LHL ), assuming that 
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these are hard to substitute for each other.11 Demand for each of these skill types can 
be represented by (𝐿𝐿𝐿 , 𝐿𝐿𝑀 , 𝐿𝐿𝐻) = (𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , 𝑤𝐿𝑀𝐿𝐿 , 𝑤𝐿𝐻𝐿𝐿).  The demand for skills is 
proportionally fixed to labor inputs aggregated over skill types (e.g. 𝑤𝐿𝐿 = (𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿⁄ ) for 
low skilled). In Nest 6, a similar no-substitution assumption is made to model the split 
of labor inputs for each of the skills between workers from rural and urban areas. For 
example, demand for rural-low skilled (𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑅 )and urban-low skilled (𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑈 ) labors can be 
denoted as (𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑅 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑈 ) = (𝑤𝐿𝐿
𝑅 𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑤𝐿𝐿
𝑈 𝐿𝐿𝐿), where the rural low-skilled and urban low-
skilled workers are fixed proportionality of low-skilled (𝑤𝐿𝐿
𝑅 , 𝑤𝐿𝐿
𝑈 ) = (𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑅 /𝐿𝐿𝐿 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑈 /𝐿𝐿𝐿). 
Finally in Nest 7, workers in rural and urban areas across all skill types are split up 
into ethnic groups, i.e. Malays ( BE ), Chinese ( CE ), Indians ( IE ) and others ( OE ), using 







LL EEEAEL  . We thus assume that substitution between workers of different 
ethnicities is possible. 
 
 Modeling substitution among consumption of commodities using flexible and 
widely applied functional forms such as the generalized Leontief (see Diewert, 1973), 
the translog (see Christensen et al., 1975) and the “almost ideal demand system” (see 
Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980) is also impossible due to limited data availability. The 
household expenditure survey (HES) that is published every 5 years provides rich data 
on the consumption of commodities by individual household, but does not include 
price data. Also, time-series data for consumption is available in Malaysia but not in 
disaggregated form (neither by type of commodities nor by groups of households). 
Given these constraints, Cobb-Douglas and Leontief functions are the natural options 
to choose from. Given that cross-country evidence suggests that the magnitude of 
elasticity of substitution between consumption of different commodities is below 0.5 
(see Regmi and Seale, 2010; Clements, 2008), the Leontief function with zero 
substitution is perhaps the most plausible choice (Deaton and Muellbauer, 2007). 
Thus, using the Leontief function, demand for product i by each household group 𝑘 (𝑘 
= Malays, Chinese, Indians and others in rural and urban areas, and non-citizen) can 
                                          
11 This is supported by the facts that skilled and unskilled labors are imperfect substitutes (see, for 
example, Welsch and Ochsen, 2005; Berndt and Morrison, 1979). 
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be modeled as 𝑘(𝑐𝑖 , … , 𝑐𝑛) = (𝑧𝑖𝐶𝑖 , … , 𝑧𝑛𝐶𝑛),  in which 𝑧𝑖 = (𝑐𝑖 𝐶𝑖⁄ ) is the fixed consumption 
share for product i in total consumption. 
 
 Since econometric estimation of parameters in the nested production function 
framework adopted in the previous section is impossible due to lack of observations, 
we calibrate the parameters. In the context of this chapter, calibration boils down to 
pinning down the variables at the values that are observed in our SAM. We use a SAM 
for Malaysia for 2000, which was briefly discussed in Section 5.2 (see Saari et al., 
2014, for details) and is the most recent one available for Malaysia. Setting price 
variables equal to unity for that table, the quantity variables are simply equal to the 
corresponding values in the SAM (see Hosoe et al., 2010, for an overview of calibration 
methods). This calibration method may not provide perfect estimation of the 
parameters because it relies on data for a single year, which means that whatever 
stochastic anomalies were present in that year will influence the model. Nevertheless, 
as mentioned in the previous section, an insufficient number of observations and lack 
of data justify our choice for this method.  
 
5.4 Imposing a Price Shock 
 
In Malaysia, the domestic petroleum price is controlled and subsidized by the 
government under an automatic pricing mechanism. The sales tax on petroleum 
products is reduced to offset part of the differences between the wholesale domestic 
price and the world price. In our analysis, we consider the petroleum price in 2007 as 
a baseline for the price simulation shock. In 2007, the price of petroleum products 
was fixed at an average of 1.79 Malaysian ringgit (MR) per liter (average price of 
gasoline and diesel)12 for the entire year, whereas the world price of crude oil increased 
by 13.1% (from 61.08 to 69.08 USD per barrel). This suggests that the government 
provided increasing subsidies (or a reduction of the sales tax) on petroleum products. 
In 2008, however, subsidies on petroleum products did not grow at the same pace as 
the world price of crude oil, which increased by 36.7% from 69.08 USD to 94.45 USD 
per barrel between 2007 and 2008 (see Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, OPEC, 2010). This led to the highest domestic oil price increase in the 
                                          
12 The prices of liquid petroleum gas (LPG) remained more or less unchanged between 2007 and 2008. 
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Malaysian history, by as much as 20.7%, to 2.16 MR per liter. This is the type of price 
shock we will analyze. 
 
  Our price simulation involves three steps. The first step consists of calculating 
the price effects for the outputs of all sectors as a result of the increase in the 
domestic and world petroleum prices. We will assume that the world price is 
independent of domestic price changes. With 0.69% and 0.61% of the shares in the 
world market for petroleum crude oil and refineries in 2012, respectively, production 
of petroleum in Malaysia is too small to influence the world prices (see Energy 
Information Administration, 2014). In our setup, the world price for crude oil and the 
domestic petroleum price are treated as exogenous variables, which implies that the 
subsidy level is considered as endogenous. As a consequence, the price model in 
equation (5.5) is not appropriate, since the domestic petroleum price is determined 
endogenously in that model. To address this issue, we apply the mixed endogenous-
exogenous method (see Appendix 5.2 for details with a simple numerical example of 
this model).13  
 
To illustrate the mixed endogenous-exogenous price model, we first represent 
equation (5.3) in 3-by-3 matrix form and split the exogenous expenditure coefficients 
(vector 𝐚) into coefficients for imported petroleum products (𝐦𝑝), a group of imported 
other products (𝐦𝑛) and a group of other exogenous cost components (𝑑, including the 
sales tax, indirect taxes, savings, and investments abroad)—thus 𝐚 = 𝐦𝑝 + 𝐦𝑛 + 𝐝. 
Splitting the imports requires additional data because our SAM only includes 
aggregated imports, presented as a single row vector in the SAM. For this purpose, the 
import matrix (92 products-by-92 products) included in the input-output tables 
(Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2005) is used to split the imports of petroleum and 
imports of a group of other products from the total imports. Thus, the expanded 
equation (5.3) can be shown as; 
 
                                          
13 See Miller and Blair (2009, pp. 621-633) for a broad treatment of mixed endogenous-exogenous 
quantity models, and Resosudarmo and Thorbecke (1996) and Hartono and Resosudarmo (2008) for 
applications of such models within the context of SAM-based quantity models. We are not aware of 
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]   (5.9) 
 
 Equation (5.9) indicates a fully endogenous model. It shows that prices of sector 
1 (𝑝1), sector 2 (𝑝2) and sector 3 (𝑝3) are determined by the exogenous expenditure 
coefficients of 𝐦𝑝, 𝐦𝑛 and 𝐝. In the baseline solution, the endogenous prices 𝑝1, 𝑝2 and 
𝑝3 are equal to unity. It follows that an increase in any exogenous price or cost 
component increases the endogenous prices 𝑝1, 𝑝2 and 𝑝3. Our study, however, focuses 
on the case in which the price for petroleum products is set exogenously. Assuming 
that the petroleum sector is represented by sector 3, the elements of equation (5.9) 







(1 − 𝑎11) −𝑎21 0







𝑛 + 𝑑1 + 𝑎31𝑝3
𝑚2
𝑝 + 𝑚2
𝑛 + 𝑑2 + 𝑎32𝑝3
𝑚3
𝑝 + 𝑚3
𝑛 − (1 − 𝑎33)𝑝3 
]   (5.10) 
 
 Equation (5.10) consists of four exogenous parts, i.e the domestic petroleum 
price (𝑝3 ), the world petroleum price (affecting the costs 𝐦
𝑝), the costs of non-
petroleum imports (𝐦𝑛) and other exogenous costs (d1 and d2). These determine three 
endogenous prices: the prices of the domestic non-petroleum products 1 and 2, and 
the other costs per unit of output of domestic petroleum (d3). In our simulation, prices 
of domestic petroleum (𝑝3 ) and the costs of imported petroleum (𝐦
𝑝) increase by 
20.7% and 36.7%, while the other exogenous components (i.e. the elements of 𝐦𝑛 and 
d1 and d2) remain fixed. It is important to note that an increase in the price of 
imported petroleum would not only affect the petroleum sector but also other sectors 
that consume imported petroleum, unless it would be offset by a change in the fuel 
subsidy. 
 
In the second step, the increases in the prices of all sectors along with the 
imposed substitution elasticities are used as variable inputs into equations (5.6) and 
(5.7) so that a new set of average expenditure propensities matrix, ?̃? is produced. 
Finally, we use equation (5.8) to measure the extent to which substitution effects have 
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implications for the income distribution under the assumption that exogenous income 
levels, x , remain unchanged. 
 
 5.5 Results and Discussion 
 
This section mainly discusses the extent to which rising petroleum prices affect 
income and inequality in per capita income among the major ethnic groups in 
Malaysia. 
 
5.5.1 Price effects 
 
According to the price model of equation (5.10), the rising prices of domestic and 
imported petroleum products have modest implications on prices of other sectors, with 
increases ranging from 0.28% for the household machinery sector to 4.6% for the 
fishing sector. Figure 5.2 clearly shows that price responses are generally strongest for 
energy-intensive industries. The energy intensities are defined as cost shares of energy 
(crude and refined petroleum products) in total output. 
 
Higher petroleum prices (both domestic and foreign) affect the producers’ costs 
through two channels. First, there is a direct effect from an increase in the price paid 
by producers for the consumption of petroleum products inputs. According to Figure 
5.2, the price of fishing products increases most strongly (by 4.6%). This is because 
energy consumption for this sector is the highest among all sectors and amounts to 
17.3% of its total costs (including profits and other compensation for the use of 
capital). Second, there is an indirect effect from the use of non-energy inputs, the 
prices of which are increased to offset the increase in their energy costs. This indirect 
effect explains why some sectors which are not extremely energy intensive themselves 
still experience substantial increases in their costs of production. Preserved seafood is 
an example of such a sector. Not surprisingly, preserved seafood’s most important 
inputs (49.8% of the costs) come from the energy-intensive fishing industry, while the 





Figure 5.2 Correlation between changes in price and energy intensity 
 
Source: Computions of Equation (5.10), based on data taken from the social accounting matrix (see Saari 
et al., 2014). 
 
5.5.2 Income effects 
 
Next, we derive the new matrix of average expenditure propensities, taking the 
changes in prices and substitution elasticities into account. Using these new average 
expenditure propensities and given the current exogenous income levels, we calculate 
the impacts on income across ethnic groups. The results are summarized in Table 5.4, 
which contains results in both nominal and real terms. Panel A of Table 5.4 provides 
the nominal income effects of rising petroleum prices. Rows 1 and 2 show the baseline 
income levels and the estimated income levels after the price shock, respectively. Rows 
3 and 4 give the changes between the baseline and the post-price shock income levels 
in millions of MR and in percentages, respectively. The results indicate that rising 
petroleum prices have modest positive effects on nominal household income, of 0.58% 
on average.14 The positive effect is due to the fact that our price model assumes that 
higher product prices lead to higher wage rates. The observation that changes are not 
too substantial is comparable with other studies that impose substitution effects in  
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A. Nominal income effects 
Baseline income (in MR million) (1) 25,396 10,161 3,907 4,554 40,514 47,360 10,412 3,892 9,844 
Nominal income after price shock (in MR million) (2) 25,715 10,166 3,902 4,562 40,784 47,590 10,473 3,901 9,859 
Change in nominal income (in MR million) (3) 319 5 -5 7 270 229 61 9 15 
Change in nominal income (in %) (4) 1.26 0.05 -0.12 0.16 0.67 0.48 0.59 0.24 0.15 
B. Real income effects 
Change in index cost of living (in %) (5) 3.68 1.45 1.29 1.65 3.28 2.27 2.69 1.52 1.63 
Real income after price shock (in MR million) (6) 24,781 10,019 3,852 4,486 39,455 46,514 10,193 3,842 9,699 
Change in income (in %)a (7) -2.42 -1.40 -1.42 -1.49 -2.61 -1.79 -2.11 -1.28 -1.47 
C. Per capita income effects 
         
Distribution of population (in %) (8) 35.37 7.49 2.89 2.16 23.28 20.33 5.37 0.93 2.18 
Distribution of baseline income (in %) (9) 16.28 6.51 2.50 2.92 25.96 30.35 6.67 2.49 6.31 
Distr. of real income after price shock (in %) (10) 16.21 6.56 2.52 2.94 25.81 30.43 6.67 2.51 6.35 
Change in distribution (in %-points) (11) -0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.15 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.04 
Sources: computed from the social accounting matrix (Saari et al., 2014)  
Notes: (a) percentage difference between real income after the price shock (row 6) and the baseline income (row 1). 
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Leontief models. Kratena (2005), for example, who modeled substitution effects by 
means of a generalized Leontief function for aggregated labor and intermediate inputs, 
observed that the differences in output effects between the price-induced model and 
the fixed input coefficient model were 0.2% on average. 
 
The relative income effects for the individual household group in rural and urban 
areas differ to some extent. Rising petroleum prices cause a growth of nominal income 
for rural households of 0.74% while the corresponding increase of urban income 
amounts to 0.56%. The changes in nominal incomes of households belonging to the 
various ethnic groups are also not identical. It is not very useful, though, to assess the 
effects of the changes in prices on inequality on the basis of these results. Nominal 
income effects do not take increases in the cost of living due to higher energy prices 
into account. Given the percentage price changes of consumer items and given the 
different consumption patterns among ethnic groups, changes in real income caused 
by higher petroleum prices should be used instead. 
 
 To account for the real income effects, the nominal income is adjusted for the 
change in consumer price index, which is given in row 5. The consumer price index 
measures the cost of acquiring the baseline basket of goods, before and after the price 
shock. Data on the baseline expenditure patterns of the individual ethnic groups in 
rural and urban areas are available in our SAM and have been used for the 
calculation. To estimate the new level of expenditure, the initial consumption 
expenditures of each ethnic group is multiplied with the increased prices (as caused 
by the energy price rises). The weights (consumption expenditure shares of products) 
vary across ethnic groups. The percentage difference between the estimated value of 
the consumption bundle and the baseline value then gives the change in the 
consumer price index. The real income effects can then be calculated by taking the 
difference between the changes in the nominal income (in row 4 of Table 5.4) and the 
changes in consumer price index (in row 5). The results for the real income effects are 
tabulated in row 6. Row 7 gives the percentage change in real income compared with 




 For all household groups, the increase in consumer price index appears to be 
larger than nominal income growth, which implies erosion of real income levels. 
Income losses (averaged over households in each of the nine groups) vary roughly 
between 1.3% and 2.6%. Households in urban areas suffer slightly more than 
households in rural areas. On average, real income levels of rural households decline 
by 2.04%, while those of urban households decline by 2.17%. The unfavorable impact 
of the rise in the prices of petroleum products on real income is considerably stronger 
for Malay households than for other ethnic groups. The differences are particularly 
sizable in the rural areas. There, the expected percentage decline in real income for 
Malays is about a full percentage point larger than for households of Chinese and 
Indian ethnicity. 
 
 The variation in the increase in consumer price index, which is much larger for 
Malays than for other ethnic groups, depends on the relative shares of petroleum 
products and petroleum-intensive products in their consumption bundles. For the 
ethnic Malays, the data in our SAM show that the direct consumption shares of 
petroleum products are much larger than for other groups, 11.9% and 13.3% points 
larger than the Chinese and Indians in rural areas and 5.2% and 3.3% points larger in 
urban areas. For the indirect consumption of non-energy products, differences are 
mainly large for outputs of sectors of which prices are least affected by the higher 
petroleum prices. Differences in consumption for the non-energy products of which 
prices are most strongly affected by the higher petroleum prices such as preserved 
seafood, oils and fats, and clay products are marginal. Thus, we find that the direct 
consumption of petroleum products is responsible for the higher increase in consumer 
price index for Malay households.  
 
  Panel C of Table 5.4 tabulates the distributional impacts of higher petroleum 
prices. Row 8 gives the shares of each of the nine household groups in the Malaysian 
population as a reference point (see Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2001). Row 9 
shows that the baseline income distribution is not too different from the population 
distribution, with two major exceptions: the income share of rural Malays is much 
lower than its population share, while the urban Chinese have a considerably higher 
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share in income than in population.15 In row 10, the distribution of real income after 
the price shock is given. The change between the baseline distribution and the 
distribution of estimated real income is given in the bottom row 11. The results show 
that the changes in terms of the real income distribution are very limited. The rural 
Malays (who already have relatively low incomes) are among the groups that face a 
negative change in their share of the pie. The urban Malays, however, lose a little bit 
more. The urban Chinese households, who have on average higher incomes than any 
other household group apart from the small non-citizens and urban others gain 
relatively much.     
 
5.6 Concluding remarks  
 
This chapter examines how the incomes of various ethnic groups in Malaysia are 
affected by a major change in the domestic price of petroleum products, caused by 
large jumps in the world price for crude oil, and the decision by the Malaysian 
government not to fully compensate this by an increase in the subsidies for petroleum 
products. This is a situation faced by the country in 2008. When both rises in nominal 
income levels (due to price propagation of inflation into wages) and changes in the cost 
of living are taken into account, our results show that the distributional impacts of 
rising petroleum prices tend to be regressive. That is, the lowest income groups (of 
ethnic Malays) bear the highest burden and the highest income groups (mainly 
households of Chinese ethnicity living in cities) suffer least. The Malay households 
experience larger income losses than the Chinese and Indians, because they spend a 
relatively larger share of their consumption bundle on the direct consumption of 
petroleum products. Thus, although price deregulation implies fiscal benefits, it must 
be evaluated carefully and, if deemed needed, be supplemented with measures to 
compensate for further deteriorations in the income distribution. 
 
  The results of this study have been obtained by running a novel price-induced 
SAM model that allows some degree of substitutability among production inputs and 
products for consumption. Two shortcomings should be mentioned. First, the results 
can be sensitive to the choice of the elasticities of substitution. Due to scarce data, we 
                                          
15 Other major differences are only observed for small groups, i.e. the urban “others” and the non-citizens. 
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adopted functional forms of production and consumption functions that completely fix 
these elasticities. If extensive data would have been available, more sophisticated 
estimation methods could have been used. Second, the presented model is still 
considered as a partial model. The average expenditure propensities are adjusted 
when relative prices change, but these adjustments only reflect the first round effects. 
Second round effects would consider changes of prices due to the changes in 
quantities caused by substitution effects. Next, these second round price changes 
cause substitution effects, etc., until equilibrium is attained.  Computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models capture the full price and quantity feedbacks but require 
the estimation of many more parameters. For the purposes of this chapter (which 
requires both data for various population groups and for various production sectors) 
and in the context of data availability for an economy like that of Malaysia, the novel 
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Appendix 5.1 Numerical example for the effects of substitution on coefficient 
matrices. 
 





] , ?̂?𝑝 = [
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The price of product 1 increases with 1% (as shown in ?̂?𝑝) and as a consequence the 
use of  product 1 decreases with 0.8% and is partly substituted for product 2, the use 
of which increases with 0.4%. In the same fashion, the price of product 2 increases 
with 2%. Every %-increase in price of product 2 decreases its use by 1.0% and 
increases the use of product 1 by 0.6% due to substitution. The price increase of 2% 
for product 2 thus reduces its use with 2% and increases the use of product 1 with 







The exogenous price increases of products 1 and 2 occur simultaneously so that the 
use of product 1 increases with −0.008 + 0.012 = 0.004 and the use of product 2 
decreases (i.e. its change is 0.004 − 0.020 = −0.016).The change in the use of product 1 
is assumed to apply to any use, i.e. the firms producing products 1 and the firms 
















The new coefficients become 
 
𝐀11 ⊗ (𝐄 + 𝚺?̂?𝑝𝐄) = [
𝛼11 × 1.004 𝛼12 × 1.004
𝛼21 × 0.984 𝛼22 × 0.984
]. 
 
Appendix 5.2 Numerical example of a mixed endogenous-exogenous price model. 
 
This example gives a simple numerical illustration of mixed endogenous-exogenous 
multipliers for a simplified SAM price model, as introduced in Section 5.4. The 
notation used in this appendix is specific for this example and may differ from the 
notation in the main text.  
 
Let us consider the SAM flows in Table A.1 and coefficients derived from it.  
 
Table A.1 Stylized SAM 
  
Transactions (RM billion)  Coefficients (𝐀 and 𝐚) 
Agr Man Pet Agr Man Pet 
Agriculture (Agr) 6.04 0.00 34.46 0.11 0.00 0.02 
Manufacturing (Man) 0.00 0.09 35.66 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Petroleum (Pet) 10.83 15.48 627.02 0.20 0.18 0.43 
Imported petroleum products (𝑚𝑝) 3.00 3.00 244.00 0.05 0.03 0.17 
Imported non-petroleum products (𝑚𝑛) 1.15 1.20 100.54 0.02 0.01 0.07 
Taxes (𝑡) 0.85 0.08 11.23 0.02 0.00 0.01 
Value Added (𝑑) 33.19 67.05 409.03 0.60 0.77 0.28 
Total primary input (𝑎) 38.19 71.33 764.80 0.69 0.82 0.52 
Total input 55.07 86.90 1,461.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Notes: primary input consists of imported commodities (petroleum and non-petroleum products), indirect 
taxes and value added.  
 
For each sector, exogenous costs (𝑎) consist of imports of petroleum products (𝑚𝑝) 
and imports of non-petroleum products (𝑚𝑛), taxes/subsidies (𝑡) and value added (𝑑). 
The solution for the price model is represented by the following matrix form 
 
𝐩 = (𝐈 − 𝐀′)−1𝐚         (A1) 
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where 𝐚 reflects the exogenous costs per unit of output (in Table A1 under 
coefficients). In the context of the economy described by Table A.1, equation (A1) can 







(1 − 𝑎11) −𝑎21 −𝑎31
−𝑎12 (1 − 𝑎22) −𝑎32






𝑛 + 𝑡1 + 𝑑1
𝑚2
𝑝 + 𝑚2
𝑛 + 𝑡2 + 𝑑2
𝑚3
𝑝 + 𝑚3
𝑛 + 𝑡3 + 𝑑3
]  (A2) 
 
In both equations, the variables on the left hand side are considered as endogenous. 
The prices of agriculture (𝑝1), manufacturing (𝑝2)and petroleum (𝑝3) sectors are 
determined by exogenous cost components. The empirical analysis in Section 5.4, 
however, requires us to treat the price of domestic petroleum (𝑝3) as exogenous 
variable, since it is a target variable for the government. Since the government cannot 
affect the prices of imports, one may choose the taxes/subsidies on product 3 (𝑡3) as 







(1 − 𝑎11) −𝑎21 0







𝑛 + 𝑡1 + 𝑑1 + 𝑎31𝑝3
𝑚2
𝑝 + 𝑚2
𝑛 + 𝑡2 + 𝑑2 + 𝑎32𝑝3
𝑚3
𝑝 + 𝑚3
𝑛 + 𝑑3 − (1 − 𝑎33)𝑝3 
]  (A3) 
 
Let us assume that the domestic price of petroleum (𝑝3) increased by 10% (thus 
𝑝3 = 1.10) and the price of imported petroleum grew by 15% (implying that the costs of 
these imported inputs are multiplied by 1.15). Given the information available in Table 
A.1, (𝐈 − 𝐀′), (𝐈 − 𝐀′)−1and 𝐚 contain the following values 
 











(0.05 × 1.15) + 0.02 + 0.02 + 0.60 + (0.20 × 1.10)
(0.03 × 1.15) + 0.01 + 0.00 + 0.77 + (0.18 × 1.10)
(0.17 × 1.15) + 0.07 + 0.28    − (1 − 0.43) × 1.10
]      
  
















]      (A4) 
 
This numerical example shows that 10% and 15% increase in prices of domestic and 
imported petroleum products leads to the increase in prices of agricultural products 
by 3.1%, and of manufacturing products by 2.3%. The difference is largely due to the 
fact that inputs of petroleum per unit of agricultural output are higher than for 
manufacturing output. The tax per unit of output in the petroleum industry increase 
from 0.01 to 0.038. Just from a cost perspective, the rise in the price of domestic 
petroleum could have been much less than 10%. The gap between revenues and costs 
of the domestic petroleum sector goes in this example entirely to the government in 























This thesis deals with the income distribution over the major ethnic groups in 
Malaysia. The income inequality between the ethnic Malays, Chinese and Indians has 
received considerable attention in the past four decades, especially after the bloody 
ethnic riots in May 1969. These riots highlighted the inherent dangers of a multi-racial 
society when ethnic prejudices are exacerbated by income disparities. As a result, 
Malaysian economic policies changed after 1970. Policies that focused entirely on 
growth were replaced by policies aiming at growth combined with more income 
equality. 
 
 This thesis provides three perspectives on income inequality across ethnic 
groups in Malaysia. First, we look at long-run tendencies in the past. Did the process 
of economic transformation and structural change between 1970 and 2000 reduce 
inequality? The decomposition analysis applied in Chapter 3 to the 1970 SAM and the 
2000 SAM described in Chapter 2 provides an answer to this question. Second, we 
analyze—also in Chapter 2—which factors mainly accounted for income inequality 
across ethnic groups in 2000, the most recent year for which all required data were 
available. Finally, we are interested in examining the potential future impacts of 
economic policies on income inequality, taking the economic structure of 2000 as a 
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proxy for the current situation, because more recent data are lacking. The analyses in 
Chapters 4 and 5 quantify the likely distributional impacts of two important types of 
policy in Malaysia—growth and energy price policies.  
 
 The next three sections give a brief summary of the main results, organized in 
three themes: sources of income inequality, growth interdependencies, and energy 
price deregulation. The last section discusses the main limitations of the present 
study. 
 
6.2 Sources of Income Inequality 
 
An examination of different income types shows that factor incomes are unequally 
distributed over the ethnic groups. The results in Chapter 2 show that the differences 
in income per capita can largely be explained by the interplay of three factors: unequal 
income per hour worked, unequal numbers of working hours per week, and unequal 
numbers of household members that depend on a worker’s income. The unequal 
hourly wage rates appear to be mainly due to differences in industrial occupation of 
employees: a large fraction of the ethnic Malays work in low-wage industries (mostly in 
public services sectors), while the ethnic Chinese and Indians often work in high-wage 
industries (mostly in private sectors). Failing to recognize the dualistic nature of 
Malaysian labor markets might easily lead to the impression that all workers will 
benefit equally from economic growth, which could lead to misguided policies.  
 
 The analyses of structural changes in Chapter 3 further highlight the 
importance of labor market segmentation. The decomposition of income changes 
between 1970 and 2000 indicates that the expansion of exports and changes in the 
relative compensation of labor and capital were the dominant factors in explaining the 
increase in income inequality. The effects of these two determinants differ largely 
across ethnic groups, where the Chinese and Indians benefit the most. Malay workers 
generally remained employed in low-paid public services sectors, which did not 
experience the rapid export-led growth of many high-wage private sectors in which 
many non-Malay workers were employed. This labor segmentation emerged as a result 
of the policy reform in 1971. The New Economic Policy (1971-1990) strategy for 
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restructuring the society was implemented through an expansion of the public 
services sectors, in which priority was given to employing ethnic Malays. Mobility of 
employment between these segments (public and private sectors) of the labor market 
was so limited that wage differences could remain substantial over long periods of 
time. Furthermore, demand for employment in the private sector shifted from 
unskilled workers to skilled workers, because technological change allowed for gradual 
substitution of essentially labor-intensive traditional activities by essentially capital-
intensive modern activities. Technological change was much slower in the public 
sectors, as a consequence of which labor productivity of the mainly unskilled workers 
in these sectors remained low. Hence, wage rates of skilled workers grew faster than 
wage rates of unskilled workers, the category of workers in which the Malays were 
overrepresented.   
  
6.3 Growth Interdependencies 
 
The analyses in Chapter 4 specifically address two issues: (i) the role of growth in final 
demand (including exports) for poverty reduction; and (ii) the role of interdependencies 
between production sectors for poverty reduction. In relation to the first issue, we find 
that growth in the final demand for the output of any sector leads to poverty reduction 
and, thus, growth is “pro-poor”. For households in rural regions, any final demand 
growth induces the largest poverty reduction for the Malays and the smallest for the 
Indians, while the poverty reduction for Chinese takes the intermediate position. For 
urban households, poverty reduction is the smallest for the Indians whereas the 
largest reduction is found for the Malays or the Chinese, depending on the specific 
sector for which final demand is assumed to grow. 
 
 The degree of poverty reduction varies across sectors for which final demand 
grows. Increases in the final demand for government services appear to be more pro-
poor than increases of the same magnitude in the final demand for manufactured 
products. Governments in developing and transition countries often pursue policies 
that promote the manufacturing sector to achieve higher GDP growth, but this policy 
is apparently not necessarily very beneficial to the poor. We argue that the contrast 
between pro-poor and pro-growth policies is smaller if the growth-driven sectors have 
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strong backward linkages with pro-poor sectors, i.e. sectors for which output growth 
leads to substantial reductions in poverty rates. This is the second issue studied in 
Chapter 4. 
 
 The results indicate that sectors for which final demand growth leads to much 
poverty reduction tend to have few backward linkages. Growth in final demand for the 
government sector, for example, yields the largest poverty reduction, but the growth 
has very small spillover effects. Hence, growth of the government sector would benefit 
the employees of this sector itself the most, whereas income earners in other sectors 
would hardly enjoy positive effects. This is in contrast to the manufacturing sector, 
which has the largest spillover effects but for which poverty reduction in the sector 
itself is minor. Hence, stimulating the final demand of the manufacturing sector yields 
some, but overall limited, poverty reduction in other sectors. The results indicate that 
there is a conflict between the objectives of achieving a large poverty reduction and 
fostering high economic growth. In the absence of strong linkages among production 
sectors, the results suggest that the best way to increase the income of poor workers 
in a sector is to stimulate the sector itself, rather than other sectors. 
  
6.4 Energy Price Deregulation 
 
Recent oil price hikes have compelled the governments of developing countries to 
increase domestic prices of petroleum by means of eliminating energy subsidies, to 
keep public deficits within manageable limits. Policy-makers who focus on equity 
considerations usually warn against the unfavorable effects of the deregulation of 
petroleum prices on income distribution. This is because households with lower 
incomes generally spend above-average fractions of their budgets on energy. The last 
chapter of this thesis examines the potential impacts of a deregulation of the 
petroleum price on the income distribution over the major ethnic groups in Malaysia. 
We propose a SAM-based model that allows for substitution possibilities among inputs 
in production activities and among consumer products. The model is used to run a 
simulation, based on the SAM for 2000 and a realistic increase in the world price for 




 A higher petroleum price affects households through two channels. On the one 
hand, the nominal income increases for all households (which is because higher 
product prices induce higher wage rates in our model). On the other hand, a higher 
petroleum price also leads to an increase of the consumer price index. The magnitudes 
of both effects generally differ across household groups. The simulation results for the 
real incomes indicate that a rising petroleum price induces distributional changes, 
favoring the Chinese and Indians at the expense of the Malays. All household groups 
experience real income reductions, because all household group-specific consumer 
price indices rise faster than income, but to different degrees. The Malays experience 
larger real income losses because they spend a relatively larger share of their 
consumption on petroleum products. We also find that the increases in inequality 
across ethnic groups as a consequence of deregulation of petroleum prices would be 
larger in rural areas than in urban regions. These results suggest that a concern 
about income inequality across ethnic groups should lead to a policy in which 
reductions in energy subsidies are supplemented by other measures to alleviate the 




The analyses in this thesis provide new insights concerning policy-relevant questions 
about how income differentials across the ethnic groups in Malaysia changed over 
recent decades, what determinants were most important in accounting for the 
inequality as measured in the year 2000, and how this inequality would be affected by 
various types of growth policy and by deregulation of petroleum prices. However, 
several aspects that might influence income inequality have—admittedly—not been 
addressed and our data do not measure everything perfectly. In what follows, six 




 First, the role of informal sectors in explaining income inequality in developing 
countries has recently drawn considerable attention (Bhattacharya, 2011; Xue et al., 
2014). The present study is unable to address this issue because statistics for 
informal sectors in Malaysia are scarce.1 If we measure informal sector employment as 
those workers that are not covered by the national social security scheme, the size of 
the informal sector in Malaysia is large, amounting to 53.7% of the total workforce 
(Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2006). The share of informal workers in the total 
workforce for each ethnic group varies. It is 56% for Malays, 53% for Chinese, 38% for 
Indians and 70% for other minority groups. These numbers raise the question to what 
extent income levels in informal sectors differ from those in formal sectors. An answer 
to this question might help explain the overall income inequality across ethnic groups 
and would require separate data on incomes and employment in the informal and 
formal sectors. If, in addition, we also would like to analyze the effects of final demand 
changes on inequality, the data should also provide information on the links between 
formal and informal sectors. This would require the separation of informal and formal 
sectors in the input-output table, including information on household purchases from 
informal suppliers. The modeling approach adopted in this thesis does not yield any 
insights regarding the implications of economic policies on informal activities and their 
role in income inequality, because the SAMs used in this study only capture the flows 
of activities within and between formal sectors.  
 
 Second, the methodologies developed in this thesis are also unable to deal with 
dualistic aspects of economic structures other than the coexistence of formal and 
informal sectors discussed above. In the Malaysian case, dualities exist in many 
aspects of the economy, ranging from the labor market to the product markets. For 
the labor market, the analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 clearly showed that (increasing) 
income inequality has mainly resulted from the widening gap between wages paid in 
the tradable sectors (i.e. private sectors, which generally have high productivity levels) 
and the non-tradable sectors (i.e. public sectors, often characterized by low 
productivity levels), combined with ethnically segmented labor markets. For the 
                                          
1 In some countries information for formal and informal sectors can be obtained. For example, in India, 
statistics for formal and informal manufacturing sectors are available through the Annual Survey of 
Industries and the National Sample Survey (see Moreno-Monroy et al., 2012).  
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product markets, there is a huge difference between small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and large enterprises.2 Although the SMEs accounted for 97.3% of 
the total number of enterprises in 2010, they only generated 30.2% of GDP while 
employing 52.7% of all workers (see Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2012). We do 
not have data on employment by ethnic group in SMEs and large enterprises, but 
differences along this dimension across ethnic groups could easily translate into 
income inequality given the low GDP contribution per worker in SMEs. In a similar 
vein, it might be worthwhile to consider a distinction between economic activities in 
two “zones”: processing trade firms (located inside the free industrial zones) and non-
processing trade firms (located outside free industrial zones). The output of the 
processing trade firms grew at an average annual rate of 12% (in real terms) between 
2000 and 2005 compared to only 4% that of non-processing trade firms (see 
Department of Statistics, various years). If ethnic groups are not equally represented 
in the workforces in free industrial zones and outsides these zones, the results 
obtained for impacts of various sector-specific growth policies on inequality might be 
biased.   
 
 These examples illustrate the fact that the homogeneity assumption underlying 
most SAM-based models can lead to biases. If sectors serve different markets, but the 
production technologies adopted (which include the use of labor of various types) are 
not identical across destinations, serious misrepresentations of reality could occur. In 
particular, one might get a false impression that development in some sector will 
“trickle down” to benefit all equally. This argument is supported by the “distributional 
invariance” property of Pyatt and Round (2012). They showed that the higher-order 
multiplier effects (i.e. closed-loop effects) of an exogenous change in final demand are 
more or less proportional to the incomes of the household groups. However, they did 
not find this “distributional invariance” when dualistic structures were explicitly 
distinguished in the construction of a SAM. 
 
                                          
2 SMEs are enterprises with low sales figures and/or low numbers of employees. In the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector, an enterprise is an SME if its annual sales do not exceed Malaysian Ringgit (MR)25 
million or if the enterprise’s employment is less than 150 fulltime equivalents. In other sectors (including 
services), these thresholds amount to MR5 million and 50 full time equivalents, respectively. 
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 Third, the results in this thesis clearly show a widening income gap between rural 
and urban households. It would have been interesting to analyze the regional aspects 
of inequality across ethnic groups in more detail. Income inequality varies across 
states: the 2005 Gini coefficients range from 0.35 for the state of Kelantan to 0.48 for 
the state of Sabah (see Economic Planning Unit, various years).3 Although differences 
in Gini coefficients do not necessarily translate into differences in inequality across 
ethnic groups, it is important to look into the effects of growth policies on regional 
economic activity and income distributions. Such an analysis was beyond the scope of 
this thesis but can be done by using regional social accounting matrices (RSAMs). For 
the development of full RSAMs, economic activities should be attributed to states. A 
major challenge in constructing RSAMs for Malaysia is the absence of regional input-
output tables, which therefore need to be estimated first. After that, geographical 
information from household income surveys and household expenditure surveys can 
be used for the remaining accounts of the RSAMs. 
 
  Fourth, the present studies analyze the causes of income inequality “between” 
ethnic groups without paying specific attention to the inequality “within” ethnic 
groups. The main justification for our focus on the income inequality between ethnic 
groups is that this is what the Malaysian government has done. Specific policies on 
equity across ethnic groups were incorporated in all development policies since the 
introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1971-1990). Statistics show that 
inequalities within ethnic groups are not only sizeable, but also increasing for all 
groups. Within the group of Malays, income inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient increased from 0.34 in 1957 to 0.45 in 2005. It went up from 0.37 to 0.45 
for the group of Chinese and it grew from 0.35 to 0.43 for the group of Indians (see 
Economic Planning Unit, various years).4 Analyses of inequality within ethnic groups 
would require modeling extensions. For each ethnic group in the SAM, disaggregation 
of the households into sub-groups would be needed. This methodological extension 
would not only address the important issue of inequality within ethnic groups, but 
would at the same time alleviate aggregation biases (due to homogeneity 
                                          
3 The Gini coefficient can range from 0 (full equality) to 1 (extreme inequality). 
4 Figures for 1957 are only for west Malaysia (peninsular Malaysia).   
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assumptions—mentioned in the previous paragraph in the household sector). The data 
required for a more detailed SAM are not available, however.   
 
 Fifth, the empirical analyses in this thesis deal only with inequality in the 
distribution of income. The literature has long recognized that the distribution of 
assets, and in particular the distribution of land, may drive the degree of income 
inequality (Deininger and Squire, 1998). Analyses of land holdings have several 
advantages. First, ownership of land can be a major determinant of the productive 
capacity of individuals and their ability to invest. Second, the distribution of land is 
easily ascertained and thus suffers less from measurement errors. Third, its coverage 
is relatively stable, both across regions and over time. The distribution of land as a 
productive asset has important implications for allocative efficiency in the economy. In 
the Malaysian case, it is expected that the distribution of land is skewed towards the 
ethnic Malays in rural areas. This is because Malays have been protected by law under 
the so-called Malay Reservation Enactment and their land holding is therefore much 
larger than the land holding of other groups.5 However, it is not so much land holding 
per se that matters, rather whether the land is productive or not. Ownership of 
unproductive land and restricted access to credit markets (and thus a relatively low 
ability to finance productive activities) may explain why income from the agricultural 
activities of the Malays is lower than for other groups, despite the larger share of land 
holding. The approach suggested here—analysis of distribution of income and land—
allows us to evaluate the joint effects on inequality across ethnic groups. This is 
feasible given the fact that data on the size of land ownership for agricultural activities 
and income generated from land are collected at a regular basis by the Economic 
Planning Unit.  
 
 Finally, the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 investigate the relationship between 
demand-side policy analyses and income inequality. Another topic that has received 
considerable attention in the literature is the role of supply-side policy variables on 
                                          
5 The basic aim of the Malay Reservation Enactment was the perpetuation of the ownership of land under 
Malay settlement and cultivation in the hands of the Malays. This was to ensure that the Malays would 
own a share of land that is at least as large as the share of Malays in the total population, which was 




income inequality. Supply-side policy intervention is more effective than demand-side 
policies (see for example, Sylwester, 2002; Gońi et al., 2011), but it takes more time to 
become effective and requires strong political commitment. Examples that may have 
consequences for income inequality across ethnic groups include: supply-side policies 
regarding the immigration of unskilled workers from neighboring countries; tax 
reforms; and human capital investment. A large supply of unskilled foreign workers to 
the domestic labor market may lead to downward pressures on wage rates. Reforming 
income tax laws and broadening the tax base through the introduction of a value-
added tax (VAT) may increase the fiscal budget. The additional revenues from these 
reforms could be used for redistribution. Underinvestment in human capital for some 
ethnic groups and quality differences between public and private educational 
institutions may have significant implications on labor compensation, and hence on 
income inequality.  
 
 Studies on such supply-side policies would require the development of extended 
models, the empirical implementation of which is only possible with additional data. 
For the examples above, modeling international migration requires detailed data on 
inflows and outflows of workers, demographic structures, labor market structures, 
and incomes and expenditures of citizens and non-citizens. Detailed data on the 
current government programs for transfers (including subsidies) to various household 
groups would be needed for the analysis of redistribution effects from tax reforms. 
Extending the model to include human capital requires additional data on numbers of 
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Dit proefschrift behandelt de inkomensverdeling over de belangrijkste etnische 
groepen in Maleisië. Er is de afgelopen vier decennia veel aandacht besteed aan de 
inkomensongelijkheid tussen autochtone Maleisiërs, Chinese Maleisiërs en Indiase 
Maleisiërs, vooral na de bloedige etnische rellen van mei 1969. Deze rellen 
benadrukten de inherente gevaren van een multiraciale samenleving waarin etnische 
vooroordelen worden versterkt door inkomensongelijkheid. Als gevolg van de rellen 
veranderde het Maleisische economische beleid na 1970. Beleid dat vooral gericht was 
op groei werd vervangen door beleid dat gericht was op groei in combinatie met meer 
inkomensgelijkheid. 
  
 Dit proefschrift biedt drie invalshoeken op inkomensongelijkheid tussen etnische 
groepen in Maleisië. Eerst kijken we naar de ontwikkelingen uit het recente verleden. 
Is de ongelijkheid afgenomen als gevolg van het proces van economische transformatie 
en structurele veranderingen dat tussen 1970 en 2000 plaatsvond? Het antwoord op 
deze vraag wordt gegeven door middel van de decompositieanalyse die in hoofdstuk 3 
wordt toegepast op de Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) voor 1970 en de SAM voor 
2000, die uitgebreid wordt beschreven in hoofdstuk 2. Bovendien analyseren we (ook 
in hoofdstuk 2) welke factoren met name verantwoordelijk waren voor de 
inkomensongelijkheid tussen etnische groepen in 2000, het meest recente jaar 
waarvoor alle benodigde gegevens beschikbaar zijn. Na de analyse van de 
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ontwikkelingen uit het verleden, richten we onze blik op de potentiële invloeden van 
economisch beleid op inkomensongelijkheid in de toekomst, waarbij we de 
economische structuur van 2000 als representatief beschouwen voor de huidige 
situatie omdat recentere gegevens ontbreken. De analyses in de hoofdstukken 4 en 5 
kwantificeren de waarschijnlijke gevolgen voor inkomensverdeling van twee belangrijke 
soorten beleid in Maleisië: groeibeleid en energieprijzenbeleid.  
  
 De volgende drie paragrafen geven een korte samenvatting van de belangrijkste 
resultaten, geordend volgens drie thema’s: bronnen van inkomensongelijkheid, 
onderling afhankelijke groeifactoren en deregulering van energieprijzen. 
 
Bronnen van inkomensongelijkheid 
 
Ons onderzoek in hoofdstuk 2 naar verschillende inkomensniveaus geeft aan dat de 
factorinkomens ongelijk zijn verdeeld over de etnische groepen. De resultaten laten 
zien dat de verschillen in inkomen per hoofd van de bevolking grotendeels kunnen 
worden verklaard uit een samenspel van drie factoren: een ongelijk inkomen per 
gewerkt uur, een ongelijk aantal gewerkte uren per week en een ongelijk aantal leden 
van een huishouden dat afhankelijk is van het inkomen van de kostwinner. Het 
ongelijke uurloon lijkt vooral het gevolg te zijn van de verschillen in werkzaamheden: 
een groot deel van de autochtone Maleisiërs heeft een laagbetaalde baan (meestal in de 
publieke sector), terwijl de Chinese en Indiase Maleisiërs vaak goedbetaalde banen 
hebben (meestal in de private sector). Als deze dualistische aard van de Maleisische 
arbeidsmarkt niet wordt erkend, kan dit gemakkelijk leiden tot de indruk dat alle 
werknemers in dezelfde mate profiteren van economische groei, wat weer kan leiden 
tot ondoordacht beleid.  
 
 Ook de analyses van structurele veranderingen in hoofdstuk 3 benadrukken het 
belang van de segmentatie van de arbeidsmarkt. De decompositieanalyse van 
inkomensverschillen tussen 1970 en 2000 geeft aan dat de toenemende exporten en 
veranderingen in de relatieve vergoeding van arbeid en kapitaal de belangrijkste 
verklaring vormen voor de toegenomen inkomensongelijkheid. De effecten van deze 
twee beslissende factoren verschillen enorm tussen de etnische groepen, maar de 
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Chinese en Indiase Maleisiërs profiteren hier het meest van. Maleisische werknemers 
hebben over het algemeen nog steeds laagbetaalde banen in de publieke sector, waar 
de snelle export-gerelateerde groei niet dezelfde effecten heeft gehad als in de 
hoogbetaalde private sector, waar veel niet-Maleisische werknemers werken. Deze 
arbeidsmarktsegmentatie ontstond als gevolg van de beleidsherzieningen van 1971. De 
New Economic Policy-strategie (1971-1990), die tot doel had om de samenleving te 
herstructureren, werd geïmplementeerd door middel van een uitbreiding van de 
publieke sector, waarbij voorrang werd gegeven aan autochtone Maleisiërs. De 
mobiliteit tussen deze twee sectoren (publiek en privaat) van de arbeidsmarkt was zo 
beperkt dat de inkomensverschillen lange tijd groot bleven. Bovendien verschoof de 
vraag naar arbeid in de private sector van ongeschoolde werknemers naar geschoolde 
werknemers. Dit kwam doordat traditionele arbeidsintensieve werkzaamheden steeds 
meer werden vervangen door moderne kapitaalintensieve werkzaamheden, als gevolg 
van technologische ontwikkelingen. Deze ontwikkelingen waren in de publieke sector 
veel trager, waardoor de arbeidsproductiviteit van de voornamelijk ongeschoolde 
werknemers in deze sector nog steeds laag bleef. Hierdoor groeide het inkomen van 
geschoolde werknemers sneller dan dat van ongeschoolde werknemers, de categorie 
waarin autochtone Maleisiërs oververtegenwoordigd zijn. 
  
Onderling afhankelijke groeifactoren 
 
De analyses in hoofdstuk 4 gaan specifiek in op twee aspecten: (i) het effect van groei 
van de finale vraag (d.w.z. de vraag naar eindproducten plus de exporten) op 
armoedevermindering en (ii) het effect van onderlinge afhankelijkheden tussen 
productiesectoren op armoedevermindering. Voor wat betreft het eerste aspect is de 
conclusie dat groei van de finale vraag naar ieder eindproduct leidt tot 
armoedevermindering en dat groei dus ‘pro-armen’ is. Voor huishoudens in landelijke 
gebieden leidt elke groei in de finale vraag tot de grootste armoedevermindering onder 
autochtone Maleisiërs en de kleinste voor Indiase Maleisiërs, terwijl de 
armoedevermindering voor Chinese Maleisiërs hier tussenin ligt. Voor huishoudens in 
stedelijke gebieden is de armoedevermindering het kleinst voor Indiase Maleisiërs, 
terwijl deze het grootst is voor de autochtone Maleisiërs of de Chinese Maleisiërs, 
afhankelijk van het eindproduct waarvoor de groei in finale vraag plaatsvindt. 
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 De mate van armoedevermindering verschilt per eindproduct waarvoor de finale 
vraag toeneemt. Een toename in de finale vraag naar overheidsdiensten lijkt eerder 
‘pro-armen’ te zijn dan een vergelijkbare toename in de finale vraag naar 
‘manufacturing’ goederen. Overheden in ontwikkelings- en transitielanden voeren vaak 
beleid dat de productie stimuleert om het bruto binnenlands product (BBP) te 
verhogen, maar dit soort beleid is niet altijd voordelig voor de armen. Wij stellen dat 
het contrast tussen beleid dat gericht is op armoedevermindering en beleid dat gericht 
is BBP groei kleiner is als de sectoren die belangrijk zijn voor BBP groei sterk 
afhankelijk zijn van inputs geleverd door sectoren waarvoor geldt dat productiegroei 
leidt tot een substantiële vermindering van de armoede. Dit is het tweede aspect dat 
wordt onderzocht in hoofdstuk 4. 
 
 De resultaten laten zien dat sectoren waarvoor de groei van de finale vraag tot veel 
armoedevermindering leidt, meestal weinig afhangen van inputs geleverd door andere 
sectoren. Groei in de finale vraag naar overheidsdiensten leidt bijvoorbeeld tot de 
grootste armoedevermindering, maar deze groei heeft weinig effect op andere sectoren. 
Daarom zou groei in de overheidssector vooral positief zijn voor werknemers in deze 
sector, terwijl kostwinners in andere sectoren er nauwelijks profijt van zouden hebben. 
In de maakindustrie is het effect juist omgekeerd: deze sector heeft het grootste effect 
op andere sectoren, terwijl de armoedevermindering in de sector zelf minimaal is. Het 
stimuleren van de finale vraag in de maakindustrie leidt dus wel tot enige, maar 
uiteindelijk beperkte, armoedevermindering in andere sectoren. De resultaten laten 
zien dat de doelstellingen van het streven naar een grote armoedevermindering 
onverenigbaar zijn met het bevorderen van een grote economische groei. Zolang er 
geen sterke afhankelijkheden zijn tussen productiesectoren, duiden de resultaten erop 
dat het stimuleren van de sector zelf in plaats van andere sectoren de beste manier is 
om het inkomen van arme werknemers te verhogen. 
  
Deregulering van energieprijzen 
 
Als gevolg van recente verhogingen van de olieprijzen hebben regeringen van 
ontwikkelingslanden de binnenlandse prijzen van aardolie verhoogd door 
energiesubsidies af te schaffen, om zo de overheidstekorten binnen aanvaardbare 
209 
 
grenzen te houden. Beleidsmakers die gefocust zijn op gelijkheid waarschuwen 
meestal voor de ongunstige effecten van het dereguleren van olieprijzen op de 
inkomensverdeling. De reden hiervoor is dat huishoudens met lagere inkomens 
meestal een meer dan gemiddeld deel van hun budget besteden aan energie. In 
hoofdstuk 5 van dit proefschrift worden de potentiële gevolgen van deregulering van de 
olieprijzen op de inkomensverdeling over de belangrijkste etnische groepen in Maleisië 
onderzocht. Wij ontwikkelen een model dat is gebaseerd op een SAM en dat substitutie 
toestaat tussen de inputs in het productieproces en tussen de producten die 
consumenten kopen. Dit model wordt gebruikt voor een simulatie op basis van de 
SAM voor 2000 en een realistische verhoging van de wereldprijs voor ruwe olie.   
 
 Een hogere olieprijs heeft op twee manieren gevolgen voor huishoudens. Aan de 
ene kant neemt het nominale inkomen van alle huishoudens toe (omdat in ons model 
hogere productprijzen leiden tot hogere inkomsten uit arbeid). Aan de andere kant 
leidt een hogere olieprijs ook tot een hogere consumentenprijsindex. De omvang van 
deze effecten verschilt over het algemeen voor verschillende soorten huishoudens. De 
simulatieresultaten voor de reële inkomens laten zien dat een stijgende olieprijs leidt 
tot veranderingen in de inkomensverdeling waar vooral de Chinese en Indiase 
Maleisiërs van profiteren, ten koste van de autochtone Maleisiërs. Alle huishoudens 
ervaren een verlaging van het reële inkomen, omdat de groep-specifieke 
consumentenprijzen van alle huishoudens sneller stijgen dan het inkomen, maar in 
verschillende mate. De autochtone Maleisiërs ervaren een groter inkomensverlies 
omdat ze een relatief groter deel van hun inkomen aan olieproducten besteden. We 
vinden bovendien dat de toename in ongelijkheid tussen etnische groepen als gevolg 
van deregulering van de olieprijzen groter is in landelijke gebieden dan in stedelijke 
gebieden. Deze resultaten duiden erop dat zorgen over inkomensongelijkheid tussen 
etnische groepen moeten leiden tot beleid waarbij een verlaging van de energiesubsidie 
wordt aangevuld met andere maatregelen ter compensatie van de toenemende 
ongelijkheid die het gevolg is van deze verlaging.  
 
 
 
 
